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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a number of theoretical ideas about the emergence 
of the predominant party system in Turkey under the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) government from 2002 to 2015. A predominant party system emerges when a 
party wins at least three elections in a row by more than a 10 percent margin and forms 
the government alone. I argue that the expansion of clientelist networks under the AKP 
government has twofold ramifications, which in turn have reproduced the cycle of 
dominance. First, it strengthened voters’ partisan identification. Second, it changed 
voters’ ideology such that they became less resistant to or even supportive of neoliberal 
reforms. The conclusions are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most 
densely populated districts of Istanbul, Bağcılar. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION*1 
How did Turkey’s party system, long characterized by high fragmentation, volatility 
and polarization, turn into the predominant party system? Why has the urban poor, 
once the major constituency of social democrats, realigned with the neoliberal AKP? 
How does the everyday functioning of clientelism change in the urban setting? How 
does clientelism affect the partisan identification and ideological positioning of 
clients? This dissertation aims to address these questions based on ethnographic 
fieldwork in one of Istanbul’s poorest and most densely populated districts, Bağcılar.  
Coming to power in 2002, the AKP is now enjoying the longest period of one-
party government in modern Turkey. To date, the party has won all legislative 
elections by a wide margin. While the vote share of the AKP was around 34 percent 
in 2002, it reached 49 percent in 2011 and the November 2015 snap elections. The 
AKP has performed similarly in the local elections as well and typically has dominated 
Central and Eastern Anatolia, the Black Sea and metropolitan areas, including Istanbul 
and Ankara.  
 The AKP’s electoral success has drawn huge scholarly interest. The dominance 
has widely been discussed within the framework of the Islamization (for example, 
Eligür, 2010; Hale & Özbudun, 2009; Tuğal, 2009; Yeşilada & Rubin, 2011) and 
neoliberal transformation debates (for example, Bozkurt, 2013; Atasoy, 2009; 
Gümüşçü, 2010; Öniş & Şenses, 2009). This electoral dominance has not been widely 
addressed within the framework of the dominant party literature, however. There are 
a few superficial exceptions (cf. Ayan-Musil, 2015; Çarkoğlu, 2011; Müftüler-Baç & 
Keyman, 2012), but they do not advance a theory of dominant party politics either. 
This study aims to fill this gap.  
In this study, I first clarify the widely used, but weakly operationalized concept 
of “predominant party system.” An overview of the literature suggests that authors 
have used a variety of labels to refer to the same phenomenon or the same set of cases 
                                               
1 *Some sections of this thesis are (for example, conceptual, theoretical, empirical and 
comparative sections) part of manuscripts currently under revision in scholarly journals. 
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without sufficient logical consistency. The labels include: predominant party system 
(Sartori, 2005); dominant party system (Dunleavy, 2010; Greene, 2007; Templeman, 
2012); dominant-power politics (Carothers, 2002); single-party dominance (Pempel, 
1990); one-party dominant state (Scheiner, 2006); hegemonic party autocracy 
(Magaloni, 2006); and dominant party regime (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Reuter & 
Remington, 2009).  
This diversity of labels illustrates the notion of “conceptual stretching” 
(Sartori, 1970). To avoid that, I revisit the concept of predominant party system as 
presented in Sartori’s seminal book, Parties and party systems: A framework for 
analysis (1976[2005]).  
Because the confusion that plagues the concept of predominant party system 
largely stems from overlooking overlaps with associated concepts, I adopt a threefold 
strategy. First, I distinguish between the “dominant party” and the ‘predominant party 
system’. Drawing on Sartori’s framework, I argue that a dominant party system 
emerges “if a party wins at least three consecutive elections in a competitive political 
environment by more than a ten per cent margin and forms the government alone.” I 
believe that this definition has distinct analytical utility, because it disqualifies, for 
instance, the Social Democratic Party (SAP) in Sweden and the Christian Democracy 
(DC) party in Italy, which were dominant parties, but were unable to transform the 
party system into a predominant party system, because they could not form a 
government alone.  
In a second step, I seek to distinguish between predominant party system and 
the neighboring concept of “hegemonic party system.” The distinction is between a 
party system that would (predominant party system) and one that would not 
(hegemonic party system) allow the existence of antagonist parties, as well as the 
alternation of power. 
Finally, I connect the predominant party system to the political regime type. I 
contend that a predominant party system emerges only in a regime that permits a 
certain level of competition and allows government alternation. In most cases, 
predominant party systems allow “meaningful,” but “unfair” elections. While the 
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former deters a search for alternative channels of political struggle, such as boycotts 
and violent protests challenging the ruling party, the latter marks the existence of 
elements, including clientelism, that level the political field in favor of the ruling party 
(Greene, 2007).  
After defining the concept of “predominant party system,” the next task is to 
highlight the theories that account for its emergence and maintenance. I show that, 
although several theoretical frameworks (for example, institutional theory, social 
cleavage theory, and performance legitimacy theory) are relevant in explaining 
dominant party politics, resource theory has more explanatory power when it comes 
to understanding the AKP’s grip on power. 
Developed by Greene (2007) in his insightful book on the PRI in Mexico, 
resource theory posits that the predominant party system will sustain itself if the 
incumbent commands public resources (for example, secret line items and patronage 
jobs) and politicizes the bureaucracy. The cycle of dominance is likely to break down 
only if there is a severe economic downturn that shrinks public resources and curbs 
the room to maneuver of the public institutions.  
I suggest a minor revision to resource theory, however. I contend that the 
privatization of public institutions does not necessarily undermine dominant party rule. 
On the contrary, privatization may foster dominance. The AKP case shows that the 
cronies who are nurtured through privatizations may well compensate for shrinking 
public resources during times of economic turmoil (such as the 2008 financial crisis).  
The central concept of resource theory is clientelism. As Kitschelt & Wilkinson 
(2007, p. 2) suggest, clientelism is a “transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen’s 
vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and 
services.” Here, I should emphasize that direct payment is not common in Turkey. 
Although clientelism is a historically-rooted phenomenon in Turkey and has 
played a major role in mobilizing the voters at the polls, it has not been studied 
sufficiently. As far as I can see, the existing scholarship has severe drawbacks. First, 
existing studies are mostly descriptive and repetitive; that is, they merely postulate 
how clientelism spread to urban areas in a historical context. Although recent additions 
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based on a quantitative approach (for example, Aytaç, 2014), list experiments (for 
example, Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2015), or formal modelling (for example, Kemahlıoğlu, 
2005) have considerably enhanced our understanding of clientelism, they do not shed 
light on its mechanics and structure. Second, the interplay of clientelism, 
neoliberalism, and Islam has remained virtually untouched. Finally and more 
importantly, with a few notable exceptions (for example, Kemahlıoğlu, 2005), the 
literature lacks comparative findings that would situate the AKP experience in a cross-
national perspective, highlighting its peculiarities and similarities with other cases.  
In order to improve our understanding of clientelism, this study first focuses 
on the prevailing features of clientelism in Turkey. To start with, clientelism primarily 
targets the urban poor and the devout bourgeoisie. While the latter replaced the 
nationalist-secular bourgeoisie as patrons, the former have been added to village 
dwellers as clients. Second, clientelism is leader- rather than broker-mediated. This 
expresses the absence of strong brokers who command their own resources, thereby, 
enjoying autonomy from the party. I observe that clientelist exchange is guaranteed by 
the charismatic leader, whose image is constructed and propagated by the partisan 
media. Third, there is a division of labor among the patrons that take part in clientelist 
exchange. To illustrate, while the Ministry of Family and Social Policies explicitly 
targets the disabled and the elderly, the municipalities predominantly target the poor. 
Fourth, in stark contrast to other Islamic countries in which the Islamic-rooted parties 
could not adapt themselves to neoliberal programs (for example, Egypt and Tunisia), 
clientelism has been nurtured in line with the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. 
Fifth, clientelism is a problem-solving strategy for distinct classes (Auyero, 2001). To 
illustrate, while clientelism secures food for the poor, it is an instrument for doing 
business for construction companies. Sixth, Islam constitutes a non-material aspect of 
clientelism in Turkey; that is to say, Islam is the cement that assembles different 
classes under the clientelist machine. Similarly, it deters exit from the clientelist 
network. Finally, clientelism hinges on sectarian rather than ethnic exclusion. This 
implies that, while the clientelist network includes the overwhelming majority of 
Kurds, because they predominantly vote for the AKP – at least in the case of the urban 
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poor – it excludes Alevites because of their historical alliance with the social 
democrats. 
Having highlighted the features of clientelism in Turkey, this study reveals the 
mechanism that connects clientelism to voters. In doing so, I question the widely 
recognized “clientelism automatically brings votes” argument, on at least two 
grounds. First, after receiving clientelist benefits, voters may easily vote for another 
party because voting is secret (Szwarcberg, 2015). Second and more importantly, if 
clientelism automatically brings votes, then the predominant party system would have 
emerged long before the advent of the AKP, given that clientelism is a strong feature 
of Turkish politics.  
What then is the mechanism that keeps clients as loyal supporters of the 
incumbent AKP? I put forward the following hypothesis. Taking part in clientelist 
exchange boosts partisan identification and fosters the neoliberalization of Islamic 
ideology, which then reproduces the cycle of dominance.  
To be more specific, clientelism strengthens partisan identification, which has 
historically been very weak in Turkey. I observe that strong partisan identification has 
three ramifications. First, it leads to the reading of political issues through the eyes of 
the party leadership. This explains why partisan polarization increasingly dominates 
religious and ethnic polarization. Second, it leads to the proliferation of “hostile 
partisanship.” And third, it leads to the rise of partisan identification as a superior 
identity over traditionally dominant identities (for example, religious community 
identity).  
In addition, clientelism prompts ideological change, namely neoliberalization 
of Islamic ideology. This apparently entails more complex processes and has drawn 
great scholarly interest (cf. Tuğal, 2009), although not in the context of clientelism. 
This transformation is crucial to understanding how Islam and neoliberalism, which 
have been widely imagined to be incompatible, are intermingled and harmonized. In 
the same vein, such a transformation is crucial to explaining why poor people have not 
only not resisted, but in fact have wholeheartedly embraced the neoliberal reforms that 
have undermined their material well-being. Third, this accounts for why Islamist 
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voters who tended to vote for more conservative parties or who long boycotted the 
elections aligned/re-aligned with the AKP. 
 
1.1. Comparative cases 
The established literature on clientelism has suffered extensively from 
“parochialism” (Sartori, 1991) arising from excessive reliance on single-case studies 
(Piattoni, 2001). In order to avoid that, this paper includes a comparative chapter. 
Relying on the secondary literature and the reports of both public and private 
institutions that compile regular data on similar cases in Mexico, Taiwan, India, and 
Japan, I investigate the role of clientelism in the emergence and maintenance of the 
predominant party system. I find that if brokers are strong and vote buying is prevalent, 
it is likely that partisan identification will not become stronger over time and 
ideological change (if prompted by the dominant party) will remain weak.  
 
1.2. Method and fieldwork  
To date, scholars have used a wide range of methods (for example, quantitative 
approaches, formal modelling, surveys, and ethnography) to understand and measure 
clientelism. Each method has its own drawbacks. For instance, because clientelism is 
informal, unwritten, and personal, using proxies (quantitatively) and surveys would 
potentially provide biased and unreliable information (Muno, 2010).  
 This study explicitly rests on an ethnographic approach. In comparison with 
alternative methods, ethnography is a good way to observe clientelist exchange in daily 
life and build a bottom-up theory from it. Within the ethnographic approach, my 
method is participant observation, which requires ethnographers to participate in 
relevant activities with the subjects and observe their behavior.  
 In this framework, I conducted field research in Istanbul’s peripheral district of 
Bağcılar. The selection of Bağcılar was based on the following rationale. First, the 
AKP wins the highest number of votes in the districts of Istanbul, averaging more than 
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50 percent since 2002. Second, Bağcılar is the stronghold of Islamic groups, which 
makes it a good laboratory in which to observe their changing voting behavior.  
The fieldwork was carried out between November 2017 and April 2018. Based 
on the “Interview Guide,” presented in Appendix I, I conducted 60 interviews with 
partisans, municipality and party workers, and the mukhtar (see Appendix II for the 
detailed information about the interviewees). The interviews took place in different 
places, including the party and municipality buildings and cafés.  
Conducting research in Bağcılar unavoidably had some difficulties. First and 
foremost, it involved security risks because of Bağcılar’s high crime rate. Second, 
mounting partisan polarization and the state of emergency, which was in force during 
the fieldwork, made it difficult for my target group to express their views comfortably. 
Therefore, after conducting a number of individual interviews, I shifted to “group 
interviews.” The logic was that if partisans saw others who vote for the same party, 
they would feel more secure and comfortable. The change in strategy worked well. In 
addition, in order not to discourage partisans, I did not record the interviews. Neither 
did I ask for detailed personal information that could identify the interviewees or make 
them feel uncomfortable.  
I must also note that the fieldwork was special for me. This is because I grew 
up in Bağcılar. This facilitated my task in the following ways. First, being familiar 
with the field meant that I was familiar with the people whom I needed to talk to and 
observe. This acquaintance substantially reduced the time needed to find key 
informants and interviewees. Second and even more importantly, the fact that an 
“insider” was doing the research allowed me to capture long-term phenomena, such as 
the changing ideology of the voters.  
 
1.3. Contributions and output 
 This study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it 
contributes to the literature on political parties by using a new three-pillar strategy to 
tackle the pervasive conceptual confusion relating to a predominant party system. 
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Second, this study will be the first of its kind to analyze the emergence of the dominant 
party system in Turkey in a cross-national perspective. Third, this study differs from 
the existing works with its empirical foci. While recent studies have explored the 
interaction of clientelism with “ethnicity” (for example, Akdağ, 2014) or investigates 
instances of “patronage” (for example, Kemahlıoğlu, 2012), “public procurement law” 
(for example, Gürakar, 2016) or “Conditional Cash Transfer” (for example, Aytaç, 
2014), this study seeks to examine the interplay between clientelism, Islam, and 
neoliberalism. Fourth, this study is unique in terms of its ethnographic approach. An 
overview of the literature suggests that there is hardly any ethnographic work on the 
functioning of clientelism in Turkey. Last but not least, the timing and space of the 
fieldwork must be highlighted. Above all, the fieldwork was carried out in the 
aftermath of the July 2016 failed coup attempt (November 2017 to April 2018), when 
the authoritarian character of the AKP government was very tangible. Regarding the 
space of the fieldwork, because most people living in Istanbul have never been in 
Bağcılar because of its peripheral location and notoriety, it was stimulating to do 
research there.  
 
1.4. Plan  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides an introduction. Chapter 
2 clarifies the concept of “predominant party system.” Chapter 3 evaluates different 
theoretical perspectives to try to explain the emergence of the predominant party 
system and to justify the supremacy of resource theory over alternatives. Chapter 4 
traces party system change in Turkey. Chapter 5 examines the AKP government with 
reference to its Islamic and neoliberal character, the amalgam of which makes 
clientelism work smoothly. It also briefly highlights the electoral performance of the 
AKP. Chapter 6 presents the empirical findings, drawing on fieldwork in Bağcılar. 
Chapter 7 extends the argument to the cases of Japan, India, Mexico, and Taiwan. 
Chapter 8 concludes.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK* 
This chapter revisits the concept of predominant party system, drawing on Sartori’s 
framework. Scholars have used a plethora of labels to refer to the same phenomenon 
or the same set of cases: “predominant party system” (Sartori, 2005); “dominant party 
system” (Dunleavy, 2010; Greene, 2007; Templeman, 2012); “dominant-power 
politics” (Carothers, 2002); “single-party dominance” (Pempel, 1990); “one-party 
dominant state” (Scheiner, 2006); “hegemonic party autocracy” (Magaloni, 2006); and 
“dominant party regime” (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Reuter & Remington, 2009). 
Even if it is true that party systems are closely linked to regime or polity types, the 
arbitrary use of the concept inevitably leads to conceptual stretching. 
In order to achieve conceptual clarity in this framework, I adopt a threefold 
strategy. First, I distinguish between the dominant party and the predominant party 
system and unequivocally concentrate on the latter. The logic behind this strategy is 
straightforward: A dominant party by itself does not make the party system a 
predominant one (Sartori, 2005). Prominent examples include the Christian 
Democracy (DC)-led coalition governments in post-war Italy and the Social 
Democratic Party (SAP)-led coalition governments in Sweden. As a second step, I 
distinguish between predominant party systems, which belong to competitive politics, 
and hegemonic party systems, which do not. Finally, I briefly relate predominant party 
systems to regime types and conclude that they are observed only in hybrid and 
democratic regimes. 
 
2.1. The party and the party systems 
In order to account for any type of “party system,” one should start from 
defining a “party.”2 An overview of the literature suggests that the political party 
                                               
2 As Sartori (2005, p. 57) argues, it seems inadvisable to analyze the party systems “unless we 
establish what is not a party, and unless we are clearheaded about the essential what for of 
parties.”  
.  
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literature is quite old: Ostrogorski (1902); Michels (1911); Schattschneider (1942); 
Key, (1949); Duverger (1954); La Palombara & Weiner (1966); Lipset & Rokkan 
(1967); Sartori ([2005]1976); Aldrich (1995); Ware (1996); and Katz & Crotty 
(2006).3 As widely argued (cf. Schattschneider, 1942; Ware, 1996; Penning & Lane, 
2005; Katz & Crotty, 2006), political parties are central to the political systems. 
Although there has been growing skepticism about the validity of this argument in 
recent years (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010; Diamond & Gunther, 2001, p. ix), it is evident 
that in all modern polities – except the few partyless (for example, dynasties in the 
Gulf region) and anti-party polities (for example, military regimes) – political parties 
are the major institutions driving the political process. 
  Parties perform numerous functions: they aggregate interests; identify goals 
(ideology and program); recruit elites; form and sustain the government; integrate 
(participation, socialization, mobilization), persuade, and deliberate (Von Beyme, 
1985, p. 13; Bardi & Mair, 2008, p. 117; Key, 1964: 43; Sartori, 2005: 25; Diamond 
& Gunther, 2001, n.p. ; Macridis, 1967, p. 17; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 91). In order 
to carry out these broad tasks, parties have developed complex 
institutional/organizational structures, such as mass parties4 after World War Two or 
catch-all parties5 since the early 1970s.  
The rule of thumb is that wherever they are institutionalized, political parties 
do not function on their own; rather, they influence and are influenced by the 
environment in which they operate. This is where parties are connected to party 
systems.  
                                               
3 Despite the volume of scholarship, the disagreement on how to define, categorize, and 
conceptualize political parties has persisted (Maisel & Cooper, 1978, p. 10). 
4 The mass party was based on workers’ mass membership. The members equally finance the 
party through contributions. It has a well-disciplined and strong leadership (Duverger, 1954). 
5 The rise of “catch-all parties” (Kirscheimer, 1966) or “professional electoral parties” 
(Panebianco, 1988) coincided with the decline of ideology, party membership and class 
politics and the increasing salience of the party leadership and the interest groups in shaping 
politics (Kirscheimer, 1990, p. 59; Pizzorno, 1990, p. 61).  
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In comparison with political parties, party systems are less studied because of 
their complexity (Bardi & Mair, 2008, p. 147; Kitschelt, 2007, p. 522). As Kitschelt 
(2007, p. 523) argues, party systems define the numbers of players, as well as the 
distribution of resources and capabilities among the parties. On the concept of the party 
system, Sartori (2005, p. 57) notes that:  
 
yet, and at a minimum, the concept of system is meaningless – for 
purposes of scientific inquiry – unless (i) the system displays properties 
that do not belong to a separate consideration of its component elements 
and (ii) the system results from, and consists of, the patterned 
interactions of its component parts, thereby implying that such 
interactions provide the boundaries, or at least the boundedness, of the 
system … parties make for a ‘system’, then, only when they are parts 
(in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions 
resulting from inter-party competition. 
 
Without understanding the party as a unit, then, party-system analysis will be 
incomplete and vice versa. Furthermore, the system cannot be reduced to its parts: a 
party must be a “part of a whole” rather than a “part against whole” (Sartori, 2005, p. 
22). The part‒whole framework has broader implications in understanding the 
functioning of the party system: if the parts overwhelm the whole, the result is 
factionalism; if the whole overwhelms the parts, the result is monopoly or unipartism 
(Sartori, 2005, p. 58).6 The predominant party systems are typical examples of the 
latter instance.  
Within this framework, this study focuses on the analysis of the party system 
rather than the party because clientelism leads to power asymmetry among political 
parties. In other words, while maximizing the votes of the incumbent, clientelism 
                                               
6 In this sense, it is possible to argue that one-party polities have no party system because the 
ruling party represents the whole (Sartori, 2005). 
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diminishes the opposition and hinders them from being a credible alternative to the 
ruling party.  
 In order to account for diverging party systems, scholars have developed 
distinct typologies.7 The most popular party typologies are those of Duverger (1954), 
Dahl (1966), Blondel (1968), Rokkan (1970), and Sartori (1976)[2005], which are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Contrary to Mair (1997, p. 199), who suggested that “the classification and 
typologies of party systems is by now a long-established art,” the recent changes in 
the political landscape – the rise of extreme right-wing and radical left-wing parties in 
Western Europe – make it essential to revisit the long-established party system 
typologies. However, since the publication of Sartori’s book on parties and party 
systems in 1976 [2005], no serious effort has been made to enhance our understanding 
of party systems (Ware, 1996).8 Therefore, the confusion about the classification of 
party systems has persisted (Kitschelt, 2007, p. 522). 
                                               
7 In analyzing the party systems, the first and most widely used approach is centered on the 
number of parties (Mair, 1998, p. 200). The numerical approach is relevant in showing the 
extent of political power fragmentation and concentration; the number of possible interaction 
streams and the tactics of party competition and opposition (Sartori, 2005, p. 106). The 
resulting types under the numerical criterion are one-party system, two-party system, and 
multi-party system. Another popular approach again centers its analysis on the numerical 
criterion, but this time to show the distribution of power among political parties. The resulting 
typologies are unipolar, bipolar, and multi-polar structures. The third approach highlights the 
type of polity, thereby classifying party systems into competitive and non-competitive ones 
(Maisel & Cooper, 1978, p. 12). Similarly, some approaches combine a variety of the 
approaches mentioned above. The resulting types include authoritarian versus democratic; 
issue-oriented versus clientele-oriented; national versus regional; religious versus secular; and 
democratic versus revolutionary party systems (Macridis, 1967, p. 20). The hybrid typologies 
have two main problems. First, some define the nature of the political regime (authoritarian 
versus democratic) rather than the party system. Second, some are far from being 
comprehensive, namely the issue-oriented versus clientele-oriented and the religious versus 
secular party systems.  
8 The party system typologies are rarely developed today because they are parsimonious and 
“invariably obscure certain differences” (Wolinetz, 2004, p. 9). Likewise, existing typologies 
have an inherent problem: they reflect the country-specific bias of the researchers who 
developed them, such as Duverger of France, Rokkan of Norway, Sartori of Italy and Lijphart 
of Holland (Daalder, 1983, p. 8). The fact that the party system typologies are largely based 
on the European context also causes validity problems (Gunther & Diamond, 2003, p. 168). 
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Among the wide-ranging typologies, the most comprehensive is the one 
developed by Sartori (Mair, 1997; Wolinetz, 2004). According to Sartori (2005, p. 
105), “almost every writer comes up with his own scheme” and thus “confusion and 
profusion of terms seems to be the rule.” This is because there is no counting rules. 
Therefore, Sartori introduces “irrelevance criteria,” which discounts parties that have 
neither “coalition” nor “blackmail potential.” To put it simply, a party has coalition 
potential if other parties consider it as a feasible coalition partner. On the other hand, 
a party has blackmail potential if it intimidates the ruling parties even if it is in 
opposition (Sartori, 2005, pp. 107‒110).  
In addition to the number of parties, Sartori takes into account the spatial 
distance between the parties in developing his typology. This refers to the attitudinal 
position of the parties toward each other and vis-à-vis the regime. Here, the key 
concept is “anti-systemic party.” Typically, anti-system parties, such as the Italian 
Communist Party or the Alternative for Germany, have the potential to weaken the 
legitimacy of the political regime through veto power. Moreover, these parties are 
capable of influencing the dynamics of the party system in a “centrifugal” fashion 
(Sartori, 2005, pp. 108‒109).  
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Table 1: Types of party system 
Author Principal criteria for classification Principal types of party system 
identified 
Duverger  • Number of parties • Two-party systems 
• Multiparty systems 
Dahl  • Competitiveness of 
opposition 
• Strictly competitive 
• Co-operative/competitive 
• Coalescent/competitive 
• Strictly coalescent 
Blondel  • Numbers of parties 
• Relative size of parties 
• Two-party systems 
• Two-and-a-half-party systems 
• Multiparty systems with one 
dominant party 
• Multiparty systems without a 
dominant party 
Rokkan  • Number of parties 
• Likelihood of single-party 
majority  
• Distribution of minority 
party strengths 
• The British/German “1 vs. 1+1” 
system 
• The Scandinavian “1 vs. 3-4” 
system 
• Even multiparty systems: “1 vs. 1 
vs. 1+ 2-3” 
Sartori  
 
• Number of parties 
• Ideological distance 
• Two-party systems 
• Moderate pluralism  
• Polarized pluralism 
• Predominant-party systems 
Source: Mair (1997, p. 2).
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Given the number of parties and their ideological distance, Sartori develops a 
nine-fold typology, some of which will be highlighted in more detail below. Despite 
its analytical strength, Sartori’s typology has been contested on several grounds. These 
include the overcrowding of the systems of “moderate pluralism,” the absence of a real 
“two-party system,” and the exhaustion of systems of “polarized pluralism” (Mair, 
1997, pp. 204‒205). Von Beyme (1985, pp. 1‒2) adds that Sartori overlooks social 
and structural considerations that actually shape the party system. Another critique 
posits that Sartori’s emphasis is on the nuances of the party system rather than its 
properties (Bardi & Mair, 2008, p. 150).  
Against this backdrop of criticisms, I adopt Sartori’s typology because it is the 
most innovative and the most advanced: it encompasses the degree of consolidation of 
the party system, the mode of power alternation, the quality of opposition, and the 
general dynamics of the party system (centripetal versus centrifugal) within a time- and 
context-sensitive framework (Bogaards, 2004, p. 193). In a similar vein, Sartori’s 
typology performs better than alternative typologies in that it highlights the 
interactions between parties and thereby denotes the functioning of the party system 
(Mair, 1997, p. 204). 
 
2.2. The dominant party and the predominant party system 
Dominant party politics have attracted great scholarly interest. Since the 
seminal work of Duverger (1954), numerous authors have contributed to the literature 
(for example, Arian & Barnes, 1974; Blondel, 1968; Bogaards, 2004; Bogaards & 
Boucek, 2010; Dunleavy, 2010; Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006; Pempel, 1990; Van 
de Walle & Butler, 1999; Scheiner, 2006; Templeman, 2012) in a variety of times and 
contexts.9 No consensus has yet been reached about the definition and 
operationalization of the concept, however (Bogaards, 2004). 
                                               
9 For instance, the studies of Coleman (1960) and Van de Walle & Butler (1999) examine 
dominant parties in a Sub-Saharan African setting, while those of Pempel (1990) and Ware 
(1996) focus on established democracies. 
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Analyzing the dominant parties in Scandinavia and the Third Republic in 
France, Duverger (1954, pp. 308–309), for instance, posits that:  
 
a party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its 
doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of 
the epoch … a dominant party is that which public opinion believes to 
be dominant ... Even the enemies of the dominant party, even citizens 
who refuse to give it their vote, acknowledge its superior status and its 
influence; they deplore it but they admit it. 
 
Duverger’s definition is normative because he takes influence rather than 
strength as operationalizing dominance. Alan Ware (1996) adopts a similar approach, 
drawing attention to the opposition parties that are “without hope of being in 
government” in the dominant party system.  
By contrast, the numerical approach takes two variables into account: length of 
time in office (longitudinal criteria) and size of vote/seat share. Regarding the former, 
virtually all scholars agree that dominance is established over time. As Table 2 shows, 
however, the settled threshold varies considerably: a single re-election (van de Walle 
& Butler, 1999); three elections (Sartori, 2005); 20 years, four consecutive elections 
or one generation (Blondel, 1968; Greene, 2007); or 30‒50 years (Cox, 1997). The 
longitudinal approach suffers from one serious drawback: If one increases the 
threshold to 50 years, only Mexico remains on the list; if one reduces it to a single re-
election, the set of cases become so large that the result would involve “conceptual 
stretching” (Greene, 2007, pp. 15‒16).10 
                                               
10 For Patrick Dunleavy (2010), the longitudinal approach is tautological, as it involves an 
attempt to measure dominance with the mechanism that sustains it. 
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                   Table 2: Definitions of dominant parties 
 Source: Adopted from Bogaards (2004, p. 176).
Author(s) Coleman Van de Walle & 
Butler 
Ware 
predominant 
Sartori 
(pre)dominant 
Ware 
dominant 
Blondel Pempel 
Threshold of 
dominance 
70% of the 
seats 
60% of the seats 50% of the 
seats 
50% of the seats 45–50% of 
the seats  
40–50% of 
the votes 
Double the 
second 
party 
Plurality of 
votes and 
seats 
Opposition Dispersed – Divided – Several 
smaller 
parties 
Multiple 
opposition 
helpful 
Inferior 
bargaining 
position 
President – – – No divided 
government 
– – – 
Duration Analysis 
limited to 
single 
election 
Analysis limited 
to single election 
Permanent Three 
consecutive 
elections 
Dominant 
party 
should win 
“usually” 
Analysis 
over 20 
years  
Substantial 
period 
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In addition, regarding the size of the vote and seat shares, while for Sartori 
(2005) and Ware (1996) dominant parties need an absolute majority in the parliament, 
Duverger (1954) and Pempel (1990a) opt for a plurality of votes and seat shares. 
Similarly, while Coleman (1960) and Van de Walle & Butler (1999) take a 
supermajority in the context of Africa, MacDonald (1971) sets the bar at 60 percent of 
the seats in the context of Latin America. More recently, Greene (2010, p. 4) contends 
that the dominant party in the parliamentary system11 must hold the premiership in 
addition to at least a plurality of the seats. Such divergence hinges mainly on 
country/regional-specific bias. To illustrate, in the party systems that award the first 
party a comfortable majority, the threshold is higher (for example, Africa), while in 
political systems that experience tight electoral races, the threshold is lower (for 
example, Europe).  
Relying on Sartori’s framework, I here define a dominant party in terms of its 
role in forming the government, its strength vis-à-vis the second party, and its duration 
in power. A dominant party, then, is “one that wins at least three consecutive elections 
in a competitive political environment with a significant margin and plays a major role 
in government formation.” This definition encompasses the SAP in Sweden and the 
DC in Italy, which were the main partners in coalition governments, as well as the 
AKP in Turkey and the INC in India, which formed the government alone. 
As far as I can see, predominant party systems have the following properties. 
First of all, predominant party systems unquestionably belong in a context of party 
pluralism. This feature distinguishes them from single-party systems, which lack party 
pluralism.  
Second, the opposition must consist of true antagonist parties. This marks the 
existence of independent parties, which are legal and legitimate, albeit not necessarily 
efficient actors challenging the incumbent (Sartori, 2005, p. 173; Magaloni, 2006, p. 
                                               
11 According to Greene (2010, p. 4), to be a dominant party in a presidential system the 
incumbent must control the executive and an absolute majority of the seats. 
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1; Ware, 1996, p. 159). This distinguishes them from hegemonic party systems, which 
have satellite parties. 
Third, alternation in power must be possible. Given that only one in six 
elections led to partisan alternation until recently (Przeworski, 2010, p. 46), this 
criterion is crucial to distinguish between the predominant party system, on one hand, 
and the single-party and hegemonic party systems, on the other.  
Fourth, the dominant party must win at least three consecutive elections. 
Exceptions to this rule include cases in which the dominant party temporarily loses 
power but regains it in snap elections (for example, the November 2015 snap elections 
in Turkey).  
Finally, the dominant party must form the government alone (Sartori, 2005, p. 
175; Ware, 1996, p. 159). While this criterion requires the holding of an absolute 
majority in some settings, it requires only a simple majority in others. Recall that this 
criterion draws a line between the dominant party and the predominant party system. 
For instance, it disqualifies the Mapai Party in Israel that joined the government as the 
largest coalition partner and the SAP in Sweden, which formed minority governments 
(Sartori, 2005, p. 175).  
Meeting these five criteria, the set of cases with predominant party systems 
includes, but is not limited to Mexico, Taiwan, India, Japan, and Turkey.  
 
2.3. Predominant party systems versus hegemonic party systems 
Predominant party systems are widely confused with “hegemonic party systems.”12 
This stems mainly from the changing character of party systems – for example, from 
a hegemonic party system to a predominant party system or vice versa, as happened in 
Taiwan and Mexico.  
                                               
12 The concept of the “hegemonic party” was coined by Wiatr (1970) in his analysis of the 
party system in Poland. Sartori borrowed the term and came up with the type of “hegemonic 
party system.” 
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  Broadly speaking, hegemonic party systems are different from predominant 
party systems in at least three respects. First of all, hegemonic party systems are 
essentially non-competitive. A hegemonic party “neither allows for a formal nor a de 
facto competition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, 
licensed parties; for they are not permitted to compete” (Sartori, 2005: 204). In 
hegemonic party systems, elections are used to mask the reality of authoritarian 
domination under which opposition victory is virtually impossible (Diamond, 2002, p. 
24). Hence, the hegemonic party will remain in power whether “it is liked or not” 
(Sartori, 2005, p. 30). Egypt under Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) was 
a notable example of a hegemonic party system. Typically, the NDP tolerated the 
opposition to the extent that it could retain control over them. Otherwise, it did not 
hesitate to crack down on the opposition, as in the case of Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates after the 2005 elections.  
Second, building on the first aspect, a hegemonic party is much stronger than 
a dominant party: It would be able, for example, to unilaterally change the constitution 
(Magaloni, 2006, p. 35). This allows the hegemonic party to dominate the political 
regime in a desired direction.  
Third, electoral malpractice is more frequent in hegemonic party systems than 
predominant party systems, which can be ascribed to the hegemonic party’s unilateral 
control of organizing, monitoring, and adjudicating elections (Magaloni, 2006, p. 36). 
This makes government alternation through elections practically impossible.  
 
2.4. Predominant party systems and political regimes 
The third move, linking party systems to regime type, is more demanding than the first 
two steps, simply because there is no consensus on what democracy is or is not. 
Nevertheless, I emphasize, along with others (Boucek & Bogaards, 2010a, p. 5; 
Greene, 2007; Mair, 1997, p. 199; Wolinetz, 2006, p. 51), that this is an important step, 
because party systems directly influence the legitimacy, stability, and functioning of 
the regime through altering social locations, policy implementation, manipulation of 
social relativities, and control of institutional processes, such as voting system and 
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electoral boundaries (Dunleavy, 2010, p. 19). It also matters in distinguishing between 
a predominant party system and a hegemonic party system. For instance, predominant 
party systems can be observed only in democratic (for example, Japan and India) and 
hybrid regimes (for example, Turkey and Taiwan), which are competitive to varying 
degrees, while hegemonic party systems can be observed only in authoritarian regimes 
(for example, Egypt under Mubarak), which lack any competition.  
As already noted, country-and region-specific bias frequently lead scholars to 
attribute predominant party systems to different regime types. For instance, according 
to some scholars (for example, Arian & Barnes, 1974; Sartori, 1976; Pempel, 1990a; 
Ware, 1996), who based their analysis on democracies, predominant party systems 
emerge in democracies, too. Such a perspective assigns an affirmative role to the 
dominant parties, such as bringing political stability (Arian & Barnes, 1974). As 
Pempel (1990a, pp. 1–2) points out:  
 
In these countries [with predominant party systems], despite free 
electoral competition, relatively open information systems, respect for 
civil liberties, and the right of free political association, a single party 
has managed to govern alone or as the primary and ongoing partner in 
coalitions, without interruption, for substantial periods of time. 
 
Another strand of research attributes predominant party systems to “hybrid 
regimes,”13 which combine elections with authoritarian traits (Diamond, 2002). 
Unlike democracies, the dominant party system in hybrid regimes is assigned a 
negative role, because the dominant party regularly manipulates media, politicizes 
bureaucracy and judiciary, and exploits public resources to maintain its grip on power.  
 To be more specific, predominant party systems under hybrid regimes belong 
to competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs) (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Greene, 2007). 
According to Levitsky & Way (2010, p. 5): 
                                               
13 The literature suggests numerous labels in lieu of hybrid regimes, such as “semi 
authoritarianism” (Ottaway, 2013) or “grey zone” (Carothers, 2002).  
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Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal 
democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary 
means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state 
places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such 
regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic 
institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic 
because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. 
 
In competitive authoritarian regimes, contestation occurs mainly in four arenas: 
the electoral arena, the legislature, the judiciary, and the media. Through this 
contestation, “opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally 
even defeat autocratic incumbents” (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 54). As Greene (2007, 
p. 15) argues, competitive authoritarian regimes experience both “meaningful” and 
“unfair” elections: the former induces the opposition to form parties and contest 
elections, while the latter makes opposition victory almost impossible.14 While 
meaningful elections15 distinguish competitive authoritarian regimes from 
authoritarian regimes, unfair elections distinguish them from democratic regimes 
(Greene, 2007, pp. 12–14; Greene, 2010, pp. 810–811).  
Predominant party systems under hybrid regimes need to be monitored closely 
lest they collapse into hegemonic party systems (Giliomee & Simkins, 2005), as many 
African states have done (van de Walle & Butler, 1999). In fact, dominant parties in 
                                               
14 According to Greene (2007, p. 259), there are two problems with regard to Sartori’s 
approach to political regimes. First, Sartori understates the significance of meaningfulness of 
elections in dominant-party authoritarian regimes. Second, he overstates the fairness of 
elections in dominant-party democratic regimes.  
15 The notion of meaningful elections is closely linked to the “alternation rule.” The basic 
premise of the alternation rule is that “parties lose elections.” Accordingly, the regime is called 
authoritarian unless the incumbent peacefully transmits power to the opposition if it loses the 
elections. There is one serious drawback with this assumption, though. The alternation rule 
puts non-overlapping or even completely different regimes – that is, those that maintain their 
rule through democratic (for example, Japan) or autocratic (for example, China) means – in 
the same category (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010a, p. 9).  
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hybrid regimes16 have the potential to distort democracy in three fundamental ways. 
First, they may narrow the scope of competition (Boucek & Bogaards, 2010b, p. 222). 
Second, because the possibility of power alternation is low, they may encourage 
corruption (Cox, 1997, p. 238). Third, the line between the state and the dominant 
party may blur as dominance is reproduced (Çarkoğlu, 2011; Cox, 1997; Scheiner, 
2006).  
As Sartori (2005) notes, the transition from a competitive (predominant) to an 
uncompetitive (hegemonic) party system ‒ which does not correspond to progression 
along a continuum ‒ is not possible unless the incumbents use force or fraud. 
Accordingly, the increased levels of repression and fraud observed in the past couple 
of years in Turkey should be taken as signals of the regime moving in a more 
authoritarian direction. 
                                               
16 Turkey belongs among the hybrid regimes simply because of its long-established military 
tutelage, its undemocratic electoral law, and the constitution. Despite these drawbacks, Turkey 
fulfils the minimal procedural requirements of democracy if one overlooks malpractice during 
the recently held elections and referendums. These situate Turkey mid-way between 
democracy and authoritarianism. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: THEORY 
As a rule of thumb, concepts are not meaningful outside a theoretical framework. To 
that end, having established the conceptual framework, I now proceed to the theories 
on the emergence of predominant party systems.  
An overview of the literature suggests that the factors leading to the rise of 
dominant parties are diverse: in South Africa’s case, it was apartheid; in Mexico’s 
case, civil war; in Taiwan’s case, struggle against mainland China; in Israel’s case, the 
establishment of a new state; and in Sweden’s case, the establishment of the welfare 
state (Dunleavy, 2010, p. 13; Giliomee & Simkins, 2005, p. 3). However, as Greene 
(2007, p. 4) rightly notes, “it is unlikely that the mechanisms that produce dominant 
party rule also reproduce it over time.” 
Within this framework, this section briefly evaluates institutionalist theories, 
social cleavage theory, performance legitimacy theories, decision-theoretic models, 
and resource theory in explaining the reproduction of dominance. It also seeks to 
justify why resource theory and its central concept, clientelism, best explains the AKP 
case. Table 3 presents a summary of my findings.  
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Table 3: Theories of predominant party systems 
   THEORIES   
CASES      
      
 Decision- theoretic Performance Social cleavage theory Resource theory (clientelism) 
 Models 
legitimacy 
theory   
     
     
Mexico 
Applies  
(Greene,  Cleavage based on development policy Applies (Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 
(PRI) 2007) 
Partially applies at 
least from 1940s to (Boucek & Bogaards, 2010; 2006) 
  
1970s (Magaloni, 
2006) Greene, 2007)  
     
Japan NA* Applies NA Applies (mostly in rural areas) 
(LDP)    (Scheiner, 2006) 
     
   
Cleavages based on castes, religion, 
and 
Applies, although it has become less salient 
in recent decades (Wilkinson, 2007) 
India Applies (Riker, NA ethnicity (Chibber, 1999; Chibber  
(CP) 1976)  and Petrocik, 1989)  
     
   Center-periphery (Mardin, 1973) Already-existing clientelistic 
Turkey  Applied until cleavage has transformed into a networks have been expanded 
(AKP) 
Applies (for example, 
June 2007 financial religious and, to a lesser extent, during the AKP’s rule (Akdağ, 2014; 
 2015 elections) crisis (Öniş, ethnic cleavage since the 1990s Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2014; Erdem 
  2012; Kirişçi, (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006) Aytaç, 2014; Kemahlıoğlu, 2012; 
  2009)  Sayarı, 2014; Yıldırım, 2017) 
Taiwan NA Applies 
Cleavage based on relations with China 
(Yu, 2005; Templeman, 2012) Applies (Fell, 2005; Wang &  
(KMT)     Kurzman, 2007) 
 
Note: * Not applicable.  
Source: Author’s elaboration and highlighted sources. 
 
 
3.1. Institutional theories 
Institutionalist theories contend that electoral systems structure party systems 
(Duverger, 1954; Farrell, 1997; Lipset, 1960; Sartori, 2001; Taagepera, 2007). For 
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example, it influences the number, size, and cohesion of parties; the government 
formula; the length of government (Sartori, 2001, p. 102; Taagepera, 2007, p. 1), and 
the parliamentary representation of women and minorities (Farrell, 1997, p. 142). 
Electoral systems have commonly been viewed as durable institutions 
(Lijphart, 1994; Taagepera, 2007) because majorities or even qualified majorities are 
required in the legislative arena to make any changes to them. Usually, parties in power 
tend to alter electoral systems if they are unstable and fragmented (for example, Italy 
and Israel) or hyper-stable (for example, Singapore and Japan) (Norris, 2004, p. 81). 
The electoral engineering in Turkey illustrates both factors. While the latter applies to 
the 1960 military coup, which aimed to end the hegemonic party system, the former 
applies to the 1980 military coup, which aimed to eliminate high fragmentation. 
The design of the electoral system is more important in predominant party 
systems than in other party systems because small changes in the electoral formula 
may realize substantial gains for the incumbent party (Sartori, 1990, p. 347). However, 
despite the significance of this issue, the relationship between predominant party 
system and electoral system has largely remained underexplored (Erdmann & 
Basedau, 2007, p. 10).17  
Thus far, it has been shown that non-proportional systems ‒ plurality voting, 
block voting, and single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems ‒ are more relevant 
than proportional systems in explaining dominance (Dunleavy, 2010, p. 13). To 
illustrate, the literature typically refers to the SNTV system in Japan, which helped to 
keep the JDP in power, although it never won more than half of the votes after 1963 
(Cox, 1997; Ware, 1996; Reed, 2007).  
Against this background, Table 4 demonstrates that a predominant party 
system may emerge under wide-ranging electoral systems, including majoritarian 
systems in India and Mexico, and the SNTV system in Japan and Taiwan. While 
Mexico and Japan switched to the mixed electoral system in the mid-1990s, Taiwan 
introduced the mixed electoral system in 2005. India, on the other hand, is still using 
                                               
17 For notable exceptions, See: Bogaards, 2008; Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2001; Reed, 2007.  
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the first-past-the-post system (FPTP). The impact of electoral system changes on the 
party system varies. To illustrate, while the PRI and the KMT lost their majority in 
less than a decade after the change in the electoral system, the LDP lost its majority 
more than one and a half decades later.  
Unlike these cases, Turkey has been using a proportional system with the 
D’Hondt formula since 1983. Bormann & Golder’s dataset (2013) shows that although 
37 countries use the D’Hondt formula, most of them do not have a predominant party 
system. This is mainly because the D’Hondt formula is designed to “minimize 
overrepresentation of the most overrepresented party” (Gallagher, 1991, p. 34). 
However, when the D’Hondt formula is combined with a high national threshold, it is 
conducive to the predominant party system. This is because of a drop in the number of 
tiny splinter parties in the party system (Farrel, 1997) and an increase in 
disproportionality (Anckar, 1997).  
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Table 4: Electoral system in selected countries with predominant party systems 
   
 Electoral formula(s) in place during  Period in 
 Dominance power 
   
   
 In the Chamber of Deputies a purely  
 majoritarian system was implemented until  
Mexico the 1960s. Then, the majoritarian system 1929–2000 
(PRI) was gradually abandoned. Since 1996,  
 Mexico has used a mixed system: 300 seats are  
 allocated according to plurality vote and the  
 remaining 200 by proportional  
 representation based on party lists.  
   
 Japan used the SNTV system for its House  
 of Representatives from 1947 to 1993. Since then, it 1955–2009 
Japan has used a mixed-electoral system: 295 seats are (except 
(LDP) allocated according to plurality vote and the 1993–4) 
 remaining 180 seats by a proportional system  
 based on party lists.  
   
 In the Legislative Yuan the SNTV system  
 was used until 1992. A parallel system was  
Taiwan introduced in 2005 and was first applied in the 1949–2000 
(KMT) 2008 election: 73 seats are allocated on the  
 basis of plurality vote, 34 by a party-list  
 proportional system (Hare quota) and six by  
 the SNTV system (for aboriginal voters).  
   
India Since independence, India has used  1947–1977 
(INC) the FPTP system for the House of the  
 People.  
   
   
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
 29 
The D’Hondt system applied in Turkey, with a 10 percent national threshold, 
best illustrates this. The electoral threshold, above all, substantially empowers the 
leading party while weakening the small ones. To illustrate, in the 2002 elections, the 
AKP captured two-thirds of the parliamentary seats even though it won only one-third 
of the votes. This extends to provincial level. For instance, the AKP won eight out of 
ten seats in Diyarbakır province with a vote share of a mere 15 percent. However, 
when the pro-Kurdish candidates ran under the party list of the HDP (People’s 
Democratic Party) and passed the electoral threshold in the June 2015 elections, the 
AKP won only one seat with its 14 percent vote share, while the HDP won ten with its 
79 percent vote share. The Diyarbakır case illustrates the trend in other Kurdish-
majority provinces as well. 
Second, the electoral threshold reduces the number of wasted votes (see Table 
5), which coincides with the crystallization of votes around the major parties. This 
trend illustrates the “psychological effect” (Duverger, 1954) in voting behavior, 
although, to my knowledge, this argument has not been tested with individual data so 
far.  
Furthermore, the electoral threshold encourages strategic voting. The 
underlying assumption is that voters cast their votes strategically to avoid the other 
camp being empowered by wasted votes. This is arguably the case with the HDP’s 
passing of the threshold in the June 2015 elections. The most likely scenario was that 
if the HDP had failed to pass the threshold, then the AKP would have obtained a large 
enough majority to change the constitution unilaterally. In view of this, some CHP 
voters residing in metropolitan areas switched to the HDP (Öniş, 2016; Canyaş, 
Canyaş & Gümrükçü, 2016; Grigoriadis, 2016), although whether this was sufficient 
for the HDP to pass the threshold was doubtful.18 In any case, the tendency towards 
strategic voting clearly manifests the extent of polarization in society (Esmer, 2019). 
This also corresponds to hostile partisanship and must be taken as alarming for the 
future of the political system.  
                                               
18 The KONDA (2015) survey, for instance, found that the HDP passed the threshold mainly 
because AKP voters switched rather than CHP voters. 
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Aware of the institutional barriers, the small parties in Turkey have followed 
two main strategies. One is aligning with other parties, be they large or small, before 
the elections. A typical example was the alliance between the Nationalist Work Party 
(MÇP, then MHP), the RP, and the Reformist Democracy Party (IDP) in the 1991 
legislative elections.  
The second strategy, particularly followed by pro-Kurdish parties/candidates, 
was to run as independents. For instance, in the 2007 elections, the pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) ran with independent candidates instead of under a 
party list and won 21 seats. The same strategy awarded its successor, the Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP), 36 seats in the 2011 elections. 
 
Table 5: Wasted votes and turnout (%) (2002–2015/2) 
 2002 2007 2011 2015/1 2015/2 
Wasted 46.3 18.2 6.3 4.7 2.5 
Turnout 76 82 81 81 84 
Source: Supreme Election Council (YSK). 
 
What is unique to the Turkish case is that, despite having a relatively 
disproportionate electoral system, turnout remains very high (Table 5). This might 
reflect two contradictory tendencies. The first is that voters might have interiorized the 
rules of the game. In this sense, high turnout is an indication of a legitimate political 
system. The second and the most likely scenario is that the electoral system 
delegitimizes the political system by fostering polarization, which motivates voters to 
go to the polls. In this sense, high turnout expresses the level of polarization in society.  
In a nutshell, the evidence presented above reveals that a combination of 
electoral formula and national threshold played a significant role in transforming the 
party system into a predominant one for two main reasons. First, it brings about the 
overrepresentation of large parties and the underrepresentation of small ones. This 
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leads small parties to align with other parties or run with independent candidates to 
bypass the highest threshold in the world. Second, the electoral system concentrates 
votes among major parties and encourages strategic voting. 
Despite its crucial role, outlined above, the electoral system alone does not 
fully account for the party system change in Turkey. That is to say, if the electoral 
system is a major reason behind the AKP’s success, why did it not lead to the 
emergence of a predominant party system during the 1990s, given that the present 
electoral system has been in force since 1983? Thus, I contend that the electoral system 
should be supplemented by other elements, primarily clientelism and the mobilization 
of the religious cleavage, to fully account for the reproduction of dominance in Turkey. 
 
3.1.1. Gerrymandering 
In addition to changing the electoral formula or electoral laws, dominant parties 
frequently adopt the strategies of “malapportionment” and “gerrymandering” to skew 
the political field in their favor (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010).19  
Malapportionment refers to “imbalances in the population densities of 
constituencies which favor some parties over others” (Farrell, 1997, p. 8). Although 
malapportionment is not frequent practice in Turkey, this does not mean that there is 
no disproportionality across electoral districts. For instance, in the November 2015 
elections, in the most crowded electoral district in Turkey, Istanbul’s first electoral 
district, 3,361,968 registered voters cast their votes for 31 deputies. This makes 
108,450 voters per deputy. By contrast, in the least densely populated electoral district, 
Bayburt province, 52,698 voters voted for two deputies. This makes only 26,349 voters 
per deputy. Because Bayburt is the stronghold of the AKP, one might assume that 
malapportionment onesidedly benefits the AKP. However, this is not true. For 
instance, Tunceli (Dersim) province, the electoral district in which the AKP is weakest, 
                                               
19 Malapportionment and gerrymandering are widely discussed phenomena in the context of 
Malaysia (for example Hai, 2002; Ostwald, 2013), Japan (for example Christensen, 2004; 
Hata, 1990) and Mexico (for example Lujambio & Vives, 2008). 
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returns two deputies with only 62,615 votes, a number that does not significantly differ 
from Bayburt’s. 
In the case of gerrymandering, “constituency boundaries are redrawn with the 
intention of producing an inflated number of seats for a party, usually the governing 
party” (Farrell, 1997, p. 8). In comparison to malapportionment, gerrymandering is 
more evident in Turkey. That is to say, the ruling parties in Turkey have not refrained 
from punishing districts that did not vote for them. The most notable example was the 
DP governments during the 1950s, which divided Malatya province into two and 
downgraded the status of Kırşehir from a province to a district because they voted for 
the opposition.  
Recently, the AKP government has also concentrated its efforts on rearranging 
district boundaries, an undertaking redolent of the practice of gerrymandering. By 
Municipal Law No. 6360 of 2012, 14 cities were promoted to metropolitan 
municipalities and 27 new districts were established. In the same vein, within the 
framework of this law, the AKP government redrew the boundaries of some districts 
that had experienced a tight race between the AKP and opposition parties. 
Accordingly, as Aygül (2016) reports, the incumbent party skewed the electoral field 
to its advantage.  
To be more concrete, I briefly analyze election results from the Şişli and 
Sarıyer district in Istanbul to examine the effect of gerrymandering on electoral 
outcomes with this law. Before delving into the analysis, I must note that because 
Sarıyer and Şişli both belong to Istanbul’s second electoral district, changing borders 
does not affect the number of seats gained in the legislative elections, although it does 
have the potential to substantially affect local election outcomes, as I demonstrate 
below. 
Law No. 6360 relocated three neighborhoods (mahalle) in Şişli ‒ Ayazağa and 
Maslak, known as Istanbul’s financial centers, plus Huzur ‒ to Sarıyer. This relocation 
sparked controversy among policymakers, but its consequences have not been 
empirically examined. Şişli is a known stronghold of the CHP, while Sarıyer has 
witnessed closer races (see Table 6). Huzur and Maslak tend to vote for the CHP, while 
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Ayazağa overwhelmingly votes for the AKP. More importantly, registered voters in 
Ayazağa far outnumber the voters in Huzur and Maslak (see Table 7). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that redistricting would benefit the AKP. However, whether it 
would be sufficient to affect electoral outcomes remains in doubt. 
 
Table 6: Election results in Sarıyer district (number of votes) 
 
Election year 
 
AKP 
 
CHP 
 
Vote difference 
Difference in 
relocated 
neighborhoods 
2015/2 88,928 86,415 2,513 6,926 
2015/1 69,155 75,836 -6,681 4,269 
2014 82,328 107,268 -26,940 3,342 
2011 71,293 73,888 -2,595 8,627 
2009 46,546 54,909 -8,363 4,773 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 7: Election results in Ayazağa, Huzur, and Maslak neighborhoods 
(number of votes) 
Name 2009 2011 2014 2015/1 2015/2 
 AKP CHP AKP CHP AKP CHP AKP CHP AKP CHP 
Ayazağa 5,454 1,152 12,549 3,424 12,093 5,918 9,928 3,726 13,415 4,351 
Maslak 233 137 452 389 372 1,108 369 1,122 568 1,539 
Huzur 1,011 636 2,060 2,621 1,622 3,719 1,296 2,476 1,652 2,819 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 7 suggests that gerrymandering has not had a significant impact on 
electoral outcomes, with the exception of the November 2015 snap election. However, 
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the electoral trend in the Sarıyer district (Table 6) hints at the possibility that 
gerrymandering may have a decisive impact on future elections, particularly local 
ones. 
 
3.2. Social cleavage theory 
Drawing on the European context, social cleavage theory suggests that parties reflect 
major social cleavages in society (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Ware, 1996).20 In the set of 
cases with dominant parties, this ranges from race in South Africa to relations with 
China in Taiwan, or economic development policy in Mexico (Boucek & Bogaards, 
2010a, pp. 7‒8; Greene, 2007, p. 308; Greene, 2008, p. 17).  
In the case of Turkey, social cleavage theory has widely been depicted in terms 
of a “center–periphery cleavage” (Şerif Mardin, 1973).21 In this designation, the center 
represents secular military, intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and the urban classes. The 
periphery, on the other hand, represents the conservative peasants, as well as small-
scale provincial business owners.  
The center–periphery framework has a changing character. As Çarkoğlu & 
Hinch (2006) contend, the center–periphery cleavage has started to be colored more 
by the religious and, to a lesser extent, the ethnic cleavage since the 1990s.  
In this sense, once the party began to fear for its future in 2008, the AKP started 
to follow a polarization strategy, mainly along religious lines (Çınar, 2016).22 This 
makes social cleavage theory relevant to the AKP case. However, it would be 
                                               
20 For Lipset & Rokkan (1967), there are four types of social cleavage: center–periphery, 
urban–rural, worker–employer, and bourgeoisie–landowner. While the center–periphery and 
the urban–rural cleavages emerged due to a national revolution, the worker–employer and the 
bourgeoisie–landowner cleavages emerged due to an industrial revolution. 
21 Şerif Mardin imported the term “center–periphery cleavage” from Shils (1961). While for 
Shils, the center–periphery cleavage lost its salience with political and social integrity, for 
Lipset & Rokkan (1967) it is a feature of party systems. Recently, Wuthrich (2013) concisely 
debated this issue in the Turkish context.  
22 For an excellent piece on the dynamics and current situation of mounting polarization, see 
(Esmer, 2019). 
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misleading to claim that the AKP still represents the periphery, given its alliance with 
the devout bourgeoisie and its mandate over the bureaucracy. This orientation seems 
to have pushed the AKP towards the center.  
 Despite its popularity, social cleavage theory has been contested on several 
grounds.23 Above all, social cleavage theory does not apply to all cases with 
predominant party systems, particularly to India where the Congress Party achieved 
more or less the same support from different classes, ethnicities, and religions 
(Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989). Second, social cleavage theory may invert the direction 
of causality. Sartori (1968, p. 21) contends that, even if it is true that societal changes 
are registered through political parties, it is also true that parties might (de)politicize 
issues that are key to the functioning of the system. Third, social cleavages are not 
static and might strengthen or weaken over time, especially when parties cannot find 
any new cleavage to mobilize voters (Ware, 1996, p. 127). This was the case in Turkey 
in recent years. Last but not the least, parties not only reflect social cleavages, but also 
actively shape them (Leon, Desai & Tuğal, 2009). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, 
the strengthening of partisan identification has severe implications for the content and 
structure of social cleavages in Turkish society.  
 
3.3. Decision-theoretic model 
The decision-theoretic model assumes that dominant parties conquer the center, 
and thus represent the median voter (Arian & Barnes, 1974; Cox, 1997; Greene, 
2007; Riker, 1976). This enables the dominant parties to appeal to broad social groups 
(Greene, 2007, p. 45), divide the opposition (Riker, 1976), enhance their legitimacy 
(Arian & Barnes, 1974), and mitigate social conflicts (Greene, 2007, p. 45).  
 Among dominant parties, while the Congress Party in India is widely assumed 
to fit this model because of its pluralist voter base and the party leadership (Riker, 
                                               
23 Specifically in the Turkish case, the center–periphery cleavage does not explain the 
heterogeneous party base of the mainstream parties and the CHP’s garnering of support from 
Southeast Anatolia through patronage (Sayarı, 2008, pp. 402-404). 
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1976; Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989), the LDP in Japan (Scheiner, 2006) and the KMT 
in Taiwan (Tzelgov & Wang, 2016) apparently do not conform to it.24  
Regarding the case of Turkey, although the AKP arguably represents the 
median voter (Tuncer & Sağdiç, 2016), it is clearly a right-wing party because it 
incorporates neoliberalism, conservatism, and selective nationalism as parts of its 
political appeal. Illustrating this, a survey carried out by Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu 
found that the number of voters who define themselves as “right-wing” has boomed in 
recent years. To be more concrete, the proportion of self-identified right-wing voters 
increased from 22.7 percent in 1990 to 34.2 percent in 2009 (Radikal, 2010).  
 
3.4. Performance legitimacy theory 
Performance legitimacy theory posits that predominant party systems emerge because 
of dominant parties’ remarkable economic performance. This theory takes voters to be 
rational actors who punish poor economic outcomes and reward good ones (Duch, 
2007, p. 808).  
While it can plausibly be argued that the KMT in Taiwan and the LDP in Japan 
took advantage of prolonged economic growth, others, including the PRI, were able to 
maintain their rule for two decades despite a deteriorating economic record (Greene, 
2007, p. 19; Magaloni, 2006, p. 13).25 In my view, the Turkish case stands between 
these two examples. On one hand, the Turkish economy experienced high growth rates 
and booming exports from 2002 to 2008 (Kirişçi, 2009; Öniş, 2012), which led to an 
increase in the AKP’s vote share. On the other hand, the AKP’s vote share peaked at 
49 percent in the November 2015 elections despite its deteriorating economic 
performance since 2008 (Cömert & Çolak, 2014; Acemoğlu & Uçer, 2015). 
                                               
24 Based on the expert survey with the political scientists in 1993, Huber & Inglehart (1995) 
positioned the LDP, the PRI and the Congress on the right with the medium scores of 8.43 
6.20 and 5.80, respectively in a scale that 1=left and 10=right. 
25 Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu & Şenatalar (2005) found that AKP gathered huge support from 
those whose economic conditions deteriorated after the 2001 financial crisis. In another study, 
Başlevent & Kirmanoğlu (2015) argue that economic voting matters in Turkey and the AKP 
voters are satisfied with their economic conditions.  
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3.5. Resource theory 
Resource theory aims to explore the political economy of single-party dominance. 
While the role of commanding public resources in the reproduction of dominance has 
been emphasized before (cf. Lipset, 1959; Weingrod, 1968; Pempel, 1990a; Scheiner, 
2006), it was Greene (2007) who developed a comprehensive theory, dwelling on the 
PRI’s dominance in Mexican politics. Greene (2007, 2010) posits that if the dominant 
party commands public resources and subordinates the public bureaucracy, it becomes 
more difficult to break the cycle of dominance. Unless resources shrink ‒ often due to 
privatization of state-owned enterprises following an economic downturn ‒ the 
dominance is expected to reproduce itself.  
According to Greene (2007), dominant parties may benefit from public 
resources in several ways. In the first place, they may transfer money to clients from 
the budgets of state-owned enterprises or through secret line items. Such transfers are 
difficult to trace and usually closed to public scrutiny. Second, the dominant parties 
may take advantage of patronage resources, depending on the size of the public sector. 
Third, public resources can be used to exchange kickbacks and receive an illicit (if not 
illegal) campaign contribution from business circles. Last but not least, the dominant 
parties might use the administrative resources of the state, such as public vehicles and 
phones, as part of its electoral strategy to reach and mobilize voters (Greene, 2007, pp. 
40–41). Having these advantages in hand, the dominant parties attract better candidates 
and communicate more easily with the electorate.  
In comparison with alternative theories, resource theory has two advantages. 
First, it is inherently dynamic because it explains the ups and downs of the incumbent 
vote share in parallel with command over public resources. Second, it provides an 
insight into the weakness of opposition parties in challenging the incumbent.  
  Despite its merits, I suggest a minor revision with regard to resource theory. 
This is because resource theory does not account for dominant parties, which maintain 
power despite pursuing a privatization policy (even from the onset). The AKP case 
illustrates this well. For instance, while privatization revenues were merely 8.2 billion 
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US dollars between 1986 and 2003, they peaked at 58 billion US dollars from 2004 to 
2015 (Bloomberg, 2016). Despite following this policy, the AKP’s electoral 
performance took an upward trend from 2002 to 2015 November.  
 
3.5.1. Clientelism  
The central concept in resource theory is clientelism. Clientelism is a dynamic 
phenomenon located at the confluence of politics, society, and the market (Roniger, 
2004, p. 368).26 This makes it a rich concept that can be analyzed through the lenses 
of different disciplines. For instance, taking it as a type of “social relationship,” 
anthropologists elaborate on the daily working mechanisms of clientelism, while 
political scientists, taking it as a “feature of government,” investigate the effects of 
clientelism on voting behavior and democratization (Weingrod, 1968, p. 380). 
Broadly defined, clientelism is “a transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen’s 
vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and 
services” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2).27 Yet, I observed during my fieldwork 
that direct payment is not pervasive. 
Clientelism is the scapegoat of modern politics. It is blamed for inhibiting 
horizontal solidarity (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984); corroding ideal citizenship 
(Trantidis, 2013; Roniger & Ayata, 1994); reinforcing oligarchic tendencies 
(Kaufmann, 1974); reversing accountability (Stokes, 2005); directly or indirectly 
                                               
26 Recently, political science studies on clientelism have exceeded anthropological ones. This 
political turn, while providing precision and calibration to the understanding of clientelism, 
has also caused problems. First, clientelism is increasingly taken as a political strategy that is 
restricted to election time. Second, clientelism is conceived as a vote-buying or turnout-buying 
strategy (Auyero & Benzecry, 2017, p. 181).  
27 The literature offers a wide array of definitions of clientelism. For example, Stokes (2007, 
p. 605) defines clientelism as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, 
where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support 
me?.” According to Hopkin (2006a, p. 2), political clientelism “describes the distribution of 
selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support.” 
According to Roniger (2004, p. 353), “clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually 
beneficial relationships of power and exchange, a nonuniversalistic quid pro quo between 
individuals or groups of unequal standing.” 
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causing violence (Wantchekon, 2003; Wilkinson, 2007); hindering institutional 
development (Graziano, 1973); blurring public and private sphere distinctions (Hallin 
& Papathanassopoulos, 2002, p. 189); leading to economic inefficiency, systematic 
corruption, and populist backlash (Müller, 2006; Singer, 2009); and fostering 
inequality and reducing policy responsiveness (Ruth, 2011). 
For long decades, the adherents of modernization theories28 hypothesized that 
clientelism would disappear with economic and political modernization (Hicken, 
2011, p. 297; Hopkin, 2006a, p. 2; Kopecký & Mair, 2006, p. 1; Piattoni, 2001, p. 1; 
Roniger, 2004, p. 356; Stokes, 2007, p. 607). However, this did not happen. 
Accordingly, it is now commonly accepted that clientelism operates effectively in both 
traditional and modern societies, and democratic and non-democratic regimes, as well 
as at local, regional, national, and supranational levels (Hopkin, 2006a, p. 2; Kitschelt 
& Wilkinson, 2007, p. 4; Kopecký & Mair, 2006, p. 1; Mouzelis, 1985, p. 332), 
although its form and shape vary greatly (Lande, 1983, p. 440).29 
The resilience of clientelism as a social and political force can be expressed 
through the multiple tasks it fulfills: clientelism links political representatives to the 
citizens (Hopkin, 2006a, p. 12); increases the bargaining positions of clients (Piattoni, 
2001); provides social mobility and integrates divided societies (Müller, 2006, p. 192, 
Lemarchand & Legg, 1972, p. 171); enhances the policymaking capacity of the parties 
(Müller, 2006, p. 190); and overcomes the collective action problem (Warner, 1997, 
p. 534).  
                                               
28 Modernists had a number of expectations with regard to clientelism. Firstly, class politics 
relying on horizontal mobilization would replace vertical ones. Secondly, the dissemination 
of the mass party model would make it harder to sustain personalized representation through 
clientelism. Thirdly, professionalization would bring meritocracy. Fourthly, due to economic 
development, the domestic market would be more integrated into broader regional, national, 
or supranational units, which in turn would reduce the demand for a patron. Finally, the need 
for a mediator would decline as citizens become richer and more educated (Kopecky & Mair, 
2006, pp. 4–5). 
29 There is a rich scholarship on the analysis of clientelism in different settings: West and 
South Europe (c.f. Piattoni, 2001; Roniger, 2004); Far East (c.f. Callahan & McCargo, 1996); 
Latin America (c.f. Auyero, 2001; Gay, 1998; Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006); Africa (c.f. 
Van de Walle, 2003; Wantchekon, 2003) and the Middle East (c.f. Blaydes, 2011). 
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Conceptually, there are two major difficulties in studying clientelism. The first 
problem is what to include and exclude when defining clientelism. To illustrate, for 
Hicken (2011, p. 290), clientelism is dyadic, contingent, hierarchic, and iterated; for 
Kaufmann (1974, p. 285), it is unequal, reciprocal, particularistic, and private; for 
Lemarchand & Legg (1972, p. 152), it is asymmetric, extensive, and durable; while 
for Hopkin (2006b, p. 406), it is unequal, hierarchic, durable, obligatory, and duty-
based.  
The second problem is to distinguish clientelism from the neighboring concepts 
of “vote-buying” and “patronage.” If this is not done carefully, it may lead to 
conceptual stretching (Piattoni, 2001). To avoid this, I briefly underline how my take 
on clientelism differs from vote-buying and patronage. 
To start with, a vote-buying strategy can be pursued by both the incumbent and 
the opposition (Stokes, 2009, p. 15). Second, vote-buying is largely limited to election 
time (Schaffer, 2007; Stokes, 2009). Finally, vote-buying is limited to individual votes. 
Given all of this, my focus is not on vote-buying simply because I take clientelism to 
be a political and social phenomenon that is embedded and reproduced in everyday 
life (Auyero, 2001) rather than an instrument limited to certain situations.  
Similarly, while clientelism entails the use of all kinds of public resources for 
electoral purposes (Hicken, 2011, p. 295; Hilgers, 2011, p. 575; Piattoni, 2001, p. 6), 
patronage merely denotes “the exchange of public employment for electoral support” 
(Stokes, 2009, p. 15). Because patronage jobs are limited in number, they are often 
earmarked for party activists rather than partisans (Stokes, 2009, p. 15). Despite the 
AKP government’s extensive use of patronage, this study does not deal it because it 
would have required interviews with people in public institutions or with more 
educated people rather than with the uneducated poor in the street.  
 
3.5.2. Clientelism in Turkish politics: The past 
Although clientelism plays a major role in shaping Turkish voters’ party preferences, 
it has not drawn much scholarly interest. Existing studies also have serious drawbacks, 
for example, for being too descriptive and repetitive. Although recent studies based on 
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a quantitative approach (for example, Marschall et al., 2014), list experiments (for 
example, Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2014) or formal modelling (for example, Kemahlıoğlu, 
2005) have considerably advanced our understanding of clientelism, they take actors, 
structures, and relations as given and do not (intend to) highlight the dynamics and 
mechanisms of clientelism. Similarly, the interplay of clientelism, religion, and 
neoliberalism has remained virtually unexplored. More than that, the present literature 
lacks any comparative findings that would allow us to unearth the peculiarities of the 
Turkish case.  
Clientelism is a historically-rooted phenomenon in Turkey. During the late 
Ottoman and early republican periods, first local notables, then small-town merchants 
(eşraf) and large landowners (ağa) brokered between the state and clients. The 
relationship between the brokers and the ruling elite was symbiotic: It enabled the 
center to control the periphery while it extended brokers’ influence over the peasants 
(Ayata, 1994).  
Although, with the transition to multi-party politics, the political parties 
gradually replaced the traditional actors as patrons (Sayari, 2011, p. 7), the hierarchical 
nature of clientelism remained virtually untouched. As rightly noted by Sayari (2011, 
p. 7), this kind of vertical mobilization contrasts markedly with class-based horizontal 
mobilization in western Europe and had substantial implications with regard to the 
voter–politician linkage in Turkey. On the supply side, the new political elite tried to 
solve socio-economic problems with pork-barrel projects, such as building new roads 
or providing electricity (Sayari, 2011, p. 8; Heper & Keyman, 1998, p. 259). On the 
demand side, it was expected that deputies be accessible and act as direct 
representatives of the voters (Ayata, 1994, p. 53).  
From the 1960s onwards, clientelism spread rapidly to urban areas with 
urbanization and industrialization. The new urban squatters, who relied on political 
support for electrification and the distribution of land deeds, came to the forefront in 
this context (Kselman, 2012, p. 237). In this framework, Sherwood (1967, p. 57) 
illustrates how clientelist networks were serving as problem-solvers in big cities during 
the 1970s:  
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A typical villager arriving in Ankara or Istanbul goes immediately to 
that district populated by people from his home village. The local 
Justice Party [AP] man helps him settle, aids him with his problems 
with the authorities, and functions as an employment agency, or a 
marriage bureau, as the case may be.  
 
In the post-coup period, Turgut Özal, who became prime minister in 1983, put 
the blame on the “strong state” for the prevalence of clientelism. His assumption was 
that if his party (ANAP) could reduce the size of the state, clientelism would diminish. 
As a rule, if the diagnosis is wrong so is the prescription. That is to say, although the 
ANAP dramatically scaled down the public sector through large-scale privatizations 
(Öniş, 2004), clientelism only spread more widely. This was because the ANAP was 
itself a clientelist party, granting title deeds to squatter settlements, institutionalizing 
preferential electrification, frequently turning sub-provinces into provinces (White, 
2002; Ayata, 1994), and creating new cronies. Accordingly, when the ANAP broke its 
promises it triggered a huge public reaction, which led to its defeat in the 1991 
elections.  
Why did the ANAP’s clientelist machine fail to survive even though the party 
governed alone? Two major elements can be underlined. First, ANAP cronies were 
reluctant to share the burden of the clientelist state. Second, the ANAP lacked a strong 
party organization that could interact with voters in daily life and monitor their voting 
behavior.  
The ANAP’s main rival on the center-right, the DYP, was also deeply involved 
in clientelism. As the Civangate scandal and the Özer Çiller case illustrate, the party 
leadership built a massive clientelist network around the triangle of mafia, 
businessmen, and politicians. 
 In this context, the RP’s anti-corruption discourse found a large audience. After 
coming to power in 1996, however, far from taking measures to eliminate it, the RP 
merely reshaped corruption, injecting an Islamic element,. When this was combined 
with the door-to-door electoral strategy of the highly committed party members, the 
RP created an efficient clientelist network. Even the breaking of the RP-DYP 
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government could not undermine this network, given the RP’s control in the 
municipalities.  
 
3.5.3.  Clientelism under AKP governments 
Although the AKP is the successor to the RP, its use of clientelism differs 
substantially. First, while the RP hinged its clientelism on a discourse of equality and 
social justice (economy), the AKP has built its clientelism on a discourse characterized 
by destroying the Kemalist order (politics). Second, while the RP’s clientelism offered 
permanent solutions to clients’ problems, such as housing, the AKP's strategy has been 
shaped by a professed concern to “save the day.” Third, the parties differ in terms of 
their relations with business. Although the RP could not develop loyalty in the business 
sector due to pressure from the military and the social sector, the AKP has been able 
to nurture such loyalty, with friendly business sponsoring the clientelist machine 
during economic downturns. Finally, the AKP’s clientelism is more efficient in 
deterring exit because multiple actors are involved in monitoring clients (see Chapter 
6).  
As Singer & Kitschelt (2011, p. 17) illustrate, clientelist parties must have the 
following features and the AKP evidently does.30 First, clientelist parties rely on vague 
legislation. The most prominent item in this regard is the Public Procurement Law, 
which has been amended more than 100 times under AKP governments.31 Second, 
clientelist parties are largely unresponsive to the demands of the middle class. This is 
because targeting the middle class is more costly than targeting the poor (Hicken, 
2011, pp. 299–300).32 Finally, clientelist parties are organized in a centralized and 
                                               
30 An exception to this assumption is that the AKP’s clientelism explicitly targets core rather 
than swing voters.  
31 For insightful discussions on the amendments to the Public Procurement Law, see Ercan & 
Oğuz, 2006; Çeviker-Gürakar, 2016. 
32 There were also some legitimate reasons for the AKP to distant itself from the middle class, 
which historically aligns with the Kemalist establishment (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 64). 
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hierarchical, albeit informal structure. The AKP illustrates this feature as well because 
the clientelist machine is guided by a very strong and centralized leadership. 
In line with this, Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) 
data33 also demonstrate that the AKP far exceeds its rivals in appealing to voters with 
clientelist inducements (see Table 8). Its high scores reveal that the AKP is more 
clientelist than dominant parties in other settings (see Table 28).  
 
Table 8: Clientelism and mainstream parties in Turkey 
Party b1 (gift 
and 
payment) 
b2 
(social 
policy 
benefits) 
b3 
(patronage 
jobs) 
b4 
(procurement 
contracts) 
b5 
(regulatory 
favors) 
b11 
(effectiveness 
of clientelist 
targeting) 
HDP 2.0 3.3 3.7 3.4 3.4 2.9 
MHP 1.5 2.9 3.7 3.2 3.3 2.6 
AKP 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.7 
CHP 2.1 3.0 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.4 
Note: * Scores: 1 to 4 – 1= a negligible [clientelist] effort or none at all; 2= a minor effort; 3= a moderate 
effort; 4= a major effort. 
Source: DALP. 
 
Based on the narrative presented above, below I outline the properties of the 
AKP’s clientelism.  
 
                                               
33 The DALP was a cross-national survey carried out by political scientists in the Political 
Science department at Duke University. The data were gathered in 2008 and 2009 from more 
than 1,400 experts in 88 countries. The experts assessed five targeted clientelistic partisan 
activities on a four-point scale to highlight the extent of clientelism and democratic 
accountability.  
 45 
Clientelism targets mainly the devout bourgeoisie and the urban poor 
Clientelism potentially targets all socio-economic groups by offering wide-ranging 
benefits (Landé, 1983, p. 440). Broadly speaking, the following benefits can motivate 
people from various social strata to join a clientelist network: For the poor, material 
aid or finding a job; for the middle class, finding or protection against the fear of losing 
a job; and for the upper class, exchanging kickbacks with the government.  
Ayata (1990, p. 159) argues that a cross-class alliance is needed for the smooth 
operation of clientelism. In the case of the AKP, this is formed between the urban poor 
and the devout bourgeoisie. Starting with the former, the urban poor is targeted 
because they outnumber other groups (Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004; Calvo & 
Murillo, 2004; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Szwarcberg, 2013), they are more risk-
averse (Wantchekon, 2003; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno & Brusco, 2013), or because 
they are less costly (Hicken, 2011, pp. 299–300). Accordingly, it is not surprising that 
clientelist parties have regularly been observed in poor societies characterized by high 
inequality (Singer & Kitschelt, 2011, p. 17; Robinson & Verdier, 2013, p. 264). 
Turkey, with its high income disparities and poverty (see Chapter 4), thus offers 
favorable conditions for clientelism to expand.  
 The AKP government seeks to attract the votes of the poor with the money of 
the rich. In fact, the AKP’s alliance with loyal business is not surprising if one 
considers that dominant parties typically have organic links to strong social groups, 
such as rich businessmen (for example, Japan), the church (as in Italy), or the unions 
(such as Sweden) (Dunleavy, 2010, p. 12). In this framework, AKP governments have 
frequently exchanged kickbacks with loyal businessmen, particularly in the 
construction sector (Marschall, Aydogan, & Bulut, 2015; Karatepe, 2016). In return 
for these favors, loyal businessmen donate money to a “pool,” which is used to fund 
election campaigns and the non-partisan press. The purchasing of ATV-Sabah media 
by Çalık Group best illustrates this.34 Second, loyal businessmen employ partisans in 
their businesses.  
                                               
34 The making of the partisan press under the AKP government is a dramatic example of 
patron-client relationship. In 2004, “Star TV” and “Star newspaper” owned by Genç Party 
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There is a division of labor among patrons in clientelist exchange 
The party organization and its leader are not the only actors that ensure clientelist 
exchange. As will be discussed (see Chapter 6), there is a division of labor among 
patrons, including the party, the leader, the district governorship, the municipality, the 
Ministry of Family and Social Policy, mukhtars, charity organizations, religious 
communities, and loyal businessmen. To illustrate, while the Ministry of Social Policy 
targets primarily the disabled and elderly voters, the municipality targets the young 
poor. The division of labor has two main functions. First, it hinders the monopolization 
of clientelist resources. Second, it improves the efficiency of monitoring voters.  
 
Clientelism is leader- rather than broker-mediated 
A broker is a middleman who arranges exchanges of resources between clients and 
patrons who are geographically or personally distanced (Auyero & Benzecry, 2017). 
In addition, brokers target clients, monitor their actions, obtain knowledge, and enter 
into face to face interactions with them (Stokes et all., 2013; Auyero & Benzecry, 
2017).  
 In the case of the AKP, as far as I observed, the party brokers organize 
meetings, make home visits, inform the party about developments in their area of 
responsibility, and take care of the people assigned to them, be it the elderly or the 
disabled. In this way, brokers keep the party organization alive and make things 
happen. Despite their crucial role, party brokers are not allowed to develop 
autonomous influence. Neither are they indispensable to the party leadership. The 
absence of strong brokers, in fact, maintains the unity of the party under a strong 
leader.  
                                               
leader Cem Uzan, was handed over to prime-minister controlled “Saving Deposit Insurance 
Fund” (TMSF). Three years later, the popular newspapers “Sabah” and “Takvim” and a 
popular TV channel ‘ATV’ were also taken over by the TMSF. These were then sold to the 
loyal businessmen through procurements. With the sale of Doğan group-owned “Vatan” and 
“Milliyet” to the pro-AKP Demirören family in 2011, the loyal businessmen’s control over 
newspaper circulation rose by 30 percent in 7 years (Çarkoğlu, Baruh & Yıldırm, 2014, pp. 
300-301).  
 47 
 
Clientelism is a problem-solving strategy 
Clientelism is a problem-solver for diverse groups (Auyero, 2001; 2012). In the case 
of the urban poor, clientelism serves to meet basic needs, which in theory are supposed 
to be met by the welfare state. In addition, clientelism promises upward social 
mobility and safeguards access to urban services and state jobs through its 
informal promotion and reward mechanisms (Auyero, 2012, p. 98).  
 
Clientelism is shaped by neoliberalism 
Unlike similar Islamic-rooted parties in the Middle East, the AKP’s clientelism is 
shaped by neoliberalism. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, by implementing 
neoliberal policies, such as privatization and deregulation, the AKP has nurtured its 
Islamic bourgeoisie, which funds the clientelist network. Similarly, by perpetuating 
poverty, neoliberalism keeps clients dependent on the government to sustain their 
lives. In this sense, clientelism and neoliberalism are mutually reinforcing in Turkey.35  
  
Islam constitutes a non-material aspect of clientelism 
To build an efficient clientelist network, the flow of material benefits must be 
complemented by non-material instruments, such as Islamism (see Chapter 6). 
Islamism as an ideology fulfills two crucial roles for clientelist exchange. First, it 
serves as a cement that keeps normally antagonistic classes under the same party flag 
(Gülalp, 2001; Beinin, 2004). Second, it deters exit from the clientelist network 
through neighborhood pressure.  
 
Clientelism hinges on sectarian rather than ethnic exclusion 
                                               
35 This stands in a stark contrast to Mexico, where the clientelist machine weakened after the 
PRI’s neoliberal turn during the 1980s (see Chapter 6).  
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Clientelism is by nature exclusionary. In this sense, Alevites are excluded from the 
clientelist network because they have long been aligned with the social democrats. By 
contrast, because Kurds predominantly vote for the AKP – at least in Bağcılar – ethnic 
exclusion is not evident.  
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN TURKEY 
This chapter illustrates the trajectories of party system change in Turkey. To this end, 
it first introduces the framework for party system change and then illustrates such 
change on the example of Turkey.  
 
4.1. Defining party system change 
It seems obvious to state that party system change requires an already-existing party 
system (Mair, 2006, p. 66). The issue, then, is to determine how much change suffices 
to call it “party system change.” Scholars have addressed this question by adopting 
one of two approaches. On one hand, the mathematical approach (for example, Rae, 
196736; Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) treats party system change as a matter of degree. 
In this framework, thresholds are set to reframe and locate party system change (Mair, 
2006, pp. 63–64). On the other hand, as adopted in the present study, there is the 
traditional approach (for example, Duverger, 1954; Blondel, 1968; Sartori, 1976), 
which suggests that party system change is rare in practice because party systems are 
characterized by demanding features and precise boundaries (Mair, 2006, p. 63). The 
prominent example is Ireland, whose party system evolved into a predominant party 
system through the stages of polarized pluralism and moderate pluralism, respectively 
(Mair, 1979).  
 Although Turkey has the longest experience with parliamentary democracy in 
the Muslim world, the trajectories of the Turkish party system reveal that it has an 
“inchoate” (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995) “open” (Mair, 1997) or “unstructured party 
system” (Sartori, 2005) evidenced in high levels of fragmentation, volatility and 
polarization.37 The reasons behind this are diverse: military interventions, inefficient 
                                               
36 Sartori (2005, pp. 273-274) shows that, Rae’s fractionalization index overvalues large 
parties and undervalues small parties. 
37 According to Özbudun (2013, p. 2), these are “the three maladies of the Turkish party 
system”. 
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governments, factionalism, party closures38, party switches39, and a lack of intra-party 
democracy. This feature poses a challenge to developing a consistent framework that 
would aid in thoroughly analyzing change in the Turkish party system.  
 Within this framework, this chapter above all seeks to up-to-date some 
decades-old pieces of research that examine the party system change in Turkey.40 
Second, unlike other studies that cover a time-limited period in their analysis and 
thereby lack reliable findings that highlight the general characteristics of the Turkish 
party system41, this part encompasses the analysis of the party system change since the 
establishment of modern Turkey. Third, by consistently adopting Sartori’s party 
system typology throughout the text, this chapter goes beyond taxonomies that do not 
provide meaningful insights within the context of party system theory.42  
Against this background, using Sartori’s typology, I examine the change in the 
Turkish party system based on two criteria: a) the number of relevant parties and b) 
the spatial distance between the parties (the level of polarization). For the former, we 
look at the electoral results and government compositions.  
In this framework, while positioning the parties spatially, I primarily examine 
the party programs of the respective parties. My approach was content analysis that 
centered on finding key concepts that defined the ideology of the respective parties. 
                                               
38 The regime has used the party closure card against any anti-systemic party, be it religious 
(for example, Welfare Party), ethnic (for example, People’s Democracy Party) or class-based 
(for example, Turkey’s Workers Party). 
39 Party switching is a common phenomenon in Turkey, particularly before 2002. For instance, 
from 1983 to 2002, 32 percent of deputies switched their parties. This exerted substantial 
influence on the party system by increasing fragmentation (Sayarı, 2008, p. 414). 
40 See, for instance, Ergun Özbudun, 1981; Sayarı, 1978. 
41 For instance, the studies of Öney & Selck (2017) focuses on the post-1980 period. Similarly, 
Ilter Turan’s (1988) piece covers the changing party system in early 1980s.  
42 For instance, Ergun Özbudun (2013, p. 2) calls the Turkish party system during the 1990s 
“extreme multipartism,” which lacks clarity of meaning. In the same vein, Üstün Ergüder & 
Richard I. Hofferbert (1988, p. 86) misleadingly calls the period from 1950 to 1973, 
“predominant party system”. In doing so they apparently overlook the DP’s authoritarian turn 
in the late 1950s; the coup d’etat in 1960; and the coalition governments in between 1961 and 
1965.  
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To measure polarization, on the other hand, I make use of public surveys43 and the 
secondary literature.  
 I suggest that investigating party programs has a clear advantage over other 
methods such as discourse analysis (for example, of the party leaders) in understanding 
the spatial distance between the parties. It is my view that Turkey has been governed 
by the mentality expressed in the famous motto of ex-Prime Minister Süleyman 
Demirel: “Yesterday was yesterday and today is today.” This makes it inaccurate to 
base our analysis on the discourse of the party leaders. Therefore, I believe that party 
programs – although they are prone to change from time to time – will offer a more 
consistent approach to highlighting the ideological orientation of the parties.  
On the other hand, I am well aware that our approach also has some constraints. 
First, the party programs largely consist of general and ambiguous expressions. 
Excluding a few examples, such as the “democratic left” slogan of the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) in the 1970s or the “idealism” of the Nationalist Movement 
Party (MHP), there is hardly any document that fully highlights the ideological 
orientation of the parties. Nevertheless, the use of some key terms such as “anti-
nationalism” and “conservatism” helps to highlight the ideological positioning of the 
parties. Second, the party programs of both center-right and center-left parties include 
similar provisions that make it difficult to highlight the spatial distance between them. 
Third, in some cases, the party program and political practice do not overlap much. 
For instance, while the party program of the AKP is quite liberal, its policies in 
government have recently shown quite authoritarian tendencies.  
Based on these background, I call the period from 1950 to 1960 a ‘predominant 
party system with a leaning towards a hegemonic party system’; the period from 1961 
to 1980, ‘polarized pluralism driven by a left-right divide’; and the period from 1983 
                                               
43 There is a recent and growing literature on the dynamics of polarization in Turkey (e.g. 
Fabbe, 2011; Yılmaz, 2015; Çınar, 2011; Erdoğan & Semerci, 2018; Keyman 2014; Erişen & 
Erdoğan, 2019). Polarization is also discussed in different contexts such as media (Çarkoğlu, 
Baruh & Yıldırım, 2014); elites (Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2018); political Islam (Akçalı, 2011; 
Kaya & Sunar, 2015; Tepe, 2014); environmental movement (Özler & Obach, 2018); 
presidentialism (Aytaç, Çarkoğlu & Yıldırım, 2017) and class (Ferguson, 2014).  
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to 2002, ‘polarized pluralism driven by ethnic and religious cleavages’. Considering 
the recent authoritarian drift of the incumbent AKP, I call the period from 2002 
onwards a “predominant party system with a leaning towards a hegemonic party 
system.” The summary of the findings can be found in Table 9.  
With regard to the role of opposition parties in this change, I shall emphasize 
several points. First, the opposition is highly fragmented. Second, the opposition 
parties tend to be more antagonistic toward each other than the governing party, 
illustrating the existence of what Sartori calls “bilateral opposition.” Overall, I suggest 
that while fragmented opposition led to the emergence of a one-party government 
and/or military intervention because of the high polarization it induces (for example, 
the 1970s and 1990s), the existence of bilateral opposition prolongs one-party 
governments (for example, after June 2015 elections). I must emphasize that this 
hypothesis works for the post-1960 period since there was neither fragmentation nor 
bilateral opposition before that.  
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Table 9: Summary of the party system change in Turkey (1923-2015/2) 
Period Party system Election 
year 
Government 
type 
Opposition 
type 
Government(s) members Anti-systemic 
party** 
Fragmentation*** 
1923‒
1950 
One-party authoritarian - One-party - CHP - - 
 
1950‒
1960 
Predominant party system 
with a leaning towards a 
hegemonic party system 
1950 One-party Unilateral DP - Low 
1954 One-party Unilateral DP - Low 
1957 One-party* Unilateral DP - Low 
 
 
1961‒
1980 
 
 
Polarized pluralism driven 
by class conflict 
1961 Coalition - CHP-CKMP-YTP-AP - High 
1965 One-party Bilateral AP TIP High 
1969 One party* Bilateral CHP-AP-MGP TIP High 
1973 Coalition Bilateral DP-MSP-AP-CGP-MHP-CHP - High 
1977 Coalition* Bilateral CHP-AP-MHP-MSP-CGP-DP - High 
 
 
1983‒
2002 
 
 
Polarized pluralism driven 
by ethnic and religious 
conflict 
1983 One-party - ANAP - Low 
1987 One-party Unilateral ANAP - Low 
1991 Coalition Bilateral DYP -SHP RP High 
1995 Coalition Bilateral RP-ANAP-DYP-DSP-CHP-RP-
DTP 
- High 
1999 Coalition Bilateral MHP-DSP-ANAP - High 
 
 
2002‒
2015 
Predominant party system  2002 One-party Unilateral AKP - Low 
2007 One-party Unilateral AKP - Low 
2011 One-party Bilateral AKP BDP Low 
2015/1 One-party Bilateral AKP - Low 
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2015/2 One-party Bilateral AKP HDP Low 
*Interrupted by military intervention/memorandum. 
** Anti-systemic parties are those that have vote power or are capable of influencing the dynamics of the competition, be it in a centrifugal or a centripetal direction 
(Sartori, 2005).  
*** Fragmentation is high if five or more parties actively shape the party system (Sartori, 2005). 
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4.2. 1923‒1950: One-party authoritarianism 
The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 by the CHP, which maintained its single-
party rule until 1950. In terms of its organizational structure, the CHP was a typical 
cadre party, guided by a group of elites who organized the war of independence under 
the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. As a general tendency, the CHP’s rule was 
authoritarian in character, not totalitarian, because the CHP did not have a clear 
ideology44 and was not interested in regulating the private sphere. In the same vein, in 
contrast to totalitarian regimes, political and social mobilization was circumscribed.45  
 Since the Young Turk era – although marginalized and frequently suppressed 
– the opposition was allowed to be represented in the parliament, be it the Liberal 
Union Party (Ahrar Party) in the First Constitutional Monarchy or the Second Group 
in the First Assembly of 1920‒1923 (Özbudun, 2015, p. 36). During the single-party 
rule of the CHP, the ruling elites allowed the establishment of the Progressive 
Republican Party (TCF) in 1924 and the Free Republican Party (SCF) in 1930. The 
regime’s tolerance of these parties diminished, however, as they started to become 
credible alternatives to the regime (Turan, 2015, p. 47). While the TCF was banned 
after the assassination attempt on Mustafa Kemal in Izmir, the SCF dissolved itself 
upon Mustafa Kemal’s request. The allegation was the same: they became the center 
of anti-secular activities. This rationale persisted in the following decades and laid the 
groundwork for the dissolution of the religious parties.  
Why did the Kemalist elites allow party pluralism, even for a short period of 
time? The relevant literature suggests that the authoritarian regimes allow party 
pluralism for a variety of reasons, ranging from a desire to monitor the success of the 
regime (Blaydes, 2011) to alleviating possible tension between the ruler and the ruling 
                                               
44 There is a great deal of literature that defines the CHP’s ideology as corporatist. For instance, 
Parla & Davison (2004) labels the CHP’s ideological orientation, solidaristic corporatism with 
a partial fascistic tendencies. Similarly, Zafer Toprak (1980) documents how the corporatism 
of the late Ottomans permeated into modern Turkey. However, not all authors share the view 
that the CHP was a corporatist party (e.g. Esen, 2014). 
45 From a different perspective, the political regime was mobilizing as it was able to form a 
new republic. Therefore, in Linz’s (2000) analysis, Turkey falls under the ‘post-independence 
mobilizational regime’.  
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elite (Magaloni, 2006, 2008). In the Turkish case, similarly to other authoritarian 
settings (Schedler, 2002, 2006), the inclusion of the opposition in parliament was 
clearly aimed at expanding the legitimacy of the regime. Once this failed, the check 
and balance mechanism was bypassed, which further intensified one-party control 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2010, p. 123).  
Absence of party pluralism does not amount to saying that there was no 
opposition. On the contrary, the opposition was organized within the ruling party. 
From the outset, intra-party contestation between the étatists and the liberals was 
intense. While the liberals overwhelmed the étatists during the 1920s, the balance of 
power shifted to the étatists after the 1929 economic crisis (Boratav, 2003; Zürcher, 
2004). As Solinger (2001) argues, intra-party opposition has the potential to weaken 
one-party regimes. And this is exemplified in the collapse of CHP rule in the next 
decade.  
 
4.3. 1950‒60: From the predominant party system to the hegemonic party 
system 
In 1945, reacting to the land reform program, four deputies resigned from the 
CHP and founded the Democrat Party (DP). The DP came into power in 1950 and 
repeated its success in the 1954 and 1957 elections, mainly drawing on the support of 
the periphery (Frey, 1975; Heper, 1985).46 It remained in power until it was ousted by 
a military intervention in 1960.  
During the 1950s, the major contestation took place between the DP and the 
CHP. Although niche parties such as the Nation Party (MP) were popular for some 
time, they could never translate that popularity into many seats in the parliament 
because of a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system that empowers large parties 
and underrepresents small ones (Norris, 2004; Taagepera, 2007). In line with this, the 
                                               
46 The alliance of the periphery with the right wing parties gave rise to an equilibrium in which 
the right-wing votes typically double those of the left (Özbudun, 2013).  
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election results show that even the second party (CHP) was highly underrepresented. 
Accordingly, the DP sustained its super-majority in the parliament despite the 
substantial decline in its vote share in the 1957 elections.  
Under any given standard, the spatial distance between the DP and the CHP 
does not suffice to put them in opposing camps – at least in the early 1950s. The 
difference between these two parties was non-ideological in character and mainly 
hinged on some policy issues (Sayarı, 1978: 43). When the DP attempted to strengthen 
its position in the political system and began to adopt populist authoritarian policies 
towards the end of the 1950s (Sayarı, 2002, p. 65), the gap between the discourse and 
the practice of the party became wider. Responding this, the CHP leadership started to 
address voters through a more reformist/progressive discourse and policy agenda.47  
Despite exhibiting the characteristics of a predominant party system until the 
1957 elections, the party system transformed into a ‘hegemonic party system’ in the 
next three years. First, the DP’s attempt to confiscate the CHP’s party property through 
the “Investigation Committee” (Tahkikat Komisyonu) (Hale, 2013, p. 106), its 
pressuring of the media, and its imposition of police control on the opposition illustrate 
the desire of the DP to eliminate competition (Harris, 1970, p. 445). The legal 
arrangements, on the other hand, included the downgrade of Kırşehir’s status as 
province and the split of Malatya province after predominantly voting for the 
opposition. Second, the DP had enough of a majority to change the constitution during 
each term.  
 Eventually, the declining popularity of the DP as a result of economic setbacks 
(Tachau & Good, 1973, p. 552) and intra-party splits48 accelerated its authoritarian 
turn. This drift brought about social mobilization within the opposition, especially in 
the form of student revolts (Sayarı, 2008, p. 406). When this was backed by secular 
                                               
47 The document which best captured the reformist turn of the CHP was the “Declaration of 
Primary Goals” (İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi) in 1959. In the document, the CHP called for the 
separation of powers in addition to making necessary changes to ensure free and fair elections.  
48 For instance, the liberal wing of the DP founded the “Freedom Party” in 1956. The next 
year, Fuad Köprülü, one of four founders of the DP and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
resigned in 1957 (Karpat, 1961). 
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intellectuals and the bureaucracy, it laid the groundwork for the military intervention 
in 1960 (Landau, 2016, p. 205; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p. 154). After the coup, the 
army dissolved the DP.  
 The military intervention in 1960 turned Turkey into a “tutelage democracy”. 
(Çalışkan, 2017; 2018). Since then, defining itself as a “guardian of the regime” 
(Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p. 154), the military frequently intervened in daily politics 
and enjoyed autonomy in preparation of the defense budget and deciding on 
promotions (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p. 151). Despite these authoritarian traits, the 
basic principles of democracies such as free elections and the rule of law were 
respected (Akgün, 2001, p. 74). As will be discussed, the military tutelage maintained 
until the AKP’s “competitive authoritarian turn”.  
 
4.4. 1961‒1980: Polarized pluralism driven by left-right cleavage 
After the coup d’état in May 1960 and in order to obscure the re-emergence of 
authoritarian one-party rule, the new electoral system (D’Hondt) was adopted. This 
move increased fragmentation in the parliament, especially on the right of the political 
spectrum, and thereby empowered anti-systemic parties at the expense of the center 
(Turan, 1988, p. 66).  
  I call the party system between 1961 and 1980 ‘polarized pluralism driven by 
left-right cleavage’. The left-right cleavage came to the forefront because of social 
transformation defined by rapid urbanization, industrialization and transition to a 
market economy (Özbudun, 2015). Accordingly, new parties with diverse ideologies 
came into existence to capture the newly rising sectors of society (Özbudun, 2015, p. 
65; Özbudun, 2013, p. 2). 
 Polarized pluralism has several properties. First, fragmentation is high, 
implying that five or more parties simultaneously and actively shape the party system 
(Sartori, 2005, p. 112). Recalling the relevance criteria, the parties I count are the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), Justice Party (AP), National Salvation Party (MSP), 
Republican Villagers Nation Party [Nationalist Action Party]) (CKMP [MHP]), New 
Turkey Party (YTP), Nation Party (MP), Republican Trust Party [National Trust Party, 
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Trust Party] (CGP [MGP, GP]), and the Democratic Party (DP). At the same time, I 
discounted the Union Party of Turkey Party (TBP), because it never joined any 
coalition government and apparently had no blackmail potential. 
Second, as a result of high fragmentation, the direction of the competition is 
centrifugal, showing the influence of the anti-systemic parties on the party system 
(Sartori, 2005, p. 119). Although during the 1970s, almost all parties adopted some 
sort of anti-systemic rhetoric49 (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 123), I only identify the 
Turkey’s Workers Party (TIP) as an anti-systemic party because its socialist leaning 
was regarded as a threat to the regime (Ünsal, 2002). Nevertheless, the TIP was 
capable of changing the dynamic of the competition in a centrifugal direction. Its 
effective opposition in the parliament, for instance, prompted the CHP to initially shift 
to the “left of the center” during the mid-1960s and then to “social democracy” in the 
next decade (Emre, 2014). It also prompted mainstream parties to abandon a “national 
reminder electoral system” and switch to the less proportional “D’Hondt system” 
(Aydın & Taşkın, 2016, pp. 173-174).  
On the other hand, despite its ultra-nationalist program and discourse, I do not 
identify the MHP as anti-systemic, simply because it found a place in the coalition 
governments known as the “Nationalist Front Governments”. Nothing could illustrate 
polarized pluralism better than the name of these coalitions!  
Third, in polarization pluralism, there is a bilateral opposition that makes the 
opposition parties closer to the governing parties than to each other (Sartori, 2005, pp. 
118-119). This can best be derived from the party programs of the respective parties, 
which I summarize in Table 10. From the table, one may infer that the Republican 
Reliance Party/Reliance Party/Nationalist Reliance Party’s (CGP/GP/MGP) emphasis 
on anti-religious extremism located them against the MNP/MSP tradition that 
prioritized religious values. In the same vein, the MHP’s emphasis on anti-communism 
situated them in opposition to the TIP, which built its program on unionism and labor.  
                                               
49 According to İlter Turan (1988, p. 66), maximizing ideological distance to the rival parties 
was pragmatically adopted to make party switches more difficult. 
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Between 1960 and 1980, parties of diverse ideological backgrounds, including 
the nationalists, conservatives, socialists, and social democrats found a place in the 
parliament. This expanded spatial dimension of the party competition (Sayarı, 2014, 
p. 90). However, rather than fostering political consensus, party pluralism enhanced 
polarization in the parliament (Tachau & Heper, 1983).  
Towards the end of the 1960s, political polarization extended to the social 
sphere, mainly through student protests and guerilla-style robberies and kidnappings 
(Tachau & Good, 1973, p. 553). The end result was the military memorandum in 1971 
that curtailed the democratic rights granted by the 1961 constitution and narrowed 
down the political space with the sanction of party closure. During the 1970s, on the 
other hand, high levels of fragmentation50 and resulting polarization, this time, turned 
into a widespread violent street clashes (Turan, 1988, p. 67), which made forming a 
stable government a formidable task.  
 
Table 10: Parties and leanings (1961‒1980) 
Party Leanings 
 
CGP/GP/MGP 
• Anti-communism 
• Anti-liberalism 
• Anti-religious extremism 
 
CHP 
• Democratic left (1976) (incorporates freedom, equality, 
solidarity, superiority of labor, and self-government) 
• Principles of Atatürk 
 • Agrarianism 
                                               
50 Here, the role of the electoral system must be underlined. In the 1977 elections, despite 
winning 42 percent of the votes, the CHP could not obtain a big enough majority to form a 
government alone. If one considers that the ANAP was able to form a government on their 
own with merely 36 percent of the votes in 1987 or the AKP with 34 percent of the votes in 
2002, the impact of the electoral system on the party system can be better understood.  
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AP • Market economy 
 
 
CKMP/MHP 
• Agrarianism 
• Idealism 
• Nationalism 
• Anti-communism 
 
 
TIP 
• Unionism 
• Labor (socialism) 
• Social equality 
 
 
MNP/MSP 
• National View 
• Conservatism 
• Heavy industrialization 
• Anti-Westernism 
YTP • Individualism 
• Traditionalism (the legacy of the DP) 
*Based on the party programs, available at  
w w w . t b m m . g o v . t r / d e v e l o p / o w a / e _ y a y i n . l i s t e _ q ? p t i p = S I Y
A S I % 2 0 P A R T I % 2 0 Y A Y I N L A R I  
 
In this environment, which was deeply polarized along left-right lines, the only 
party that could maneuver both sides was Erbakan’s MSP, the successor of the 
National Order Party (MNP). Reflecting the zeitgeist, the MSP prioritized economics 
over religion (Toprak, 2005, p. 171), despite its heavy emphasis on religion in its party 
program. This strategy put the MSP at an advantage during the 1970s, as it took part 
in the coalition governments of both camps and in the aftermath of the 1980 military 
coup (Atacan, 2005, p. 192; Yavuz, 2003, p. 69; Zürcher, 2004, p. 288). 
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  Fourth, polarized pluralism empowered minor parties, the independents, and 
the defectors (Sayarı, 1978, p. 56). The Güneş Motel event illustrates this.51 As a 
result, reflecting the nature of polarized pluralism, governments were short-lived 
during this period (20 governments were formed in 20 years).  
 Overall, my analysis reveals that fragmented opposition initially led to the one-
party governments of the AP in 1965 and 1969, which came to an end with the 1971 
military memorandum. The combination of fragmentation and bilateral opposition 
during the 1970s led to political instability, which permeated into public life in the 
form of civil-war like situation. As Huntington (1968) observes, the inevitable result 
of this development was a military intervention in the praetorian regimes.  
 
4.5. 1983‒2002: Polarized pluralism driven by ethnic and religious cleavages 
Polarized pluralism persisted in the aftermath of the coup as well, albeit changed in its 
form as the military severely crushed down the grassroots organizations of the left. In 
order to reduce fragmentation and thereby polarization, the D’Hondt system was 
implemented with a record-high national (10 percent) and a district level threshold.52 
Although these measures worked well during the 1980s, high levels of fragmentation 
returned to Turkish politics with the 1991 elections. (Çarkoğlu, 1998, p. 551). 
Accordingly, anti-systematic parties emerged as a credible alternative to the 
mainstream parties (Çarkoğlu, 1998, p. 544).  
 Recalling the relevance criteria, the parties we count include the Motherland 
Party (ANAP), True Path Party (DYP), Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP), 
Democratic Left Party (DSP), Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), Welfare Party (RP), 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the Republican People’s Party (CHP). As shown 
in Table 11, In this term, fragmentation was high, especially after the 1991 elections 
                                               
51 In the 1977 elections, despite casting record-high votes of 42 percent, the CHP failed to 
form the government alone because it lacked 13 seats. To compensate it, the CHP leadership 
transferred the splinters from the AP to the CHP after the meeting in Güneş Motel. In return 
for their favor, the splinters were awarded with ministership in the cabinet. 
52 The district threshold included the division of big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara into 
smaller constituencies.  
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(Çarkoğlu, 1998) due to a lack of intraparty democracy, an authoritarian leadership 
and a closed-list party system which strengthened leaders’ authority within their 
parties vis-à-vis opponents (Taagepera, 2007, p. 273).  
 
Table 11: The trends of selected indicators (1983-1999) 
 Turnout Volatility Fragmentation Competition Disproportionality 
1983 88 - 2.85 85.4 6.79 
1987 91 38.5 4.11 88.5 22.3 
1991 81 16.6 4.67 97 11.34 
1995 82 17.9 6.16 97.8 9.78 
1999 83 20.2 6.78 95.8 9.47 
 
Source: Tezcür, 2012, p. 119. 
Notes: Volatility is based on the Pedersen formula. As the number gets closer to 0, 
parties’ vote share remains the same across two elections. Fragmentation is calculated 
according to the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of parties’ indicator. If one party 
has a huge majority, the number is slightly above 1. Competition measures the vote 
share differences between the winning party and the second-strongest party subtracted 
from 100. The nearer the resulting value to 100, the more competitive the party system. 
Disproportionality is based on the Gallagher index and is calculated by summing up 
of absolute differences between parties’ seat and vote share. 
 
Recall that high levels of fragmentation have a systemic implication ‒ i.e., an 
increase in polarization (Sartori 2005). However, this time polarization was driven by 
ethnic and religious cleavages rather than by class (Kalaycıoğlu, 1999). Parties 
leanings derived from their program can be found in Table 12. 
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 In relation to ethnic cleavage, while pro-Kurdish parties’53 programs 
emphasized anti-nationalism and racism, the MHP’s party program was built on anti-
terrorism (ethnic) and nationalism. The salience of ethnic polarization can best be 
shown through the remarkable increase in the vote share of the MHP ‒ from eight 
percent in 1995 to 18 percent in 1999 ‒ as a result of the PKK leader’s imprisonment.  
 
Table 12: Parties and leanings (1982‒2002) 
Party Leanings 
 
DYP 
• Agrarianism 
• Nationalism 
• Conservatism 
DSP • Democratic left/social democracy 
• Secularism 
SHP/CHP • Kemalism 
• Social democracy 
 
HEP/DEP/ÖZDEP/HADEP/DEHAP 
• Anti-nationalism 
• Anti-racism 
• Pro-Kurdish 
• Pro-left 
 
 
ANAP 
• Mixture of four ideologies (center, 
center-left, center-right, Islamism) 
• Liberal market economy 
                                               
53 The Kurdish candidates, who were elected under the SHP list in the 1991 elections were 
expelled from the party in 1994. This led them to form their own party, the Party of Democracy 
(DEP). The DEP and its successors were banned by the Constitutional Court on the ground 
that they divide the nation along ethnic lines. 
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• Export-driven growth 
 
MHP 
• Anti-globalism 
• Nationalism 
• Anti-terrorism 
 
 
RP/FP 
• National View 
• Social justice (Just Order) 
• Developmentalism 
• Conservatism (Islamism) 
 
*Based on the party programs, available at  
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin.liste_q?ptip=SIYASI%20PAR
TI%20YAYINLARI 
 
The second element that drove polarization during the 1990s was religion 
(Esmer, 2002; Sayarı, 2002). The forerunner on the Islamic front was the Welfare 
Party (RP), the successor of the MSP. From the outset, while the RP constantly labelled 
itself as the “anti-order party”, it referred to others as the “order party”. This rhetoric 
hindered it from joining coalition governments after the 1991 elections. Therefore, I 
identify the RP between the 1991 and 1995 elections as an anti-systemic party. In 
contrast to this, although the RP increased its Islamic tone and injected its Islamic 
agenda into official documents such as “Just Order”, it succeeded in forming an 11-
month-long government with the DYP under the premiership of Erbakan, following 
its victory in the 1995 elections. Therefore, considering its coalition potential, I do not 
identify the RP as an anti-systemic party after the 1995 elections.  
As I have highlighted, bilateral opposition prevails in polarized pluralism. 
Illustrating this point, the opposition to Islamists mainly came from the social 
democrats, who incorporated secularism into their party programs. What was 
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interesting during the 1990s was that fragmentation on the right permeated into left, 
which came to mean that there was no single party that represented the interest of the 
center (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p. 407). And paradoxically, fragmentation of the left among 
the CHP, DSP, and SHP laid the groundwork for the further rise of the Islamists (Öniş, 
1997). The most notable example was the 1994 local elections, which resulted in a 
defeat of the social democrats in Istanbul and Ankara by a small margin.  
Bilateral opposition was also evident on the right of the political spectrum. 
Despite having similar party programs and bases of support54, the ANAP and the DYP 
failed to form a government together after the 1995 legislative elections because of 
their leaders’ personal animosities. Accordingly, the DYP formed the government with 
the RP, which set the stage for the post-modern coup in 1997 and the AKP rule in 
2002.  
In addition, as a result of the polarized pluralism, the governments were short-
lived during the 1990s (ten governments were formed between 1991 and 2002). This 
rendered parties largely unresponsive to the demands of the voters. The same applies 
to the opposition as well (Sartori, 2005, p. 122). Eventually, as a result of what Sartori 
(2005, p. 123) would call the “politics of outbidding”, economic crises and political 
instability became chronic during the 1990s and early 2000s (Akgün, 2001, pp. 79-
80).  
 
4.6. 2002‒2015: Predominant party system  
After the 1999 elections, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP) and Motherland Party (ANAP) formed a coalition government. Although 
the new government was successful in legalizing new democratic reforms, its 
management of the economy was a disaster. Consequently, the deepening of what Öniş 
                                               
54 Yılmaz Esmer (1995) shows that the ideological self-placement of the DYP and ANAP 
voters were similar to each other, just like the DSP and the CHP on the left.  
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(2003, p. 3) calls the “low-growth, high inequality syndrome” stimulated the most 
devastating economic crisis in February 2001.55  
The resulting frustration with the mainstream parties led the public to widely 
believe that coalition governments are malignant. Therefore, coalition governments 
gradually lost their image of reflecting the plurality in the society and were 
increasingly equated with political malfunctioning rather than seen as institutions that 
reflected party pluralism. This political turn – the prevailing of stability over pluralism 
– constituted the “psychological dimension” of entering into the longest one-party 
government. With the support of the electoral system, the AKP captured two thirds of 
the parliamentary seats despite winning only 34 percent of the votes. After winning 
the third election in a row by at least a 10 percent margin in 2011, the AKP transformed 
the Turkish party system into a predominant party system (Aslan-Akman, 2012; Ayan-
Musil, 2015; Baç & Keyman, 2012; Çarkoğlu, 2011; Gümüşçü, 2012).  
As Mair (2006, p. 66) rightfully states, “change in the structure of competition 
[party system] is perhaps most easily observed when it involves a new party arriving 
in office; by definition, this will also involve the adoption of an innovative governing 
formula.” The AKP as a six-month old party illustrates this occurrence.  
 
Table 13: Selected indicators after 2002 
 Turnout Volatility Fragmentation Competition Disproportionality 
2002 76 41.7 5.43 85.1 27.04 
2007 82 18.6 3.48 74.3 11.92 
2011 81 11.6 2.97 76.2 7.47 
2015/1* 81 11.4 3.65 84.1 4.9 
2015/2* 84 9.8 2.99 75.8 6.7 
                                               
55 Because of the crisis, more than a million-people lost their jobs; 350.000 workplaces were 
closed down; and real wages declined by 20 percent. Expectedly, the most vulnerable group 
to the crisis was the poor (Öniş, 2003, p. 15; Yeldan, 2007, p. 3). 
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Source: Tezcür, 2012, p. 119. 
Notes: Volatility is based on the Pedersen formula. As the number gets closer to 0, 
parties’ vote share remains the same across two elections. Fragmentation is calculated 
according to the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of parties’ indicator. If one party 
has a huge majority, the number is slightly above 1. Competition measures the vote 
share differences between the winning party and the second-strongest party subtracted 
from 100. The nearer the resulting value to 100, the more competitive the party system. 
Disproportionality is based on the Gallagher index and is calculated by summing up 
of absolute differences between parties’ seat and vote share. 
*Personal communication with Güneş Murat Tezcür, 20 June 2017.  
 
In the post-2002 period, electoral volatility and fragmentation declined sharply, 
and the party system became more stabilized (Tezcür, 2012). However, these changes 
did not tone down polarization (Çınar, 2016). On the contrary, party polarization 
increased. For instance, according to Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSeS) 
data, the party system polarization score of Turkey rose from 2.34 in 2002 to 6.21 in 
2015 (Erdoğan & Semerci, 2018, p. 39). Similarly, a survey on public polarization 
conducted by Konda (2010) reveals the intensity of polarization along party lines.  
In addition to public surveys, the extent of polarization can also be grasped 
from the electoral indicators, i.e. high turnout levels and the lowering of wasted votes, 
presented in Chapter 3 (Table 5). To remind again, while turnout reached a record-low 
79 percent in the 2002 elections, it averaged 87 percent in the last three elections (2011, 
June and November 2015). The wasted votes followed the same trend and declined 
from a record-high 47 percent in 2002 to a record-low 3 percent in the November 2015 
elections. I argue that the increase in turnout and the decline in wasted votes cannot be 
primarily explained through the policy appeals of the relevant parties. Rather, I suggest 
that voters are going to the polls in order to prevent the other party(ies) from winning 
the elections. This strategic voting resulting from polarization prompts further 
polarization and clearly undermines the quality of democracy.  
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Considering the relevance criteria, in this period, the parties I count consist of 
the CHP, MHP, and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party/Peace and Democracy 
Party/People’s Democratic Party (DTP/BDP/HDP). At the same time, I qualify the 
BDP/HDP (for the 2011 and November 2015 elections) as an anti-systemic party given 
its lack of coalition potential and veto power. However, I must also underline that the 
HDP’s anti-system party image eroded considerably between the June and November 
2015 elections, when it was seen as a viable partner in the coalition talks with the CHP 
(Sözcü, 2015).  
In accounting for the relations between the opposition parties, if one excludes 
the temporary cooperation between the MHP and the CHP during the 2010 
referendum, the presidential elections in 2014, and the cooperation between the CHP 
and the HDP in the recent campaign against the introduction of presidentialism in 
Turkey, the opposition could not open a unique front against the AKP. Instead, as a 
typical feature of polarized pluralism, bilateral opposition prevailed between the 
nationalist and MHP and the pro-Kurdish parties that locate their political orientation 
in oppose to each other in their party programs as summarized in Table 14. However, 
unlike the 1990s, the contestation between these opposite poles took place in 
parliament, at least from 2007 onwards.  
 
 
Table 14: Parties and leanings (2002‒2015) 
Party Leanings 
 
CHP 
• Kemalism 
• Social Democracy 
AKP** • Pro-democracy 
• Pro-liberalism (economic)  
MHP • Idealism 
• Nationalism 
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• Moralism 
• Agrarianism 
• Communitarianism 
 
DEHAP/DTP/BDP/HDP 
• Anti-nationalism 
• Anti-racism 
• Pro-Kurdish 
• Pro-labor 
*Based on the party programs, available at  
www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin.liste_q?ptip=SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYI
NLARI 
**What is notable for the AKP program is that it refrains from highlighting any 
concrete principle or ideology that defines its ideological orientation – at least until the 
AKP leadership formulated the term “conservative democracy” to refer its ideology.56  
 
The AKP also weakened the opposition through appealing to the leaders of 
rival right-wing parties. Most notably, the AKP melted down the HAS Party and the 
Democrat Party – which performed well in the 2009 local elections – by persuading 
their leaders to defect in return for high-ranking positions within the AKP cadres.57 
This strategy of melting down political rivals by offering political favors – 
miniaturizing its clientelist nature – further entrenched the AKP’s dominance in 
politics. 
In addition, the opposition suffered from other weaknesses. First, the 
fragmented opposition lacked any cross-class support that might jeopardize the AKP’s 
grip on power (Öniş, 2012, p. 147; Öniş, 2013, pp. 118-120). For instance, the MHP 
and the pro-Kurdish parties remained as niche parties that could not extend their voter 
                                               
56 For an insightful study on the concept of the conservative democracy, see Çağliyan-İçener 
(2009). 
57 These figures later became the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Culture, 
respectively. 
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base beyond their core constituencies. Second, the opposition suffered from lack of 
unity within the party. To illustrate, the CHP witnessed an intense intra-party rivalry 
between a defensive nationalist camp that prioritized the defense of the secular regime 
and the European style social democratic faction that prioritized democratic and 
economic reforms (Öniş, 2012, p. 147; Öniş, 2013, pp. 118-120). Third, the opposition 
parties could not generate a reliable party program as an alternative to the incumbent. 
More specifically, the opposition parties could not attract new voters with their party 
program emphasizing redistribution and anti-corruption (Öniş, 2012, p. 147).  
Finally, I suggest along with other scholars (for example, Keyman & Gümüşçü, 
2014; Özbudun, 2015; Çınar 2016; Lancaster 2016) that the predominant party system 
in Turkey has tended to transform into a hegemonic party system in recent years, 
particularly after the November 2015 elections. This is also reflected in Freedom 
House reports as well as in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index.58 
There are two major indications of this transformation. The efforts of the AKP to not 
share power with the opposition after the June 2015 elections and the declaration of a 
‘state of emergency’ (SoE), ensuing in the failed coup attempt in July 2016, evidently 
restrained political freedoms and competition (Erişen & Erdoğan, 2019, p. 5) through 
the securitization of dissent (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016). Second, electoral malpractices, 
including the use of fraud and intimidation, have become more evident. The recent 
violations with regard to the counting of votes in the presidential referendum in April 
2017 and the voting conditions in the eastern and southeastern provinces draw 
attention to electoral malpractice. Similarly, repression of opposition became evident, 
as in the case of Gezi Park protests (Akkoyunlu & Öktem, 2016, p. 506).  
Although these features bring the party system closer to a hegemonic party 
system, in order to fully qualify as a hegemonic party system, two more features must 
be observed. The first one is related to the majority of the AKP in the parliament. 
                                               
58 According to Freedom House report, Turkey moved from the category of a “partly free” 
country with the freedom score of 3.5 in 2015 to the category of “not free” with the freedom 
score of 5.5 in 2018. In the assessment of the Economist, Turkey’s democracy score dropped 
from 5.63 in 2013 to 4.88 in 2017, which indicates that Turkey is getting closer to authoritarian 
regimes.  
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Unlike the hegemonic party systems, the AKP could never retain enough of a majority 
(two-thirds of the seats) to change the constitution unilaterally. However, it would be 
logical to treat the recent alliance between the AKP and the MHP on the transition to 
presidentialism as the fulfilment of the first criterion. Second, unlike the hegemonic 
party system, it would be inappropriate to put all opposition parties in the basket of 
‘satellite parties’. 
 The transition to hegemonic party system marks that Turkey’s regime59 has 
been evolving from a “tutelary democracy”’60 to a “competitive authoritarian regime” 
(CAR) (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016; Özbudun, 2015; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2018). The drift 
towards competitive authoritarianism means that the essentials of democracies, e.g., 
the separation of powers, press freedom and the procedural requirement of conducting 
elections, have no longer been fulfilled and political competition is skewed in favor of 
the incumbent through repression, fraud and patronage (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016; 
Çalışkan, 2018). A notable example that shows the how political competition is 
narrowed down is the sending of the HDP leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, to prison along 
with other deputies, following the removal of immunities by the parliament. 
                                               
59 The AKP’s authoritarian turn takes different labels such as “delegative democracy” (Taş, 
2015); “neo-fascism” (Tuğal, 2016); “weak authoritarianism” (Akkoyunlu & Öktem, 2016) 
or “electoral authoritarianism” (Arbatlı, 2014). 
60 The AKP weakened the military through pursuing the EU agenda, decreasing the level of 
internal threats, and implementing legal reforms (Akça & Balta-Paker, 2013; Esen & 
Gümüşçü, 2016).  
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: AKP 
This chapter is about the AKP. First, it traces its political roots; then, it highlights the 
two core characteristics of the AKP, neoliberalism and political Islam, whose 
amalgamation make clientelism an efficient political mobilization strategy. Finally, it 
briefly examines AKP government policies.  
 
5.1. The rise and fall of Islamist politics in Turkey 
Contrary to the claims of the AKP leadership that the AKP is following in the DP’s 
tradition (Hürriyet, 2003), the AKP is an Islamic-rooted party that evolved from the 
“National Outlook Tradition.”61 Below, I present a short overview of this 
transformation.  
The first party in the National Outlook Tradition was the National Order Party 
(MNP), which was established in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. The founding of this 
Islamic-leaning party was a watershed: It helped to institutionalize Islamic actors, who 
had long been considered “outsiders” (Boztemur, 2001, p. 127). It also expressed the 
mobilization of small entrepreneurs in Anatolian provinces against the big secular 
capital owners in the metropolitan areas (Sarıbay, 1985; Gülalp, 2001).  
Despite its emphasis on social justice rather than Islamism in appealing to 
voters (Guidere, 2012, p. 226), the MNP was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 
1971 for its anti-secular activities. In practice, this judgment was nugatory because it 
did not impose any sanctions on the establishment of successor parties. 
After the closure of the MNP, the National Salvation Party (MSP) was formed. 
In keeping with its symbol, the MSP was a “key” party during the 1970s, despite its 
vote share of around 10 percent. This was because, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, in a highly fragmented and polarized parliament, small parties played a crucial 
role in forming governments. Consequently, the MSP became an indispensable part of 
                                               
61 The National Outlook Tradition emphasizes Turkey’s economic and cultural development 
based on Islamic ethics.  
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coalition governments in the 1970s. Along with other parties, the MSP was closed 
down by the military regime following the coup d’état.  
The third party in this tradition, the Welfare Party (RP), was founded in 1983. 
Similar to its predecessors, the RP represented mainly the interests of provincial 
businessmen and artisans in Anatolia (Tuğal, 2012, p. 32; Karadağ, 2010, p. 20). In 
terms of its organizational structure, the RP was unique (Mecham, 2004, PP. 342–343) 
as it incorporated well-organized party members whose enthusiasm was maintained 
by ascribing party duties to the “order of God” (Ayata, 1996, p. 52). When this 
enthusiasm was combined with a large-scale mobilization capacity, the RP rose to be 
the first mass party in Turkey (Özbudun, 2006, p. 552).62  
As Table 15 illustrates, the RP’s electoral performance improved rapidly 
during the 1990s. To illustrate, the RP received 16.8 percent of the votes in the 1991 
legislative elections, rising to 21.3 percent in 1995. The RP showed the same promise 
in the 1994 local elections as well and captured 28 cities, including Istanbul and 
Ankara.  
 
Table 15: Electoral performance of the National Outlook Tradition parties 
(1973–1999) 
Election year Party  Vote share Seat share 
1973 MSP 11.8 10.6 
1977 MSP 8.6 5.3 
1987 RP 7.2 – 
1991 RP 16.8 13.7 
1995 RP 21.3 28.7 
                                               
62 Parties in Turkey were first organized around cadre parties. In the course of time, their weak 
social base and need to finance party activities and election campaigns pushed these parties to 
transform themselves into cartel parties. In the course of all this no genuine mass party has 
been institutionalized in Turkey because of the weakness of organized labor and the anti-labor 
policies of the governing elites.  
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1999 FP 15.4 20.1 
Source: Supreme Electoral Council. 
 
Several elements might account for the rise of the RP. The first element was 
military support for the Islamists, who were seen as “on the same side” during the civil 
war–like situation in the 1970s, within the framework of a program known as the 
“Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (TIS). The TIS aimed to “pacify social dissent” and 
“consolidate conservative forces” to maintain social unity (Buğra, 2002, p. 189). The 
second element was the demise of the social democrats due to the military crackdown. 
The social democrats were also plagued by factionalism, however. For example, they 
contested the 1994 local elections under the flags of three separate parties. This divided 
the vote and allowed the RP candidates in Istanbul and Ankara to win with slight 
margins. Third, as center parties proved inefficient and the social democrats perished, 
the RP attracted more voters with its economic program, which explicitly targeted the 
urban poor, artisans, and provincial businessmen (Özbudun, 2000; Toprak, 2005; 
Beinin, 2004; Gülalp, 2001). Finally, the Islamists’ success in providing services must 
be noted. Recall that the RP’s popularity began to grow with its successes in Konya, 
Sivas, Maraş, and Van municipalities.  
As the leading party in the 1995 legislative elections, the RP formed an 11-
month old coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP), under the prime 
premiership of Erbakan. This development pushed Erbakan into a difficult dilemma. 
If he sought to placate the secular establishment and tone down his anti-system 
position, he would have alienated his core supporters; on the other hand, if he did not 
do so, his party would have been confronted with the threat of disbandment (Eligür, 
2010, p. 217). Nevertheless, Erbakan dared to take some steps against the secular 
establishment: he hosted religious leaders in the official residence, engaged more with 
the Islamic world, and frequently used anti-secular language, along with his deputies. 
In the shadow of a military memorandum on 28 February 1997 – which was frequently 
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called a “post-modern coup”63 – the Constitutional Court dissolved the RP for its anti-
secular activities.  
Following that, supporters founded the Virtue Party (FP). The new party 
leadership aimed to soften the FP’s radical image (Eligür, 2010, p. 236) by curtailing 
its infamous anti-democratic and anti-Western stance. Whether this was pragmatically 
motivated or not – apparently it was a tactic to solve the party’s existential problem in 
politics – the radical break with the past led to a serious intra-party contestation 
between the “moderates,” who suggested solving the party’s problems with new 
leadership, and the “hardliners,” who were true followers of Erbakan. The decline in 
the party’s vote in the 1999 legislative elections exacerbated the rivalry. At the historic 
party congress in 2000, the moderates defeated the hardliners by a small margin. 
Following that, the moderates decided to form a new party under the leadership of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.  
 
5.2. AKP  
The AKP was established in August 2001. In order not to be confronted by the secular 
establishment, the AKP developed its party program on three pillars: market reforms, 
democratization, and EU accession (Leon, Desai & Tuğal, 2009, p. 209). Broadly 
speaking, while the market reforms aimed to alleviate the impact of the 2001 economic 
crisis, the democratization agenda aimed to end military tutelage. The EU agenda, on 
the other hand, was adopted pragmatically to help realize the first two goals.  
 As already mentioned, the AKP amalgamated neoliberalism and political Islam 
to make its clientelism work more smoothly. I briefly examine these features below.  
 
                                               
63 The 28 February memorandum brought about the closure of religious schools and the 
dismissal of Islamic-affiliated personnel in the public bureaucracy.  
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5.2.1. AKP’s flirtation with the global order: neoliberalism at the climax 
Neoliberalism,64 whose influence grew from the early 1970s, is inherently 
contradictory. On one hand, it prioritizes the role of individuals as consumerist actors 
responsible for their own well-being. On the other hand, it favors the family and the 
community as substitutes for the welfare state (Kaya, 2014).  
Traditionally, Islamic-rooted parties/movements have had little to do with 
neoliberalism (Tuğal, 2009), among other things because it contradicts the Islamic 
notion of divine justice. In this sense, the AKP experience is path-breaking because it 
managed to present neoliberalism in “democratic” and “Islamic” dress (Tuğal, 2012, 
p. 40).  
The dynamo of neoliberal transformation has been loyal conservative 
businessmen, who are known as the “devout bourgeoisie.” Considering that the 
nurturing of the bourgeoisie by the political elite is an established historical trend in 
Turkey (Boratav, 2003, p. 40), the rise of the devout bourgeoisie under the guidance 
of the AKP governments is not particularly surprising. In this period, the devout 
bourgeoisie accumulated wealth through several channels.65 First, it took advantage of 
privatization programs. As already mentioned, AKP governments have generated 
more revenue than all previous governments put together from privatization. For 
instance, the electricity provider BEDAŞ, which has 10 million customers, was sold 
to the loyal KOLIN-LIMAK-CENGIZ consortium in 2013. Second, the AKP has 
exploited public procurement to enrich its loyal businessman (Gürakar, 2016). For 
instance, the Cengiz group have been rewarded with large-scale projects, including the 
third airport in Istanbul, Ordu-Giresun airport, ETI Copper and Ilısu Dam (Birgün, 
2016a). Thirdly, Islamic wealth expanded through joint businesses and Arab 
                                               
64 According to Harvey (2005, p. 2), neoliberalism is “a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade.” 
65 The backing of the devout bourgeoisie also had a symbolic meaning. It was a gesture to 
reciprocate the devout bourgeois support for Erdoğan in the AKP’s formative phase. Recall 
that 28 of the 31 deputies who had a MÜSIAD past sided with the moderates and joined the 
AKP after the closure of the FP (Gümüşçü, 2010, p. 846). 
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investments. The common Sunni identity served “as a cultural framework for capital 
accumulation” (Beinin, 2004, p. 4; Ayata, 1996, p. 51; Kaya, 2014, p. 5). Joint 
businesses include Finansbank and Kuwait-Turk in the banking sector; Turk-Telekom 
in the communications sector; and Bein Sport in the media sector.  
The evolution of the devout bourgeoisie, far from ending corruption, has 
exacerbated already corrupt state–business relations (Karadağ, 2013, p. 149). 
Accordingly, the cronyism of the 1990s expanded.66 The Denizfeneri case was a 
prominent scandal that illustrated the extent of corruption,67 although most striking 
were police corruption operations in December 2013, which included the arrests of 
ministers' sons.68  
The other constitutive element of the AKP’s clientelism is the urban poor. 
However, although the urban poor has been the AKP’s biggest source of support in all 
elections, it has done nothing to improve its prosperity. On the contrary, neoliberal 
policies have led to a dramatic increase in social inequality, indebtedness, violence, 
and crime.  
Looking at the economy overall, according to the CHP (2018) report, during 
the period between 2002 and 2016, per capita public debt rose from 3,677 Turkish lira 
to 9,647 Turkish lira. Similarly, the total amount of private household debt to the banks 
increased from 6.6 billion TL to 419.6 billion TL. In the same period, the ratio of 
                                               
66 Cronyism and nepotism became more evident during the 1990s. The most notable examples 
include the cronies around prime minister Tansu Çiller’s husband (Özer Çiller) and president 
Demirel’s cousin (Yahya Murat Demirel).   
67 The Denizfeneri scandal first erupted in Germany in 2007. The Frankfurt prosecutor's office 
claimed that merely 40 percent of donations collected by Denizfeneri Vaqf to help vulnerable 
people in Islamic countries were actually transferred, while the rest went to related companies 
in Turkey. According to the opposition in Turkey, some of the money was also transferred to 
the AKP, which led to a court case in Turkey. After trials, while the association’s managers 
were found guilty in Germany and sentenced to prison, all suspects were released in Turkey, 
where the principal perpetrators are alleged to reside (Cumhuriyet, 2015). 
68 On the morning of 17 December 2013, the police arrested prominent figures including the 
General Manager of Halkbank, the mayor of Fatih, and the loyal businessmen, such as Reza 
Zarrab and Ali Ağaoğlu and the sons of the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Economy, and 
the Minister of Environment and Urbanization. The accusations involved bribery, misconduct, 
and smuggling (BBC, 2014). 
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household debt to income (per family) rose from 4.7 percent to 57 percent. Similarly, 
the number of cases pending in the Debt Collection Office rose from 8.6 million to 
26.1 million.  
In the same vein, official figures demonstrate limited economic improvement 
during the neoliberal transformation. Before delving into numbers, I should note that 
the official statistics need to be approached cautiously, for two main reasons. First, in 
calculating GNP, TURKSTAT changed the base year to 2008, when the Turkish 
economy experienced significant upheaval. This puts the development of economic 
indicators since then in a better light (Eğilmez, 2016). Second, political pressure has 
been put on authorized institutions to manipulate the numbers, which has become more 
evident in recent years.69  
In this light, Table 16, derived from TURKSTAT Income and Living 
Conditions Survey data, shows that for the period between 2006 and 2016, the poverty 
line increased threefold, while the poverty rate declined from 18.6 percent to 14.3 
percent. In the same period, the number of poor declined by a mere 1.5 million in 
Turkey as a whole, and only 132,000 in Istanbul (Table 17). 
 
  
                                               
69 In October 2018, the vice president of TUIK, Enver Taştı, who was heading the team that 
announces inflation numbers, was dismissed. This development followed the announcement 
of record high inflation in September 2018 (6.3 percent) (Birgün, 2018).  
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Table 16: Number of poor, poverty rate and poverty gap by equivalized 
household disposable income, 2006–2016 (50% of median income) (Turkey) 
Year Poverty 
threshold 
(TL) 
Number 
of poor 
(‘000) 
Poverty 
rate 
2006 2,351 12,548 18.6 
2007 3,041 11,163 16.3 
2008 3,164 11,580 16.7 
2009 3,522 12,097 17.1 
2010 3,714 12,025 16.9 
2011 4,069 11,670 16.1 
2012 4,515 11,998 16.3 
2013 5,007 11,137 15.0 
2014 5,554 11,332 15.0 
2015 6,246 11,219 14.7 
2016 7,116 11,026 14.3 
Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey. 
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Table 17: Number of poor, poverty rate and poverty gap by equivalized 
household disposable income, 2006–2016 (50 percent of median income) 
(Istanbul) 
Year Poverty 
line  
Number 
of poor 
(‘000) 
Poverty 
rate 
2006 3,479 1,622 13.3 
2007 4,487 887 7.2 
2008 4,574 1,224 9.9 
2009 4,922 1,199 9.5 
2010 5,161 1,454 11.5 
2011 5,741 1,499 11.7 
2012 6,016 1,247 9.6 
2013 6,563 1,134 8.6 
2014 7,304 1,491 10.5 
2015 7,920 1,596 11.1 
2016 9,059 1,490 10.2 
Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey. 
 
More importantly, income inequality was high. As Table 18 shows, the Gini 
coefficient dropped slightly, from 0.428 in 2006 to 0.404 in 2016. Table 19 
demonstrates also that the share in disposable household income of the poorest 20 
percent increased slightly, from 6.0 percent in 2003 to 6.3 percent in 2015. The share 
of the fifth quintile, the richest 20 percent, on the other hand, fell slightly, from 46.2 
percent in 2004 to 45.3 percent in 2015. Furthermore, the ratio between the richest 20 
percent and the poorest 20 percent dropped from 8.1 percent in 2007 to 7.6 percent in 
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2015. In Istanbul, this rose from 5.3 percent to 7.1 percent, marking increasing 
inequality under AKP governments (Table 20).  
  
Table 18: Gini coefficient (2006–2016) 
Year Turkey 
2006 0.428 
2007 0.406 
2008 0.405 
2009 0.415 
2010 0.402 
2011 0.404 
2012 0.402 
2013 0.400 
2014 0.391 
2015 0.397 
2016 0.404 
Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey.  
 
Table 19: Distribution of annual household disposable income by quintiles 
(2006–2016)  
Year 1st 
quantile 
(poorest) 
2nd 
quantile 
3rd 
quantile 
4th 
quantile 
5th 
quantile 
(richest) 
2003 6.0 10.4 14.5 20.9 48.3 
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2004 6.0 10.7 15.2 21.9 46.2 
2005 6.1 11.1 15.8 22.6 44.4 
2006 5.8 10.5 15.2 22.1 46.5 
2007 6.4 10.9 15.4 21.8 45.5 
2008 6.4 10.9 15.4 22.0 45.3 
2009 6.2 10.7 15.3 21.9 46.0 
2010 6.5 11,1 15,6 21,9 44,9 
2011 6.5 11.0 15.5 21.9 45.2 
2012 6.5 11.0 15.6 22.0 45.0 
2013 6.6 10.9 15.4 21.8 45.2 
2014 6.5 11.0 15.6 22.2 44.7 
2015 6.3 10.9 15.5 22.0 45.3 
2016 6.3 10.6 15.2 21.6 46.3 
Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey. 
 
Table 20: S80/S20 ratio by equivalised household disposable income (2006–2016) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Turkey 9.6 8.1 8.1 8.5 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.4 7.6 7.7 
Istanbul 6.7 5.3 6.0 5.9 6.4 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.1 7.1 7.4 
Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey. 
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In this situation, instead of building a strong welfare state, the AKP leadership 
tried to restructure the social security system70 to target the most vulnerable in society, 
namely the disabled and the elderly (Tuğal, 2012, p. 29; Öniş, 2009, p. 24). This is in 
line with the neoliberal agenda. The AKP also encouraged religious charity 
organizations to share social service provision with the government (Buğra & Candaş, 
2011). These policies merely reproduced poverty rather than healing it. After all, if the 
material conditions of the poor had improved, there would be fewer clients relying on 
the support of AKP governments to meet their basic needs. This would have a negative 
impact on the AKP’s vote share.  
The neoliberal turn has also had legal repercussions. In this framework, the 
government prepared a new Health and Education Law that substantially curtailed the 
role of the state in fulfilling these functions. This allowed pro-AKP businesses to 
accumulate more wealth (Yıldırım & Yıldırım, 2011; İnal, 2012; İnal & Akkaymak, 
2012; Etiler, 2015; Kurul, 2012; Özdemir & Özdemir, 2012). Moreover, the AKP 
backed “inflexible working,” including part-time work, teleworking, and hiring, with 
amendments to the Labor Code. In the same vein, the AKP restructured worker–
employer relations by transferring some employee rights to third parties. This policy 
also championed subcontracting, particularly in the construction sector. To illustrate, 
the number of subcontracted workers rose from 387,000 in 2002 to over 2 million in 
2017 (Cumhuriyet, 2017a). When the policy of subcontracting was accompanied by 
unsafe working conditions to cut labor costs even further, it produced catastrophic 
results. Indeed, 20,000 workers have lost their lives since the AKP came to power in 
2002 (Birgün, 2017). The most tragic event was the mine accident in Soma, which cost 
the lives of 301 workers.  
The deteriorating economic indicators are also reflected in the social sphere. 
For instance, between 2002 and 2017, the divorce rate rose by 38 percent; prostitution 
by 790 percent; reported child abuse by 434 percent; homicide by 231 percent; arrests 
                                               
70 Buğra & Keyder (2006, p. 211) call the pre-AKP social security system as ‘inegalitarian 
corporatism’. This term denotes the exclusion of the rural population and the urban informal 
sector from the social security system. 
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and convictions by 285 percent; the number of drug addicts by 678 percent; and 
reported violence against women by as much as 1,400 percent  (CHP, 2018).  
 
5.2.2. AKP and political Islam: Cyclical moderation  
If one pillar of AKP’s clientelism is neoliberalism, another is political Islam. 
As noted in the first part of this chapter, the rise of political Islam in Turkey began 
long before the AKP came to power and Islamist politics has undergone substantial 
changes since then.  
As a concept, political Islam is equivocal.71 Before the Arab Spring, the 
advocates of political Islam were considered the biggest opposition group in the 
Middle East, whose access to the state was blocked by authoritarian leaderships. 
Although political Islam is a reaction to political exclusion, it would be inaccurate to 
claim that political exclusion has led to social exclusion. On the contrary, authoritarian 
leaders turned a blind eye to Islamist activism in the streets, which led to the 
mobilization of followers around mosque networks and the building of a massive 
parallel state that shares the burden of welfare services with the regime (cf. 
Wiktorowicz, 2004; Rutherford, 2013). The legacy of such burden-sharing has played 
an important role in the landslide victories of Islamic-rooted parties since the Arab 
Spring.  
Whether it was because of the internal secularization that followed political 
inclusion (Gürses, 2014; Tepe, 2005; Gümüşçü, 2010) or economic liberalization 
(Tuğal, 2009; Gümüşçü, 2010), the AKP, as a moderate Islamist party, did not 
prioritize its Islamic agenda, at least in its first term. This was also reflected in the 
discourse of the party leadership. From the outset, the leadership consistently labeled 
the party “conservative democrat,” a term coined by the party leadership and broadly 
                                               
71 On the emergence of political Islam as an ideology and a political system, see Roy (1994), 
Ayubi (2003), and Esposito (1997).  
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refers to the “socially conservative” and “economically liberal” policies of AKP 
governments.72 In this connection, Erdoğan has stated that: 
 
A significant part of Turkish society desires to adopt a concept of 
modernity that does not reject tradition, a belief in universalism 
that accepts localism, an understanding of rationalism that does not 
disregard the spiritual meaning of life, and a choice for change that is 
not fundamentalist. The concept of conservative democracy is, in fact, 
an answer to this desire. (Yavuz, 2009, p. 92) 
 
From this statement, one can infer that conservative democracy is introduced 
as a middle ground between the two antagonistic tendencies assumed to exist in 
Turkish society. This delineation clearly reflects a desire to establish the AKP in the 
political spectrum as moderate. Secondly, this statement shows that the party 
leadership was trying to avoid publically pledging anything “radical” that might call 
to mind the legacy of “Just Order” and thereby offend the secular establishment.  
In contrast to its early years, the AKP leadership prioritized its Islamic agenda 
immediately after it started to consolidate its power (Kaya, 2014; Eligür, 2010). In its 
Islamization efforts, the AKP government has collaborated with Islamic movements. 
These movements offer their members a channel for upward mobility and solve the 
collective action problem (Beinin, 2004, p. 29). This strategy has allowed religious 
movements to expand their influence in the public arena and even to capture some key 
state institutions, such as the police, the judiciary, and the army, as was the case with 
the Gülenists. 
In the same vein, AKP governments have invested heavily in religious 
education centers, particularly “Imam Hatip schools” (religious teaching schools). To 
illustrate this, while only 71,100 students enrolled in 450 Imam-Hatip high schools in 
2002, the number had risen to 555,870 students enrolled in 1,149 schools in 2015 
(Eğitim-Sen, 2016). The religious schools are instrumental in injecting Islamic values 
                                               
72 Scholars have used numerous labels, including “conservative globalism” (Öniş, 2009) and 
“neoliberal populism” (Bozkurt, 2013) to define the AKP’s political orientation. 
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in the young generation. The recent election slogan of the AKP, “not for the next 
election, but for the next generation,” becomes more meaningful from this perspective. 
Similarly, the number of religious courses in the school curriculum has been increased. 
For instance, courses on the life of the Prophet Mohammad and on the Quran and the 
Fundamentals of Religion became obligatory in primary schools.  
In the final analysis, the AKP’s alignment of Islam and neoliberalism has 
produced contradictory results. As will be shown in Chapter 6, religiosity has not 
increased. Nor has the AKP been able to prevent the radicalization of its voter base. 
Moreover, given the AKP’s recent crackdown on oppositional religious communities, 
relations between the AKP and religious actors have become more asymmetrical. That 
is to say, the AKP government started to narrow down, if not entirely eliminate, the 
room to maneuver of religious movements that do not recognize its political authority.  
 Having highlighted the AKP’s neoliberal and Islamic character, in the next 
section we examine the AKP’s electoral performance in each electoral term. Each 
section briefly analyzes civilian–military relations, neoliberalism, religion, and 
authoritarianism.  
 
5.3. Elections 
5.3.1. 2002–2007: The good old days  
 The legislative elections held in November 2002 were a landmark because they 
laid the ground for the longest ruling single-party government in Turkey (see Table 
21). Winning 34 percent of the votes, the electoral system enabled the AKP to capture 
363/550 seats, four seats too few to change the constitution unilaterally. Along with 
the AKP, the only party that surpassed the threshold was the CHP. The partners of the 
previous coalition government (ANAP, MHP, and DSP), on the other hand, suffered 
a historic defeat: their combined vote share declined from 52 percent to 20 percent. 
The AKP repeated its electoral success in the 2004 local elections as well and won 58 
cities, including Istanbul and Ankara.  
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Table 21: Election results (2002–2015/2)  
  AKP   CHP   MHP   HDP  
Election             
             
 
Vote Seat 
Differe
nce Vote Seat 
Differ
ence Vote Seat 
Diffe
rence Vote Seat 
Differ
ence  
             
2002 34.2 65 +30.8 19.3 32.3 +13 8.3 0 – – – – 
             
2007 46.5 62 +15.5 20.8 20.3 –0.5 14.2 12.9 –1.3 – – – 
             
2011 49.8 59.4 +9.6 25.9 24.5 –1,4 13.0 9.6 –3.4 – – – 
             
2015/1 40.8 46.9 +6.1 24.9 24.0 –0.9 16.2 14.5 –1.7 13.1 14.5 +1.4 
             
2015/2 49.5 57.6 +8.1 25.3 24.3 –1.0 11.9 7.2 –4.7 10.7 10.7 0 
             
Source: Supreme Election Council (YSK). 
 
How did the AKP land such a big win in 2002? Several factors might account 
for it. The first was apparently Erdoğan’s so-called success while he was mayor of 
Istanbul. The second one was Erdoğan’s image as “victim,” acquired after his 
imprisonment due to a religiously-tinged poem he read at a public meeting. The third 
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was the failure of the coalition governments during the 1990s, which boosted the 
protest vote (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu & Şenatalar, 2004, p. 308).73  
Coming to power after the worst economic crisis in modern Turkey, the AKP’s 
major aim was to secure macroeconomic stability and sustain economic growth 
(Tezcür, 2012, p. 122). In its first term, the AKP achieved this goal, to a certain extent. 
To illustrate, as shown in Table 22, between 2003 to 2006 GDP growth averaged 7.8 
percent, while inflation dropped sharply from 25.2 percent to 9.5 percent. Similarly, 
while exports rose from 116 billion dollars to 173.2 billion dollars, imports rose from 
157.8 billion dollars to 223.3 billion dollars.74 Despite these achievements, the AKP’s 
economic program failed to reduce unemployment and the deficit. In fact, as Yeldan 
(2007) points out, this term marked the beginning of the jobless growth pattern and 
record-high deficits, which laid the ground for the 2018 economic crisis.  
 
Table 22: Development of selected economic indicators (2002–2006) 
Year GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Unemployment 
(%) 
Exports 
(billion $) 
Imports 
(billion 
$) 
Inflation 
(%) 
2002 6.4 10.3 96.0 135.7 44.9 
2003 5.6 10.5 116.0 157.8 25.2 
2004 9.6 10.8 140.7 180.9 10.5 
2005 9.0 10.6 157.4 198.5 10.1 
2006 7.1 8.7 173.2 223.3 9.5 
Source: World Bank.  
                                               
73 The protest votes also account for the rise of the Islamist and the nationalist parties in the 
1990s (Tachau, 2002).  
74 Scholars used various labels such as “trading state” (Kirisci, 2009) or even “golden age” 
(Öniş, 2016) to describe the economic transformation in the AKP’s first term.  
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On the political front, the priority was to overcome military and judicial 
tutelage through EU accession-related reforms. In this framework, the government 
legislated six harmonization packages and issued a new Civil Code, Criminal Code, 
Code of Criminal Procedure, and Law on Association. Thanks to these reforms, the 
accession negotiations started with the EU on October 2005. This development further 
softened the AKP’s image in the international arena. Accordingly, Erdoğan frequently 
appeared on the covers of popular magazines as the man who successfully reconciled 
Islam and democracy.75 
Despite the initial optimism based on the AKP’s reformist agenda, it became 
clear towards the end of its first term that the weakening of military tutelage would not 
bring democratic consolidation (Gümüşçü, 2016, p. 6). On the contrary, the AKP 
leadership started to establish its own tutelage. The triggering event was the 
presidential elections in 2007. Starting as a procedural disagreement on the method of 
choosing the new president, the presidential elections rapidly turned into a debate on 
a secular versus a religious president and sparked massive demonstrations against the 
AKP government in large metropolises. The political turmoil further deepened with 
the publication of a memorandum on the website of Turkish Military Forces on 27 
April 2007, which recalled its responsibility to take measures against anti-secular acts 
on the part of the government. The message was loud and clear to the AKP 
administration. The government had no choice but to call for early elections in 2007.  
 
5.3.2. 2007–2011: Consolidation of power  
In the 2007 elections, the AKP raised its vote share to 46 percent, although the number 
of seats declined to 341 as the MHP passed the electoral threshold. The AKP’s 
increasing appeal can largely be read as a public reaction to the threat of military 
intervention. In contrast, the AKP’s vote share fell sharply to 39 percent in the local 
elections held in March 2009 due to deteriorating economic performance.  
                                               
75 For instance, the TIME cover on November 28, 2011 praised Erdoğan as a man who is 
“secular, democratic, Western-friendly.”  
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During this “time of transition” (Öniş, 2016, p. 142), the AKP government 
further consolidated its power by weakening the guardians of the old regime, namely 
the military, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. The AKP brought this about in two 
ways. First, the government prepared a comprehensive reform program, which was 
approved in a public referendum in 2010. The referendum also changed the procedure 
regarding the selection of the president, which henceforth was to be by public vote. 
Second, the AKP started to use repression against the opposition. To this end, the AKP 
government and its Gülenist allies targeted secular-nationalists in the media, the 
judiciary, and the military with broad judicial operations, such as “Ergenekon”76 and 
“Balyoz.”77 Simultaneously, the government cracked down on Kurdish politicians and 
activists with “KCK” operations.78  
As the AKP’s grip on power tightened, the secular establishment played its last 
card. In March 2008, the Chief Public Prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, filed a 
case to ban the AKP. In the indictment, the AKP was accused of Islamizing society. 
Hearing the case, although 10 of 11 members of the Constitutional Court agreed that 
the AKP had become the center of anti-secular activities, the court did not rule to 
disband the AKP, but to punish it by cutting half of its state funding.  
The AKP’s second term was also shaky as regards the economy. Most 
dramatically, the so-called economic success story came to an abrupt end. The trigger 
event was the 2008 global economic crisis, which hit the Turkish economy along with 
                                               
76 Ergenekon (allegedly the name of a clandestine organization) operations began on July 12, 
2007 after the police found 27 hand grenades in the Istanbul district of Ümraniye. The 
ammunition was alleged to belong to the so-called “deep state” that aimed to overthrow the 
AKP government by force. Hundreds of politicians, journalists, and high-ranking military 
cadres, most of whom with a nationalist-secular background, were arrested. When the long-
lasting trials ended, most defendants were sentenced to long years of imprisonment (BBC, 
2013). The defendants were later released after a retrial, whereas the judges of the first trial 
were sent to the prison for being Gülenists in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt.  
77 The Balyoz case involved the so-called military coup plan to overthrown the AKP 
government. Hundreds of military personnel were imprisoned after the hearings. As in the case 
of the Ergenekon case, however, all were released after a retrial.  
78 The KCK operations targeted the political wing of the Kurdish movement. Over time, the 
operations extended to non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, writers, journalists, and 
lawyers. After seven years of trials, dozens of Kurdish politicians were imprisoned 
(Cumhuriyet, 2017b). 
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developing countries. Accordingly, the GDP growth rate averaged 2.3 percent (see 
Table 23) and the unemployment rate reached to a record-high 12.5 percent in 2009. 
Despite the shrinking economy, the AKP government did not renew the once-
traditional stand-by agreements with the IMF. Although this decision drew huge public 
support because it was taken as a victory against international capital, it could not 
prevent a fall in the AKP’s vote share in the 2009 local elections.  
 
Table 23: Changes in selected economic indicators (2007–2010) 
Year GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Unemployment 
(%) 
Exports 
(billion $) 
Imports 
(billion 
$) 
Inflation 
(%) 
2007 5.0 8.8 192.5 248.4 8.7 
2008 0.8 9.7 190.4 264.7 10.4 
2009 -4.7 12.5 165.1 244.2 6.2 
2010 8.4 10.6 200.6 263.3 8.5 
Source: World Bank. 
 
5.3.3. 2011–2015: The “New Turkey” 
Despite the political and economic difficulties, the AKP’s vote share reached 49.9 
percent in the 2011 elections. The CHP, under newly elected leader Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu, gained a quarter of the votes, with the MHP polling half that. With its 
third consecutive election victory by a margin above 10 percent in 2011, the AKP 
transformed the Turkish party system into a predominant party system. The AKP 
repeated its success in the 2004 local elections and won 48 cities. 
On the political front, anger against Erdoğan’s neoliberal and Islamic policies 
again turned into widespread political mobilization in June 2013. In response to the 
government’s plan to build a shopping mall in the middle of Gezi Park and cutting 
down the trees, millions of protestors took to the streets and occupied Taksim Square. 
The protests ceased only after Erdoğan gave up his plan.  
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 In addition to rising extra-parliamentary opposition, the AKP had to contain 
rising right-wing challengers, namely the Democrat Party (DP) and the HAS Party. To 
ensure this, the AKP co-opted the leaders of these parties, Süleyman Soylu and Numan 
Kurtulmuş, by offering them high-ranking positions within the AKP.79 The strategy of 
co-opting political rivals in return for political favors further entrenched the AKP’s 
dominance on the right.  
Moreover, similar to other dominant party examples (Pempel, 1990a), the AKP 
exhibited its desire for a long-term strategy in the document “Political Vision 2023.”80 
The target was later revised to 2071. The “New Turkey” discourse came to the 
forefront in this context.  
On the economic front, as Table 24 demonstrates, the AKP performed better 
than in its previous term with regard to GDP growth and unemployment. To be more 
precise, GDP growth averaged 7.3 percent and the unemployment rate averaged 8.8 
percent. In contrast to this trend, while the volume of exports increased slightly from 
226.7 billion dollars to 244.8 billion dollars, the volume of imports soared from 279.9 
billion dollars to 340.6 billion dollars.  
 
  
                                               
79 They later became the minister of the interior and the minister of culture, respectively. 
80 The document described the policies that the AKP government plans to implement until 
2023. For instance, the AKP called for an end to party bans; hearings in defendants’ mother 
tongue; the transition to a presidential system and adopting a new constitution. Besides, by the 
year 2023, the AKP pledged to increase GDP per capita to 25,000 dollars; exports to 500 
billion dollars; and the overall size of the economy to 2 trillion dollars (AKP, n.d.). As things 
stand today, these economic targets seem far from realistic.  
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Table 24: Changes in selected economic indicators (2011–2014) 
Year GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Unemployment 
(%) 
Exports 
(billion $) 
Imports 
(billion 
$) 
Inflation 
(%) 
2011 11.1 8.8 226.7 279.9 6.4 
2012 4.7 8.1 228.6 325.2 8.8 
2013 8.4 8.7 247.1 323.4 7.4 
2014 5.1 9.8 244.8 340.6 8.8 
Source: World Bank. 
 
5.3.4. From June to November 2015: The fall and the rise of the AKP 
The June 2015 elections were a watershed as the AKP lost its parliamentary majority 
despite winning 40.8 percent of the votes. Sayarı (2015, p. 264) argues that three 
developments triggered this outcome: the poor economic performance, the HDP’s 
passing of the threshold, and defections to the MHP.  
 Because the AKP lost its legislative majority, the opposition gained a unique 
opportunity to end the one-party dominance. However, the opposition missed this 
chance, not because of the AKP’s central position, as the decision-theoretic model 
envisages, but because of the historical animosity between the ultra-nationalist MHP 
and the pro-Kurdish HDP. This instance shows how social cleavages may lead to a 
coordination failure in the opposition.  
After the June 2015 elections, Turkey was dragged into an unprecedented cycle 
of violence. On one hand, clashes with the PKK intensified after the end of the 
“Democratic Opening Up Process.”81 On the other hand, the civil war in Syria spread 
                                               
81 The Democratic Opening Up Process was initiated by the AKP government to end the long-
lasting war between the PKK and the Turkish government, which has cost more than 40,000 
lives. The ceasefire of 2013 ended after the killing of two policeman in Ceylanpınar in July 
2015 (the killers are still unknown), for which the government held the PKK responsible.  
 95 
to Turkey in the form of Islamic-motivated terrorist attacks.82 The escalation of 
political violence on both fronts left 602 dead between June to and the snap elections 
in November 2015 (Evrensel, 2015).  
In this context, via the partisan press, the AKP propagated the view that the 
rising political instability was due to its loss of a majority in parliament. This 
propaganda ultimately worked well and brought back the lost votes in the November 
2015 elections. Accordingly, the AKP reclaimed its majority in the parliament.  
 Since then, political instability has deepened. The most tragic event was the 
failed military coup on July 15, 2016, which was alleged to have been staged by 
Gülenists. After quelling the coup, the government introduced a state of emergency, 
allegedly to protect the constitutional order and quell the perpetrators (“Gülenists”). 
Although the state of emergency was introduced as a temporary measure, it remained 
in force for two years. During this time, it has openly been turned into an instrument 
for suppressing all opposition to Erdoğan’s rule. By means of a series of decree-laws, 
27 percent of the judiciary (excluding military judges), 12 percent of the police force, 
7 percent of military staff, and 700 academics have been dismissed. Of these 
academics, 404 had signed the “Peace Declaration” that criticized the government for 
human rights violations in the Kurdish-majority provinces. In addition, the 
government appointed public officials or trustees to 99 municipalities, 94 of which 
were held by the pro-Kurdish party. The crackdown extended to the media as well: 20 
magazines and 30 publishing houses and distribution companies were disbanded, 
along with 34 radio and 33 television channels (Deutsche Welle, 2018; Cumhuriyet, 
2018a).  
 To further consolidate his power after the coup attempt, Erdoğan put forward 
the presidential system. Aligning with the MHP, the AKP government put the relevant 
amendments to a public vote in April 2017. The controversial referendum, which was 
                                               
82 ISIL carried out numerous terrorist attacks in 2015. For instance, two days before June 
elections, five people killed in bomb attack to the HDP’s Diyarbakır meeting. In July, the 
suicide bomber targeted the meeting in support of Kobane resistance and left 33 dead. The 
most brutal attack targeted the “Peace and Democracy Meeting” in Ankara, which cost the 
lives of 109 people and wounded more than 500.  
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characterized by widespread irregularities,83 the new system was approved by a very 
slight margin. Then, in the presidential elections held in June 2018, Erdoğan became 
the first president of Turkey under the presidential system.  
                                               
83 In the referendum, despite the explicit provisions in law, the Supreme Electoral Council 
ruled to validate the large quantity of unsealed votes: the opposition estimated that the number 
of unsealed votes was around two million. Given that 650,000 votes would have sufficed to 
change the result, the validation of the unsealed votes was decisive. 
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6. CHAPTER SIX: FIELDWORK 
Political party scholarship emphasizes that clientelism reproduces dominance by 
tilting the political field in favor of the incumbent parties (cf. Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 
2006; Scheiner, 2006). In my fieldwork in Istanbul’s Bağcılar district, however, I 
found that the causal link between clientelism and dominance is far from automatic. 
My view is that the link between clientelism and dominance can be properly 
understood only if the ideological and identity changes that partisans experience after 
becoming part of a clientelist network are highlighted. To put it more clearly, first, 
clientelism strengthens partisan identification. Second, clientelism makes partisans, 
especially the poor, less resistant or even supportive of the neoliberal reforms that in 
fact undermine their well-being. 
In this framework, this chapter first highlights the method, scope, and 
significance of the fieldwork. Then, it introduces the field by identifying demand and 
supply as they pertain to the actors, as well as the structure and operation of clientelism 
in Bağcılar. Finally, it establishes the causal link between clientelism and dominance.  
 
6.1. Method 
Clientelism as an amorphous, latent, and elusive phenomenon is hard to observe, 
operate, and measure (Hicken, 2011; Wantchekon, 2003; Lande, 1983). Broadly 
speaking, while the observation problem is due to the informal and illegitimate 
character of clientelism, the operational problem is related to clientelism’s various 
components. The measurement problem, on the other hand, emerges as a result of 
these two problems.  
Scholars have adopted a wide array of methods to investigate clientelism.84 
Reflecting the zeitgeist, the most popular approach is quantitative. This primarily 
entails the use of proxies in measuring clientelism. To illustrate, Keefer (2007) 
                                               
84 Recently popularized methods include formal modeling (cf. Medina & Stokes, 2003; 
Robinson & Verdier, 2002), experiments (cf. Wantchekon, 2003), and expert surveys (cf. 
DALP data). 
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takes the level of corruption, while Desposato (2007) takes voters’ demographic 
characteristics as proxy. Because clientelism is informal, unwritten, and personal, 
using proxies may lead to unreliable and invalid conclusions (Muno, 2010). Another 
popular method is to use surveys (for example, Brusco et al., 2004), which are costly 
and unreliable because clientelism is “morally objectionable” (Muno, 2010; 
Wantchekon, 2003).  
In addition to these renowned methods, one of the most traditional, but 
seemingly less popular approaches is to investigate clientelism through ethnographic 
fieldwork. Ethnography, as a bottom-up approach, provides deep insights on the daily 
practice of clientelism (Muno, 2010; Auyero, 2001). Similarly, ethnography helps to 
distinguish between actual and expected behavior; it enhances rapport, makes it 
possible to observe non-verbal behavior, the context, and relationships, and also makes 
available recently encountered information on the subject (Scupin, 2015, pp. 128–
142).85  
Within this framework, I carried out my ethnographic fieldwork in the Bağcılar 
district of Istanbul. The fieldwork lasted from November 2017 to April 2018. In the 
field, my biggest advantage was that I was very familiar with the district because I had 
lived there for more than two decades. Practically, it allowed me to make contact with 
the residents more easily than other researchers and to find key informants and 
interviewees in a short period of time. Theoretically, it substantially contributed to 
advance my arguments because I was able to observe long-term changes (for example, 
ideological changes) in residents’ voting behavior.  
I complemented the ethnographic data with interviews. The interviews were 
conducted with partisans, brokers, party officials, mukhtars, and municipal employees 
residing in Bağcılar. More specifically, the interviews encompassed 45 partisans; nine 
municipality employees, one mukhtar and five party workers/officials. The interviews 
were held in various places, including the party and municipal buildings, parks, café, 
                                               
85 The shortcomings of using ethnography, on the other hand, include its limited comparability 
and generalizability (Muno, 2010), because of the parochialism (Sartori, 1991) embedded in 
the ethnographic studies. 
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and a high school. In the early stages of my interviews, I realized that the interviewees 
were not comfortable talking about the government because they feared losing their 
jobs or client benefits. The state of emergency that was in force at the time of the 
fieldwork added to this. This pushed me to switch from “individual” to “group” 
interviews. For practical purposes, the group interviews were less structured and were 
conducted in a more flexible manner.  
 
6.2. Scope and significance 
Because clientelism is a multi-dimensional phenomena, its scope has to be constrained 
in order to write meaningfully about it. I applied this rule using threefold strategy. 
First, I narrowed clientelism down to the exchange of votes for the distribution of 
material aid, jobs, and services. This excludes, for example, exchanging kickbacks 
with the government through public procurements. Second, I interviewed partisans 
rather than opponents to unearth the objective and the subjective conditions of political 
clientelism (Auyero, 2012, p. 99; 2000, p. 153). Third, I restricted the spatial 
dimension of this study to the urban area.  
With regard to the significance of the fieldwork, several points might be 
underlined. First, by adopting a top-down approach, this study unearths the micro-
logic of clientelism. Second, this paper is the first of its kind in featuring the operation 
of clientelism in Bağcılar. Third, this study is important because it is highly 
representative: Bağcılar’s demographic structure largely coincides with that of other 
poor districts of Istanbul, such as Esenler, Sultangazi, & Sultanbeyli. Fourth, this study 
draws the boundaries of political clientelism: it accounts for partisans who take part in 
clientelist exchange but have not experienced any change with regard to their partisan 
identification and/or ideology. Last but not least, the timing of the fieldwork must be 
noted. This fieldwork was conducted in a polarized, authoritarian setting, that is, under 
the state of emergency.  
 
6.3. Case selection: Bağcılar 
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Bağcılar is a relatively new district located on the outskirts of Istanbul (see, Figure 1). 
While it remained within Bakırköy district until 1992, it became a separate district 
with the union of Kirazlı, Güneşli, and Mahmutbey neighborhoods under Law No. 
3806. Although Bağcılar has a surface area of only 22 km2, it has 748,483 inhabitants, 
according to the 2017 census. This makes Bağcılar the third most populated district in 
Istanbul (Cumhuriyet, 2017c). Currently, Bağcılar has 22 neighborhoods (see Figure 
2).86 
 
  
                                               
86 The neighborhoods of Bağcılar are 100. Yıl, 15 Temmuz (Evren), Bağlar, Barbaros, Çınar, 
Demirkapı, Fatih, Fevzi Çakmak, Göztepe, Güneşli, Hürriyet, İnönü, Kazım Karabekir, 
Kemalpaşa, Kirazlı, Mahmutbey, Merkez, Sancaktepe, Yavuzselim, Yenigün, Yenimahalle, 
and Yıldıztepe.  
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Figure 1: Bağcılar district on map of Istanbul  
  
Source: www.wowTurkey.com 
 
 
Figure 2: The neighborhoods of Bağcılar 
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 Bağcılar’s population grew tremendously with the hyper-urbanization that took 
place from the early 1990s onwards. Accordingly, 37 percent of its inhabitants have 
moved to the district since 2000. In terms of geography, most residents are from the 
Black Sea, the East and the Southeastern regions. Bağcılar also hosts  notable amount 
of Balkan migrants, particularly from Bulgaria, who were relocated following the 
collapse of the communist regimes in the Balkans.  
Bağcılar is a notorious district in Istanbul. In social media, daily life in 
Bağcılar, as well as the neighboring districts of Esenler and Güngören, are often the 
subject of mockery. This primarily reflects the high crime rate, which is evident from 
even a short visit to the district. The first thing that is likely to draw a visitor’s attention 
is the youngsters who stand on every street corner. For a regular resident or a 
researcher, it is a part of daily routine to fall foul of these people. In the same vein, 
Bağcılar hosts various violent political groups. Since my childhood, I have witnessed 
several police operations against Hezbollah,87, PKK, and al-Qaeda. Among these 
groups, the Islamists have more influence on the street.88  
Bağcılar has a significant place in Istanbul’s economy. It hosts massive 
organized industrial zones, such as İSTOÇ, MASSİT, and OTO CENTER. Reflecting 
the residents’ socio-economic structure, the most developed sectors are textiles and 
shoes. These businesses are usually located in the basements of apartments. In these 
sectors, most people are underpaid and work long hours without social insurance. As 
Syrians recently have begun to flow into the district, wages have fallen further and 
informality has boomed.  
                                               
87 Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed Kurdish-Islamist terrorist group. In the early 1990s, the 
group had a violent clash with the PKK in Southeastern Anatolia, leaving hundreds dead. 
Hezbollah lost power after its leader, Hüseyin Velioğlu, was killed in a police operation in 
2000. Since then, the group has concentrated its efforts in the legal domain and established the 
political party HÜDA-PAR in 2013.  
88 As Tuğal (2009) observed in Sultanbeyli, the Islamic groups organized around tea houses 
and the bookstores during the 1990s. Although these places are still serving as a gathering 
place for the radical Islamic groups, as I observed in Bağcılar, their number sharply declined 
recently due to a neoliberal transformation of the Islamic ideology, which also amounts to de-
politicization of the masses. 
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In recent years, Bağcılar has come to the forefront with rapid urban 
transformation. As will be shown, although urban development was initially justified 
on the basis of renewing buildings damaged in the 1999 earthquake, it soon took the 
form of “rentier transformation,” to enrich loyal businessman. As a result, two 
conflicting trends emerged in the district. On one hand, there are some neighborhoods, 
such as Demirkapı, that are still characterized by unlicensed construction and 
unplanned urbanization. On the other hand, some neighborhoods, such as Bağlar and 
Hürriyet, are being transformed. In between these poles stands Evren. While some 
parts of Evren, closer to the highway, have been transformed substantially, with the 
construction of luxury hotels and residences, its outskirts have remained virtually 
untouched, thus exhibiting “urban duality” (Auyero, 2001; see also Photo 3).  
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Photo 3: Urban duality: A look at Bağcılar 
 
 
6.3.1. Parties and elections in Bağcılar 
Bağcılar’s large population makes it a key district in elections. As Table 25 and Table 
26 show, Bağcılar is an AKP stronghold. In every election, the AKP’s vote share has 
revolved around 50 to 60 percent, well above the national average. Bağcılar is critical 
for the AKP; in the June and November 2015 elections, it won the highest number of 
votes there of any district in Istanbul.  
Electoral politics in Bağcılar has the following characteristics. First, Bağcılar 
overwhelmingly hosts Islamist/conservative voters who migrated mainly from the 
Black Sea (Turks) and the East/Southeastern Anatolian regions (Kurds). Given the 
contradictory or even antagonistic voting tendencies of these regions, Bağcılar is an 
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interesting case and highlights the AKP’s catch-all nature. Second, the Social 
Democrats are much weaker here than the national average. For the most part, the CHP 
gets votes from Alevites and Balkan migrants. Third, the pro-Kurdish party is stronger 
than the national average, such that the HDP ranked second in the June and November 
2015 elections. In fact, the success of the HDP is not surprising given the density of 
the Kurdish population. Fourth, given the density of Kurds and the conservatives, the 
nationalist MHP underperforms here.  
 
Table 25: Vote shares of the AKP in legislative elections 
Year Nationwide Bağcılar 
2002 34.2 48.9 
2007 46.5 56.9 
2011 49.8 60.4 
2015/1 40.8 50.0 
2015/2 49.5 59.5 
 
Table 26: Vote shares of the AKP in the local elections  
Year Nationwide Bağcılar 
2004 41.6 43.9 
2009 38.3 49.2 
2014 42.8 57.2 
 
 
6.4. From the ‘social democrats’ to the ‘Islamists’: Clientelism during the 
1990s 
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 Bağcılar was within the boundaries of social democrat–leaning Bakırköy 
district before it became a separate district in 1993. Since then, while Bakırköy remains 
the stronghold of the Social Democrats, Bağcılar has realigned with the 
conservative/Islamist parties. 
 In order to reveal how this transformation has interacted with clientelism, I 
interviewed a mukhtar[60]*89 who has resided in Bağcılar for more than three decades. 
He noted that:  
 
Bağcılar was ruled by the Social Democrats when it was part of 
Bakırköy and, given the economic conditions of the residents, that was 
understandable. However, when the SHP [Social Democratic Populist 
Party] ruled the district, there were no roads, water or electricity. After 
Feyzullah Kıyıklık [the first mayor of Bağcılar from the Welfare Party, 
currently the AKP deputy] became mayor, the face of the district began 
to change. Because he was a lawyer and had good connections, the 
infrastructure of the district developed tremendously. 
 
The statements of the mukhtar provide two vital observations with regard to 
voter–politician links in Turkey. First, what voters expect from politicians is to have 
good contacts with the people who command both material and non-material resources 
or who facilitate access to them.90 Such expectations leads to the expansion of cronies 
around politicians. Second, “service” is extolled, even if it requires breaking the law.91 
This legitimizes and normalizes corruption. The pervasive view among AKP partisans 
that “they (AKP) are stealing but serving” also illustrates how service is extolled 
among AKP voters.92 Therefore, as I will show, it was not surprising that party and 
                                               
89 * The number of the interviewee is shown in parentheses. More detailed information about 
the interviewee is given in Appendix II. 
90 This conforms to what Erdoğan Yıldırım (1995) portrayed as the “ideal deputy” in the eyes 
of a typical Turkish voter. 
91 A devout follower of this tradition was Melih Gökçek, a former mayor of Ankara. He 
frequently propounded the building of new roads, even against hostile court decisions, under 
the banner “serving Ankara” (see, for instance, Evrensel, 2017). 
92 In this sense, what makes the AKP unique is that it managed to associate itself with 
“service." Within the framework of party literature, this illustrates how service as a “policy 
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municipal officials loudly proclaimed their “illegal,” if not “illegitimate” acts with 
“pride.”  
What differentiates the RP’s clientelism from that of the AKP is that it hinges 
on solving clients’ basic and permanent problems. Take the case of unlicensed 
buildings. One partisan [2] observed that:  
 
When the Social Democrats were ruling the district, you were not 
allowed to build unlicensed apartments. If you did, the municipal 
workers demolished it. After the RP took office, unlicensed 
construction was allowed in return for fines. Everyone was happy with 
that. This increased the vote share of the RP in the following elections. 
 
 In light of this, it can be argued that the RP’s main strategy was to enable 
newcomers to own a house. In turn, they were expected to vote for the RP from 
gratitude and reciprocity generated through clientelist exchange. Overall, when the 
RP’s clientelist housing policy was combined with its success in providing basic local 
services, this brought a vast number of voters, who were closely connected to the party 
leadership. This group became the core voters of the National Outlook Tradition in the 
district. 
Although the RP’s clientelism can be understood as problem-solving as it 
largely solved residents’ housing problems, it was also a double-edged sword. In other 
words, permission for unlicensed construction became a major hurdle to developing 
infrastructure and modernization in the following years. As a result, the streets 
remained disorganized and ugly and almost no green areas were left to allow residents 
to breath. More importantly, the risk of building collapses increased, for example in 
                                               
issue” is attributed to “party image.” Sartori (2005, p. 293) notes that “parties communicate 
with mass electorates via party images and much of their electoral strategy is concerned with 
building up the appropriate image for the public from which they expect votes.” Nevertheless, 
it must be noted that party images are not necessarily the same among diverse groups that 
support the same party (Sartori, 2005, pp. 293–294). For the catch-all AKP, this is even more 
evident. For instance, conservatism/Islamism was also widely emphasized as a defining 
character of the AKP during my interviews.  
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the event of an earthquake. The urban transformation in the district, which was 
propagated to renew building stocks damaged in the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake,93 came 
to the fore in this context. However, as already mentioned, the AKP used urban 
transformation projects to enrich its own business supporters rather than to improve 
the infrastructure and look of the district. 
 
6.5. The demand side: the poor 
 Among the various socio-economic groups, the poor in particular depend on 
clientelism to survive or solve their problems (see Chapter 4). Even in pursuing their 
most basic rights, the poor need the help or, to put it more bluntly, the “mercy” of the 
political authorities.  
 Looking at Bağcılar is a good way of examining the interplay between 
clientelism and poverty. Although I could not obtain official district-level data on 
poverty, despite my inquiries – possibly on purpose – poverty is a widely recognized 
phenomenon in Bağcılar. However, the views of patrons and clients diverge 
substantially with regard to its dynamics . Broadly speaking, while the party and the 
municipality emphasize the AKP government’s successful efforts to reduce poverty, 
the clients underline how the government has failed to improve their well-being.  
 To start with, the municipal officials typically referred to high levels of 
informality as a source of poverty. One [49] illustrated this as follows:  
 
Poverty is considered high in Bağcılar because of high informal 
employment. In every family, there is at least one person who is 
informally employed. These people are underpaid in return for earning 
higher wages in cash. Accordingly, they are counted as poor in the 
official statistics. 
 
                                               
93 According to official figures, in the 1999 earthquake, whose epicenter was the neighboring 
city of Kocaeli, 17,840 people lost their lives (981 in Istanbul alone) and 43,953 people were 
injured. Bağcılar was one of the most heavily damaged districts in Istanbul (Hürriyet, 2000).  
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 Although the officials consider high levels of informality to be the main source 
of apparent poverty, they are reluctant to take any measures to reduce it. For instance, 
according to the DISK report (2018), between September 2016 and September 2017 total 
employment rose by 1,233,000, whereas informal employment rose by 491,000. This provides 
an informality rate of around 40 percent. The informality rate is likely to be even higher 
(at least in the short run) in the wake of the arrival of more refugees from Muslim 
countries (for example, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq), who have gradually 
started to replace the present workforce in the district. This trend, if it persists, also has 
the potential to make Bağcılar the second Zeytinburnu district of Istanbul, in terms of 
demographic structure.  
 In addition, officials commonly believe that the number of poor has declined 
due to the AKP’s remarkable economic performance. The examples given by 
municipal officials were interesting:  
 
Do you see how many cars we have in the street? Now, there is a traffic 
jam everywhere. There is not even a place to park our cars at night. 
How can these people afford to buy a car? Because their purchasing 
power has increased. [52] 
   
Unlike before, people can afford to go out for a drink or food. Now, 
there are many expensive cafes and restaurants in Bağcılar. And they 
are all crowded. [56]  
 
 Another municipal official [54] argued that:  
 
Although I do not have the official numbers, I can assure you that the 
number of the poor has been reduced substantially in recent years. We 
can derive this from our social assistance program. While we were 
providing assistance to around 15,000 people a few years ago, this 
number has now declined to 10,000. 
 
 Are these figures correct? Apparently not. According to the “Revised 2017–
2019 Strategic Plan” (Bağcılar Belediyesi, n.d.), the number of residents provided with 
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social assistance is estimated to be around 21,000. Of those, 8,500 people benefit from 
income support; 4,000 from coal subsidies; 1,500 from sports aid; and 7,000 from bag 
and stationary aids. In total, the municipality plans to spend over 22 million TL on 
these items. This amount excludes 18.5 million TL that is planned to be spent on 
disabled people. With sport and social activities, the total number of people that the 
municipality plans to target stands at around 310,000, amounting to more than 40 
percent of all residents in the district.  
 Unlike officials’ claims related to the decline of poverty, clients’ statements 
reveal how poverty is reproduced in the district:  
 
In comparison to previous years, housing prices have increased 
substantially in Bağcılar. Although my father could comfortably own a 
flat during the 1990s, I can’t afford one. Therefore, my plan is to move 
the cheaper districts of Sultangazi or Esenyurt, after I marry this 
summer. [17]  
 
I work in a textile atelier and earn slightly above the minimum wage. I 
have two children. My wife is not working. Although I live in a very 
small flat, half of my salary goes to rent. With the remaining money, I 
do not know how I can make ends meet. Without assistance, I cannot 
survive. [19] 
 
I migrated to Istanbul in 2004. Although I receive aid from the 
municipality, life has become much more expensive for me. I even have 
difficulties sending my child to high school. I have to pay for 
transportation and food. I am seriously thinking about going back to my 
village. In my village, at least I will not pay rent. [39]  
 
These testimonies demonstrate that the AKP has reproduced poverty rather 
than curing it. Broadly speaking, it does so in two ways. The first is dispossession, 
which has been increasing with the urban transformation projects that have caused 
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house prices in the district to skyrocket.94 The second is to make people dependent on 
the state (or rather the government) to maintain their living standards and solve their 
problems.  
I am well aware that the aforementioned examples do not represent the entire 
economic picture in the district. In fact, I closely observed that there are some people 
whose economic conditions have improved such that they have come to own a car or 
a flat under the AKP. However, before attributing that “success” to the government, 
we need to underline its dynamics. None put this better than the mukhtar [60]:  
 
Yes, the economic situation of some people improved. But how has this 
happened? For many years, there were only two postmen in our 
neighborhood. Now there are four. They mostly bring legal documents. 
This means that the government enabled people to own a car or a flat 
through borrowing. 
 
 It is ironic that, similar to the displaced masses who were forced to move to 
cheaper districts, better-off people have already moved or are thinking of moving from 
Bağcılar. One partisan [30] illustrated this view: 
 
We have been living in Bağcılar for 30 years. If things turn out that 
way, we will move to Başakşehir [the district that the conservative 
bourgeoisie prefers to reside in] in a few months. I do not want any of 
my children to live here. There are many drug addicts in the street and 
they are all dangerous. If we stay here, the future of my children will 
not be much different from them. Because Başakşehir is full of housing 
estates, at least nobody bothers you in the street. 
 
 Overall, the statements by partisans and official figures demonstrate that the 
AKP government has reproduced poverty. In this context, by establishing a clientelist 
relationship with the poor, it easily turned them into true partisans.  
                                               
94 Dispossession has the potential to undermine AKP rule in the short run by fostering 
dealignment. 
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6.6. The supply side: Patrons  
As the nature of clientelism changes, so do the patrons. Illustrating this, ayans (landed 
proprietors), ağas (landowners), and religious leaders, who guided clientelist exchange 
during the late Ottoman period and the early republic, gradually lost ground after the 
transition to multi-party politics in 1950. 
 In the case of the AKP, as far as I have observed, the supply side of clientelism 
includes, but is not limited to, the party, the district, and the metropolitan 
municipalities, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the district governorship, 
the mukhtars, religious groups, merchants, industrialists, the construction industry, and 
the vaqfs.  
To ensure the efficiency of the clientelist network, there is a complex division 
of labor among these actors. Accordingly, each actor targets distinct social groups with 
distinct benefits. For instance, in delivering clientelist benefits, municipalities 
prioritize poor people, while the Ministry of Family and Social Policies targets the 
disabled.  
Despite its advanced structure, the division of labor among patrons is not 
problem-free. The major problem is double funding. That is to say, because clientelism 
is informal, a client may simultaneously receive clientelist benefits from several 
channels and it is very difficult to disentangle them. Although waste is not a serious 
problem as long as it does not put the overall functioning of the clientelist network in 
danger, the clientelist party seeks to minimize turnover. One municipal officer [47] 
admitted instances of double-funding:  
 
We have a list of people who are in need of help. We try to draw up the 
list while coordinating with relevant actors as much as possible. But 
double funding is unavoidable, even if we pay the utmost attention. 
 
Ortakaya and Torun (2009) estimate that the rate of double funding was 29.3 
percent in 2009 with regard to public assistance. To improve this, the government 
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introduced the “Social Assistance Information System” (SOYBIS) in 2009. This 
online service allows public institutions to query whether applicants have already 
applied for other aid at other institutions or already receive aid from any official body. 
Under normal conditions, this measure is expected to reduce double funding; however, 
as my interviews with the municipal officers reveal, the rate of double funding is still 
quite high. This shows that the online check using SOYBIS is used as a last resort in 
order not to disappoint clients. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the people who 
receive clientelist benefits by far exceed those who need it. This also explains why 
officials from the Ministry of Family and Social Assistance refrained from sharing 
poverty statistics with me.  
 
6.6.1. Party 
Among the actors mentioned above, political parties require special treatment 
because they increasingly orchestrate clientelism in the modern world. To perform this 
efficiently, parties need strong organizational power and charismatic leadership. The 
AKP apparently fulfills both conditions.  
 To learn more about the role of the political party in the clientelist machine, I 
visited the AKP office in Bağcılar. I should note that, although it was not election time, 
the building was extremely crowded, particularly with elderly people and women. 
When I entered the building, a group of party workers, including the head of the 
women’s branch, had gift-bags in their hands and were going out. When I asked a party 
worker where they were heading, he said they were going to celebrate the birth a 
supporter’s child.  
 During my interviews, the officials emphasized that the AKP has more than 
120,000 members in Bağcılar. Reflecting this, the first thing I realized was the party 
officials’ self-confidence. The words of one party official [55] illustrate this:  
 
There is no party if there is no strong organization. We are very strong 
in Bağcılar. The municipality cannot do its job if we do not work. We 
are the backbone of the party. 
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 Although at first glance the number of members sounds quite high, amounting 
to half the AKP votes cast in Bağcılar in the 2015 November elections, it is not 
surprising given that the typical party membership in Turkey remains only on paper 
and does not impose any responsibilities on members, such as paying membership fees 
or regularly taking part in party activities. What is unique to the Turkish case is that 
passive membership does not lead to weak partisan identification. On the contrary, 
partisan identification strengthens over time, as will be shown, due to clientelism. 
The party has multiple functions within the clientelist network. First, the party 
organization makes it possible to reach a larger audience. It does so by establishing 
daily and face-to-face contact with the voters. This essentially requires committed 
party workers to sacrifice their time and money for the party. One party official [59] 
illustrates this:  
 
We start our business on the morning of election day. There is no 
difference in our strategy before or after the election term. We do as 
much as we can. For instance, I work in the transport sector. I do my 
job from morning to 3 o’clock [pm]. Then, I come here and stay until 
night. There are always officials in this building. You can find our 
officials here from morning to 11 o’clock at night.  
 
Despite its extent and activism, the AKP organization is far from reaching 
everyone residing in Bağcılar. There are a number of important practical limitations. 
One party official [58] admitted this:  
 
It is impossible for us to reach everyone. In terms of population, every 
neighborhood in Bağcılar is as large as a small-sized province in 
Anatolia. Even though we have a good capacity and committed 
members in almost every street, it is not possible to reach everyone and 
enter every building. The biggest problem is the housing estates. 
Besides, some opposition supporters do not allow us to reach people in 
certain places. 
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Second, the party organization directs clients to the relevant institutions or the 
authorities that may help them to solve their problems. For instance, party 
workers/officials might establish contact between the district governorship and an 
elderly person who is in need of medicine but cannot afford to buy them.  
Third, the party mobilizes voters for rallies or at the polls with its strong 
organization. However, apart from election times, the party organization is not much 
visible in the street. To illustrate, one partisan [32] pointed out that: 
 
The party does not have regular contact with me in normal times. 
However, on the eve of the elections, the party frequently sends 
messages and calls by phone. The workers on the phone just kindly 
thank me if I say I can’t join the event. 
 
The lack of party activism during normal times apparently has two main 
reasons. The first is the embodiment of clientelism in the cult of personality. This 
keeps clients as loyal voters even if the party organization is not particularly active at 
grassroots level or even if it is not well liked. The second reason is to neutralize 
“excessive” politicization of the masses. The logic is that if politicization becomes an 
essential part of clients’ daily routine and heightens their sense of expectation, it may 
rebound on the clientelist machine itself.  
Last but not least, the AKP monitors clients before and after the elections. It 
does so through a sophisticated organization that has adequate and up-to-date 
information on clients because of its daily close contact with them. In this framework, 
one AKP official [55] detailed how monitoring works:  
 
We have groups of 30 people in every neighborhood targeting women, 
young people, elders, and regulars. We are very careful in choosing our 
neighborhood organization members. We always investigate them 
thoroughly before they become active in our party. They are very 
important for our party. For instance, if a person asks for assistance, we 
immediately call our neighborhood organization members. In hours, our 
organization provides detailed information about the person concerned. 
We make our decision based on this feedback. 
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 As already demonstrated, the AKP organization is crucial for the functioning 
of the clientelist network because of its ability to guide, mobilize, and monitor clients 
and reach new ones. This feature distinguishes the AKP from previous incumbents 
(for example, the ANAP), which could not transform the party system into a 
predominant one because they failed to establish effective monitoring and relied solely 
on the charismatic leader to underwrite clientelist exchange.  
 
6.6.2. Municipality 
The municipality is another key actor in clientelist exchange. In addition to 
personnel, the municipality commands vast amounts of public resources. While the 
former enables it to reach a wider audience, the latter secures the voters’ long-term 
commitment.  
During my interviews in the municipality building, I noticed two elements that 
make the municipality–voter linkage evidently clientelist: the criteria for selecting the 
needy and the way in which benefits reach the needy.  
To be more specific, there is no objective income threshold that defines the poor 
for municipality workers. One officer [48], for instance, remarked that: 
  
I think that people who earn less than the minimum wage [1,500 TL] 
are poor. [after thinking a bit more] In fact, if you add the rent, even 
2,500 TL is not sufficient. 
  
 Because the poverty criteria are evidently arbitrary, they can easily be 
manipulated by the municipality to discriminate against non-partisans. In this setting, 
applicants for aid seem to be abandoned to the prerogative of the municipal officers. 
The absence of an objective poverty threshold can also be manipulated by clients. One 
municipality official [50] noted that:  
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Our people are vigilant. A man applies for aid and passes the initial 
assessment. Then, we visit his home. He offers us Parliament cigarettes, 
which are very expensive. We witness many similar instances. I saw 
many people who have iPhones in their pocket but still apply for aid. 
However, these are easier to identify. 
 
 Well aware of the partisan bias, almost all applicants present themselves as 
partisans. Yet, it is not easy to deceive the officials. After processing the initial 
documents, the officials carry out interviews to identify whether the applicant is a 
partisan or not. In this setting, proof of party membership or the reference of a party-
related person facilitate access to clientelist benefits. On the other hand, even if 
someone is identified as not a partisan, their application is not rejected automatically. 
Here, the decision is made on the basis of whether a non-partisan can be converted 
into a partisan. This strategy is crucial to extending the clientelist network beyond core 
voters.  
In addition to the lack of an objective threshold for allocating aid, the way 
benefits are distributed to clients also conforms to typical clientelist exchange. As far 
as I observed, the municipality provides clientelist benefits as manifestly as possible. 
Because this “open-air show” is proof that the municipality backs its supporters, the 
authorities are keen to maintain it. This clearly contrasts with the flow of programmatic 
benefits, which are delivered quietly and in a more professional manner. 
 
6.6.3. Leader 
The party leader, Erdoğan, plays multiple roles in clientelist exchange. First, 
he is the guarantor of clientelist exchange. This is above all due to the intense media 
propaganda that praises him for this.95 The widespread  view among clients that “if 
Erdoğan goes, so do the benefits” is the product of such propaganda. Here, there is 
also a pragmatic concern that must be emphasized. The clientelist network is so crucial 
for the AKP that its destiny cannot be left in the hands of the fragmented party 
                                               
95 The KONDA (2017) survey demonstrates that AKP supporters strictly follow the partisan 
press: ATV (26 percent), A Haber (17 percent), and the state-owned TRT (19 percent).  
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leadership and/or brokers. If it was, then the fate of the AKP would not be much 
different from other dominant parties (for example, the KMT in Taiwan; see Chapter 
7). 
Despite my finding that loyalty to the AKP goes hand in hand with loyalty to 
Erdoğan, there is a notable difference between them, which has become more evident 
in recent years. Although the electorate is increasingly holding the party organization 
responsible for political errors and the declining electoral performance of the AKP, it 
has so far kept the leader aloof from critics.96 Accordingly, a leader who previously 
was equated with the party has slowly acquired a new position beyond and above the 
party. This strengthens his appeal by allowing him to attract non-partisans as well. As 
a result of this tendency, Erdoğan could easily get votes from the nationalist MHP in 
the 2018 presidential elections. 
In line with that, both partisans and the party leadership praised Erdoğan during 
my interviews. For instance, one partisan [23] noted that:  
 
I don’t have party membership and have never joined any party 
activities except big meetings in Istanbul. I follow Erdoğan on the TV 
and he feels close to me. If I have to describe him with one word, it 
would be “sincere.” 
 
 The party organization [59] shares this view:  
 
People believe in Erdoğan. We think that if the headman (reis) says 
something, he definitely knows it. If there is no Erdoğan, there is no 
party. 
 
Erdoğan’s role is even more crucial when it comes to local elections. One 
partisan [27] pointed out that: 
                                               
96 In line with that KONDA (2017) survey found that while 46 percent of the AKP voters vote 
because of Erdoğan, merely of 22 percent vote because of the AKP’s political appeal. 
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I vote for Erdoğan. Although I do not like the work of the mayor in 
Bağcılar, I still vote for him because I feel that I would be betraying 
Erdoğan [if I didn’t]. Erdoğan is sincere and has so far stood up to 
pressure successfully. 
 
Although the embodiment of the clientelist network in the personality of 
Erdoğan creates a strong partisan attachment at grassroots level, it also poses a risk for 
the future. The ANAP case illustrates that the clientelist network cannot survive if it 
hinges on the charismatic leader. It is likely that the AKP will confront the same 
scenario in the post-Erdoğan period.  
In addition to being a guarantor, Erdoğan keeps the clientelist network alive. 
As already emphasized, the lack of party activism during non-electoral periods is 
closely related to the strong party leader who communicates with partisans daily via 
the partisan press. In any case, this is an efficient strategy because it enables the party 
leader to reach a larger audience with far less resources than the party organization 
needs to carry out the same function.  
Third, Erdoğan keeps normally antagonistic classes united under the same 
party flag. This is more crucial in the absence of a precise ideology and growing 
income inequality. Nevertheless, I contend that even Erdoğan’s charisma may not 
suffice to unite these classes if the economic crisis that began in the summer of 2018 
deepens further in 2019.  
Last but not least, Erdoğan bypasses any judicial supervision that might put the 
maintenance of the clientelist exchange in jeopardy. As Scheiner (2006) in the context 
of Japan, and Wang & Kurzman (2007) in the context of Taiwan demonstrate, the 
institutional protection of clientelist actors is essential to building an efficient 
clientelist machine. Such protection explains, for instance, why both the party and the 
municipal officials did not hesitate to mention extralegal acts openly during my 
interviews.  
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6.6.4. Religious groups, vaqfs and loyal businessmen 
The religious groups – which are organized around mosques, Quranic courses, and 
bookstores97 – are historically dominant in Bağcılar. Although they insist that their 
main aim is to save souls, religious groups have in recent times sought also to pursue 
the interests of their members. Prominent examples include Gülenists and Menzilcis,98 
who are organized in the public bureaucracy to the extent that they constitute a 
“parallel state.”  
 The tasks of the religious groups within the clientelist machine are twofold. 
First, they attract new clients and deter exit by establishing daily face-to-face contact 
with their members. Second, because the relationship between the religious leader 
(imam) and his followers is hierarchical in itself, religious groups facilitate the 
integration of members into the clientelist network.  
 Another crucial actor is the “vaqfs”. These include “Türgev”99 and “Ensar”,100 
which seemingly operate as the civil-society wing of the AKP government.101 Similar 
to religious groups, the vaqfs, especially the religious ones, target clients with a 
discourse of “brotherhood, solidarity, and goodness” (Zencirci, 2014) and establish 
personal and constant relationships through religious gatherings, excursions, and sport 
                                               
97 According to the district office of the Mufti, Bağcılar has 69 mosques, 19 small mosques 
(mescit), 13 boarding and 36 non-boarding Quran courses.  
98 The opposition media widely report that members of Menzil tariqats have started to fill open 
positions in the Ministry of Health, after the dismissal of the Gülenists (Cumhuriyet, 2016a).  
99 Türgev was founded in 1996 under the guidance of Erdoğan when he was mayor of Istanbul. 
Currently, his son, Bilal Erdoğan, has an administrative position in it. The vaqf aims to build 
dorms for students, whose number exceeds 10,000. Türgev has frequently been accused by the 
opposition of having corrupt relations with AKP-administrated municipalities (Türgev; 
Cumhuriyet, 2016b). 
100 Ensar Vaqf was established in 1979. It is typically associated with the National Outlook 
Tradition. The vaqf has recently been targeted by the opposition because of child abuse 
scandals (Birgün, 2016b). 
101 A recent report shows how the AKP-administrated Istanbul metropolitan municipality 
supports loyal vaqfs through the transfer of public resources. To illustrate, up to 2018 , the 
municipality transferred 51 million TL to Türgev (amounting nearly 10 million dollars at 
current exchange rates) and 28 million TL to Ensar (Toker, 2019).  
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activities. The feeling of reciprocity emanating from such linkages makes it easier to 
buy the loyalty of vaqf members. 
 Loyal businessmen are also pivotal actors in the clientelist machine. It is widely 
reported that this group donates money to the pool in return for government kickbacks 
(Çeviker-Gürakar, 2016; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2018). This money is then distributed to 
the poor in the form of clientelist benefits. In addition, loyal businessmen contribute 
to public resources by paying taxes. Illustrating these, the mukhtar [60] noted that:  
 
There is a big textile company located nearby. Recently, the owners had 
to make a change in the plan of their factory. In return for this, the 
company donated thousands of food packages to the municipality. The 
municipality then distributes these packages to partisans. 
 
  Among loyal businessmen, construction companies such as Ağaoğlu and 
Torunlar merit special attention.102 In return for undertaking large-scale urban 
transformation projects or intended changes in construction plans, loyal construction 
companies donate money to the pool or employ partisans in their businesses. They 
also monitor the voting behavior of their employees. During my interviews, workers 
widely complained that the construction companies compel them to take pictures of 
the ballot when they vote. Even worse , the workers claimed that construction 
companies threaten to dismiss them if they cannot prove that they voted for the AKP.  
  Finally, the potential of construction companies to sabotage the AKP’s 
electoral performance must be emphasized. During my fieldwork, the partisans, 
especially the poor, widely complained about growing corruption between 
construction companies and local politicians and its destructive impact on the district. 
                                               
102 During the period of AKP rule, Ağaoğlu and Torunlar groups have come to prominence by 
undertaking large-scale construction projects alone or in collaboration with Emlak Konut 
(TOKİ’s subsidiary). For instance, Ağaoğlu and Emlak Konut collaborated on the “Maslak 
1453 Istanbul” project, located in the middle of the forest. Torunlar group, on the other hand, 
constructed huge towers where Galatasaray’s stadium used to be (Ali Sami Yen). It has also 
constructed popular shopping malls, such as the Mall of Istanbul and Torium.  
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This tendency might be reflected in the 2019 local elections, with a sharp drop in the 
AKP’s vote share.  
 
6.7. The content of clientelist exchange  
As already noted, clientelism involves the exchange of goods and services for 
political support. The goods and services vary, based on the setting. In the case of 
Turkey, coal seems to be the favorite clientelist good overall, followed by flour, tea, 
sugar, rice, and clothes (cf. Sayari, 2014). This observation, however, does not entirely 
apply to Bağcılar. For instance, because most houses use natural gas for heating, 
distributing coal would not be the best strategy. Nevertheless, I heard of extreme cases 
in which clients receive the coal and then sell it on. Similarly, cash payments are 
uncommon in Bağcılar.  
What is evident in the field is that different actors target clients with distinct 
benefits. In this framework, at least in theory, it is reasonable to assume that the AKP 
itself is not one of these actors, because the party finance system restricts the spending 
of treasury money for the sole purpose of party activities (for example, paying rent on 
buildings, workers’ salaries, and campaign spending). Confirming this assumption, 
one party official [57] declared that:  
 
Because parties have no budget to help the needy, we frequently collect 
money. 
 
I must, however, admit that theory and practice do not overlap much here. 
During my interviews with partisans, many admitted that they received symbolic gifts 
such as Turkish delight and Turkish coffee from the party at regular meetings (see, for 
instance, photos 1 and 2). Although it is very difficult to identify financial resources 
used to fund them, it is likely that small favors of this kind put the AKP ahead of other 
parties because opposition parties lack the resources to follow suit.  
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In comparison with the party, the municipality offers more diverse clientelist 
benefits. This is because it legally commands a vast amount of public resources. 
Illustrating this, one social worker [51] emphasized that:  
 
There is no limit on the distribution of aid. We distribute everything, 
including beds, coal, and money. We furnish a house [showing a photo 
of the truck that carries aid]. We can even find partners for those who 
come here for that purpose.  
 
Photo 1: Turkish delight with a party logo 
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Photo 2: Turkish coffee with a party logo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In addition to delivering material benefits, the clientelist actors also provide 
job and services to clients. I personally witnessed two instances in the AKP building. 
The first one was an old man with an AKP hat. Talking to the party official, he said:  
 
I have back pain so I cannot work. I do not have any money to buy my 
medicine. For God sake, help me. 
 
 Another was a woman in her early 20s who came in when I was talking to party 
officials. She said:  
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Hello, I am looking for a job. I came here with a reference from Mr. 
Kaya. He said that if I give you my CV, you would help me get a job. 
  
 
 As we have seen, clientelist actors offer wide-ranging benefits to secure clients’ 
votes. The aim is to maximize the party’s appeal while minimizing the cost. The 
reproduction of poverty clearly serves this aim.  
 
6.8. Exclusion 
Clientelism in Turkey can be regarded as both exclusionary and inclusionary. It is 
exclusionary in the sense that the opponents of the AKP government do not benefit 
from it. It is inclusionary in the sense that the poor masses who were long excluded 
from the clientelist network have been incorporated into it. These two features exert 
substantial influence on the party system: while the former extends the level of 
polarization, the latter boosts partisanship.  
During my interviews, as might have been expected, the municipal officials 
denied that they discriminate against non-partisans in selecting aid recipients. One 
municipal official [52], for instance, contended that:  
 
We do not ask people where they were born, which sect they belong to. 
Neither do we ask whether they vote for us. We only listen to their 
stories and try to solve their problems. Believe me, many people in this 
building are from other parties. 
  
He explained:  
 
We do not discriminate among the people because we have a 
conscience. 
 
 The emphasis on a conscience is common among municipal officials. It clearly 
shows how the objective notion of “law” is substituted by the subjective notion of 
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“conscience” in dealing with citizens. This notion contrasts starkly with the 
programmatic settings. That is to say, in a welfare state, the distribution of benefits is 
not left to the conscience of social workers, but the rules that apply equally to all 
citizens, regardless of how they vote.  
Although the municipal officials claim otherwise, it can easily be observed 
that, by the very nature of clientelism, the opponents are excluded from the clientelist 
network. More specifically, opponents are punished by not being helped, or by being 
informed too late or even not at all of possible assistance.103 One former party worker 
[18] admitted this: 
 
In neighborhoods such as Bağlar and Hürriyet, the residents always 
complain about lack of services at our meetings. And the response is 
that these places are not a priority for the municipality because the 
opposition is more popular. 
 
 In the same vein, the mukhtar [60] noted that: 
 
The aid distributed by the public institutions and the party target 
partisans surreptitiously. Non-partisans are not even informed about 
what is being distributed. 
 
 In fact, discrimination against the opposition is hardly rare among AKP 
politicians. In addressing the public, many AKP mayors and candidates have pledged 
that they will not serve the places that did not vote for them or that services will be 
provided in accordance with the AKP’s vote share.104  
                                               
103 It must be emphasized that receiving information on clientelist benefits is vital in settings 
characterized by a high illiteracy rate. 
104 Examples of discriminatory language are abundant. For instance, during his local election 
campaign, former mayor of Ankara Melih Gökçek pledged that he would start providing 
benefits to the district that gave him the biggest support if he was elected (Cumhuriyet, 2014a). 
Similarly, former Istanbul mayor Mevlüt Uysal promised that his priority in building the metro 
line would be districts in which the AKP is most popular (Evrensel, 2018b). 
  127 
Exclusion may also reflect sectarian and/or ethnic bias. In the case of the AKP, 
I observed that discrimination takes place against people who belong to the Alevite 
sect. This is because support for the AKP is lowest among this group.105 Because the 
place of birth, for the most part, indicates sectarian identity in the Turkish context, it 
is not difficult to identify Alevite applicants in face-to-face meetings/interviews.  
Unlike sectarian exclusion, ethnic exclusion is less visible because the 
overwhelming majority of Kurds in Bağcılar support the AKP. The close ties between 
the AKP and Kurdish voters can easily be discerned from the density of Kurdish-
speaking people in the party, municipality, and district governorship buildings. This 
shows that the AKP invests in swing voters who may potentially shift to the pro-
Kurdish HDP, as in the June 2015 elections. In Istanbul, given the weight of Kurdish 
voters and the close race with the CHP in the local elections, this strategy is even more 
important for the AKP’s electoral success.  
 
6.9. Deterring exit: monitoring and punishment 
To reproduce dominance, clientelist parties must deter exit.106 If they are unable to do 
so, clients may receive benefits with one hand and vote with another (Szwarchberg, 
2015).  
 Parties deter exit through several instruments. The most common method is to 
build an efficient monitoring mechanism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).107 In densely 
populated districts, this requires to sharing monitoring tasks among multiple actors. 
For instance, while religious groups monitor their committed followers, parties 
monitor through their neighborhood organizations. 
                                               
105 According to the Konda (2017) report, Alevites constitute a mere 1 percent of the AKP’s 
total voter base.  
106 Although monitoring and punishment are essential for clientelist parties to minimize 
turnover, two factors substantially reduce the need for them, at least in the context of Bağcılar. 
The first is the status of Bağcılar as a stronghold of Islamic/conservative parties. The second 
is weak inter-party competition on the right of the political spectrum.  
107 The successful institutionalization of monitoring leads to what Stokes (2005) calls 
“perverse accountability,” which holds voters accountable to politicians rather than vice versa.  
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In addition to establishing efficient monitoring, clientelist parties deter exit 
by playing the punishment card. This entails the withdrawal of clientelist benefits from 
those who fail to give their support.108 One partisan [33] working in the construction 
sector illustrated this:  
 
My boss said that I have to take a photo of my vote and send it to him. 
If I did not do it, he threatened to fire me. 
  
  Another partisan [5] said:  
  
The party workers said that if the AKP does not win, I will no longer 
get any aid. Therefore, I will vote for the AKP in the upcoming 
elections although I do not like its service anymore. 
 
Reflecting this approach, in interviews with clients the municipal officials 
refrain from situating distributed benefits within the welfare state framework. If 
benefits are associated with the welfare state, this would imply that they are permanent, 
not temporary and conditional. This would give clients less incentive to show loyalty 
to the government.  
 
6.10. Swing vs. core voters 
Whether clientelist parties target “swing” or “core” voters is a subject of controversy 
among scholars.109 The rule of thumb is that, while swing voters’ support is conditional 
and rests on the delivery of clientelist benefits, core voters’ support is not conditional 
and rests mainly on a party‘s policy appeal (Szwarchberg, 2013, p. 34). This 
                                               
108 This rests on the “discretional nature of particularistic transfers” and illustrates what 
Magaloni, Cayeros & Estevez (2007, pp. 184-185) call the “threat of exclusion.” 
109 To illustrate, for Magaloni (2006), the incumbent targets swing voters, while for Dunning 
& Stokes (2010), there is a division of labor between the party brokers and the leader. The 
former target the core voters and the latter targets the swing voters. 
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delineation, however, does not mean that core voters do not benefit from clientelist 
resources. On the contrary, core voters are the primary organizers and biggest 
beneficiaries of the clientelist machine – at least in the context of Bağcılar.  
In this framework, I define core voters as “those who take part in clientelist 
exchange as client or patron and/or who come from National Outlook tradition.” Swing 
voters, on the other hand, are “those who do not come from the National Outlook 
tradition and/or who are not included in the clientelist exchange.” Broadly speaking, 
conservative Kurds, nationalists, and liberals can be labeled swing voters.  
 Below, I briefly summarize the stories of core and swing voters, based on my 
interviews. Accordingly, in Table 27, I present a prototype of core and swing voters.  
 
Table 27: Prototype of core and swing voters 
  National Outlook 
Past? 
Client? 
  YES NO YES NO 
Core Ahmet/Mehmet X  X  
Murat  X  X 
Swing Serkan  X X  
Ramazan  X  X 
 
 
Core voters 
a) A client and has a National Outlook past: Ahmet and Mehmet are twin brothers. 
They studied together in the underground Quranic courses. They had to choose this 
path because their father was against enrolling them in the “secular” public schools. 
After finishing high school externally in 2013, Ahmet and Mehmet were appointed 
imams by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which transformed them into true 
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partisans. The twins’ story is noteworthy as it shows how the AKP appeals to “anti-
state” Islamic groups through the instrument of patronage. It also illustrates how 
clientelism works as an inclusionary force for those with a radical Islamic past.  
 
b) Not a client but has a National Outlook past: Murat was born in Erzurum. He 
finds Erdoğan sincere and trustworthy because, for the first time, as he sees it, “one of 
us” became head of state. Murat is not a member of the AKP. His political activism 
does not go beyond attending mass meetings, reading the partisan press, and political 
discussions with friends in coffee houses. He is a typical example of what I call a “non-
partisan partisan,” whose attachment to the party is based largely on Erdoğan’s 
charisma, built up by the partisan press. As far as I observed, this group – which has 
no direct link to clientelist actors but is strongly affiliated with the leader Erdoğan – is 
largely excluded from the clientelist network. This clearly shows the role of the party 
in accessing clientelist benefits.  
 
Swing voters 
a) A client, but does not have a National Outlook past: Serkan was born in Ordu 
and has a social democrat background. Serkan voted for the AKP until recently. He 
also worked in the youth organization, but then kept his distance after observing that 
the party had started to become corrupt. He pointed out that, after he left the party, it 
cut off all aid to him. Noting that the party workers were extremely careful in taking 
care of the poor and refraining from corruption in the 2000s, he observed that the party 
had switched from “populism” to “elitism,” nurturing the Islamic bourgeoisie. 
Although he is not a partisan anymore, he still feels closer to the AKP than their 
opponents. Serkan’s story is illustrative as it hints at the future of AKP rule. As Greene 
(2007) argues, this type of voter – who is close to becoming detached from the 
incumbent, but does not see the opposition parties as credible alternatives and so 
remains loyal to the incumbent at the ballot box – has the potential to weaken dominant 
party rule. Based on my observations, I expect that dealignment from the AKP will be 
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rapid in the short run, but I would also say that realignment will require more time 
because the opposition is still not popular among dealigned voters.  
 
b) Not a client and does not have a National Outlook past: Ramazan was born in 
Çanakkale and has a nationalist background. His interest in religion started during his 
stay in Gülenist dormitories. Although he has voted for the AKP several times, he 
recently switched to the CHP. This move followed the 17–25 December (2013) 
operations that marked the end of the Gülen–Erdoğan alliance. Ramazan pointed out 
that he never joined in any party activity and has never received any benefits from 
clientelist actors.  
 
6.11. Causal mechanisms 
Although clientelism is an efficient strategy to target and mobilize voters, it does not 
automatically guarantee clients’ votes at the ballot box. If this is the case, then the 
predominant party system should have emerged long before the AKP period because 
clientelism is a key feature of Turkish politics. This makes it essential to identify the 
mechanisms that link clientelism to dominance. 
Based on my fieldwork, I argue that the AKP’s use of clientelism leads to two 
developments, which in turn reproduce the cycle of dominance. The first is the 
strengthening of partisan identification. The second is the transformation of voters’ 
ideology in such a way that it can be reconciled with a neoliberal order.  
In the next section, I discuss these developments.  
 
6.11.1. Strengthening partisan identification 
Despite its significance, the impact of clientelism on partisan identification has 
remained virtually unexamined, at least in the context of Turkey. My fieldwork 
demonstrates that, due to the flow of clientelist benefits, AKP supporters have become 
strong party identifiers, which stands in contrast to the historically weak partisan 
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identification in Turkey.110 This is best expressed in the sharply decline in volatility 
rates since 2002. 
Partisan identification is essential to political behavior. While one stream of 
research takes it as a psychological trait or predisposition, another takes it as active 
behavior, evidenced in party membership or going to the polls (Converse & Pierce, 
1985, p. 143). In the case of Turkey, partisan identification is a mixture of both trends. 
While the notion of the “non-partisan partisan” illustrates the former, the fact that most 
AKP voters are party members111 illustrates the latter.  
Partisan identification is a matter of degree. While strong identifiers “always 
vote for the same candidate or party regardless of what it says or does,” weak 
identifiers are prone to defection (Sartori, 2005, p. 293).112 The former is widely 
regarded as a stabilizing force for the political system, whereas the latter is taken to be 
alarming for the quality of democratic representation (Campbell et all., 1960; Dalton, 
1996; Rose, 1998).  
This assumption does not extend to Turkey. That is to say, strong partisan 
identification fosters polarization and thereby destabilizes the political system. This is 
because partisan identification gets stronger due to the flow of clientelist benefits. 
More specifically, I observed that the more clients benefit from clientelist resources, 
the stronger their identification with the party.113 This shows that strong partisan 
identification works against democracy in the case of Turkey.  
                                               
110 Weak partisan identification has been attributed to a variety of elements. According to 
Sayarı (2008), this is due to the disappearance of parties or changes in their names. In another 
paper, Ali Çarkoğlu (1998) draws attention to the role of military intervention in accounting 
for this. Özbudun (2001), on the other hand, contends that disappointment with the mainstream 
parties lies behind weak partisan identification.  
111 As of March 3, 2019, the AKP had 10,337,144 members, while the CHP had only 1,218,611 
members.  
112 This does not mean that weak identifiers are always unstable voters. In fact, weak identifiers 
can be very stable if their vote is motivated by “negative voting,” that is , parties they dislike 
(Sartori, 2005, p. 293).  
113 The only exception to this rule is the group that I call “non-partisan partisans,” who are not 
part of the clientelist machine, but still have strong partisan identification.  
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The strengthening of partisan identification has three dimensions. The first 
amounts to getting people to view political, social, and economic developments 
through the prism of the party, or rather the party leader. This demonstrates that parties 
not only interpret ongoing cleavages (cf. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), but also have the 
capacity to change voters’ perceptions and identities (cf. Campbell, Converse, Miller 
& Stokes, 1960), which is more likely in polarized settings (Druckman, Peterson & 
Slothuus, 2013).  
 The best example that shows how the AKP leadership shapes the views of its 
supporters is the “Kurdish Opening Process.” Opinion surveys initially showed that 
AKP supporters were very supportive of the peace process. However, once the AKP 
switched its policy after the June 2015 elections, public support for the peace process 
dropped sharply.114 The mooted presidential system is another illustrative case. The 
panel data show that, as Erdoğan and the AKP pushed for the presidential system, 
public opinion shifted towards embracing it.115 
Second, strong partisanship involves an increasing dislike for opposition 
parties, illustrating “hostile partisanship.” This has the potential to ruin or delegitimize 
the political system by exacerbating political and social polarization (Almond & 
Verba, 1963). Hostile partisanship overwhelmingly affects the CHP in urban 
settings.116 During my fieldwork, I heard many examples of this:  
                                               
114 Several surveys showed how the AKP leadership affected the political behavior of partisans 
in an intended direction. A Konsensus (2010) survey, for instance, found that from October 
2009 to April 2010, support for the peace process rose from 32.8 percent to 48.1 percent, and 
then jumped to 65.7 percent in January 2014 (Cumhuriyet, 2014b). Similarly, a SAMER 
survey that was conducted in the Kurdish provinces found that support for the peace process 
skyrocketed to 84.7 percent in October 2014 (Bianet, 2014). In stark contrast to this trend, an 
Optimar survey in May 2016 shows that support dropped sharply to 27.3 percent once the 
AKP inverted its Kurdish policy (T24, 2016).  
115 A&G research, for instance, found that support for the presidential system rose from 37.4 
percent to 45.7 percent between June and November 2016 (Milliyet, 2016). A similar trend 
was also observed by the Konda survey. It found that from February to March 2017, the 
support for the presidential system rose by 7 percent (T24, 2017). In the same vein, Optimar 
research found that between 2014 and 2017, the approval rate rose by 12 percentage points 
(Milliyet, 2017).  
116 This trend cannot be extended to the Kurdish-majority provinces. In these areas, hostile 
partisanship is directed against the HDP as the AKP’s most powerful rival.  
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I always vote for the biggest rival of the CHP. The CHP mentality 
banned the headscarf and religious groups. For long years, we had to 
read the Quran in silence and secretly. [26] 
 
The CHP leader only talks. No action. The CHP supporters are always 
against building new airports, bridges and roads. They do not want the 
development of Turkey. Therefore, I vote for the AK Party. [29] 
 
I can swear that if the CHP comes to power, aid will be cut off. I 
remember that the municipalities were providing scholarships to 
university students. Then, they stopped after the CHP complained to the 
Constitutional Court.117 The CHP takes from the public rather than 
serving it. [13]  
 
While the CHP [SHP] was ruling Bağcılar, there was no clean water. 
The roads were full of mud. They do not know how to administer the 
municipalities. I never vote for them. [31]  
  
I work in Levent. Almost everyone supports the CHP in my workplace. 
I behave as if I am one of them. Otherwise, they would look down on 
me. In their conversations, they are constantly belittling AKP 
supporters as illiterate. The CHP cannot win elections with this 
mentality. [15]  
 
The CHP is cooperating with the PKK and FETÖ [Gülenist Terrorist 
Organization]. The HDP entered parliament with the support of the 
CHP. Therefore, I always vote for the strongest rival of the CHP. [35]  
 
The proliferation of hostile partisanship has severe repercussions in the social 
field. Illustrating this, research on the dimensions of polarization in Turkey (Istanbul 
Bilgi University, 2018), conducted in 2017, found that 69.6 percent of respondents do 
                                               
117 The story can be found here: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/belediye-burslari-iptal-
10410064 
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not want to be neighbors with voters for the party to which they are most hostile. 
Similarly, 78.7 percent of respondents declared that they would not allow their daughter 
to marry a supporter of the party to which they are most hostile.  
Third, partisan identification has begun to prevail over competing identities. 
This is by no means the same as saying that identification based on religion, ethnicity, 
or regionalism has lost its salience. On the contrary, these identities are as strong as 
ever. The change has occurred rather in the hierarchical pyramid that defines these 
identities. The expansion of the clientelist network has moved partisan identification to 
the top.118  
What best illustrates this trend is the ongoing war between the AKP leadership 
and the opposing religious groups. As already mentioned, the AKP government has co-
opted a substantial portion of religious communities by allowing them to capitalize on 
private and public resources. The rest, which have not fallen in with the political 
authorities, have faced judicial and financial investigations. The case of Kuytul119 best 
illustrates this.  
The AKP’s changing policy towards religious groups found a large audience 
among its supporters. To illustrate, during my interviews, almost all partisans underlined 
that their position changed negatively towards religious communities in the aftermath 
of the July 2016 failed coup. One partisan [45], for instance, stated that:  
 
   I have been a member of a religious community for many years. The 
difference between the party and the religious community is that the 
religious communities only think about their interests and they nurture 
regimented people. They are closed to criticisms. The members take 
whatever the leader says as a command. In most cases, the imams 
                                               
118 I should admit that this hierarchical structure cannot be applied to whole Turkey, 
particularly to the East and Southeast Anatolia, where traditional social ties still determine the 
voting behaviour. During my extended fieldwork (July 2018) in Kurdish provinces, significant 
portion of the AKP supporters and even party officials emphasized that they vote and work 
for the AKP because of their clan leader’s order. 
119 Alparslan Kuytul headed Furkan Vaqf. The vaqf has been known with its Islamic agenda 
and its opposition to Erdoğan rule. In January 2018, Kuytul and the prominent figures of the 
Vaqf were arrested for their activities against the constitutional order (Cumhuriyet, 2018c).  
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regard party leaders as rivals and oppose them. After July 15 [2016], 
the public thoroughly understood this point. Now, no one wants to send 
their children to religious schools. And this is good for our society. 
 
   Let me briefly discuss this statement. First, I believe that, during the period 
before 2013, when the AKP had good relations with the religious communities, the same 
person would not have complained that the religious communities raise “regimented” 
people, let alone are trying to capture state institutions. This is because the party 
leadership, at that time, strongly pushed the view that religious groups operate only for 
God’s sake. Second, in a political context in which the government’s authoritarian 
leanings are crystallizing, accusations from the AKP party base that religious 
communities nurture regimented people, exclude their rivals, or mindlessly obey their 
leaders are ironic, to say the least! 
The deteriorating image of the religious communities in the eyes of partisans 
has also been captured by public surveys. For instance, according to the “Religion and 
Religious Values” survey conducted by MAK research in 2017, half the respondents 
indicated that religious communities should be subjected to state control. More 
interestingly, only one-sixth of the participants declared an affiliation with religious 
communities or orders (Sputnik, 2017).  
  
6.11.2. Change in ideology 
 It is admittedly more complex to show the causal link between clientelism and 
ideological change. This is simply because ideological change is both prior and posterior 
to clientelist exchange. It is prior because the decline of working class ideology prepared 
the ground for clientelist parties to expand (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Roniger, 
2004). It is posterior, on the other hand, because clientelism is such a strong force that 
it is capable of shaping voters’ ideology.  
            This study is aimed explicitly at understanding the latter phenomena, in other 
words, the impact of clientelism on voters’ ideology. I argue that such an inquiry is 
necessary for at least three reasons. First, it helps us to understand how Islam and 
neoliberalism, which have long been considered incompatible, can coexist. Second, it 
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accounts for why the poor have not resisted neoliberal reforms even though they 
undermine their well-being. Third, it explains why Islamist-rooted voters, who are 
known to be sensitive to the notion of social justice, realigned with the AKP.  
Before delving into the analysis, the term “ideology” needs to be defined.120 
Gerring (1997, p. 957) argues that:  
 
To some, ideology is dogmatic, while to others, it carries connotations 
of political sophistication; to some, it refers to dominant modes of 
thought, and to others, it refers primarily to those most alienated by the 
status quo (for example, revolutionary movements and parties). To 
some, it is based on the concrete interests of a social class, while to 
others, it is characterized by an absence of economic self-interest. One 
could continue, but the point is already apparent: not only is ideology 
farflung, it also encompasses a good many definitional traits which are 
directly at odds with one another. 
 
In the context of Turkey, ideology refers both to the dominant mode of thought 
(for example, Kemalism) and resistance to it (for example, Islamism).121 What notably 
happened during the AKP reign is that once resistant ideology (i.e. Islamism) became 
dominant over time, in parallel to the AKP’s clientelist policies.  
In this light, I below show how clientelism leads to the moderation of the Islamic 
ideology and the approval of the neoliberal reforms, which then reproduce the AKP’s 
dominance.  
  
                                               
120 The term “ideology” is a product of the French Enlightenment. At that time, ideology was 
defined as a “science of ideas,” that is, a technique to discover truth and dissolve illusions, 
rather than as a “type of thought.” With Marx, the concept embraced its present meaning: the 
“quality of thought” that can be distorted (Mullins, 1972, pp. 499–500). 
121 As far as I observed, ideology has a very negative connation for supporters, as well as the 
administration. They commonly believe that ideology constrains parties to narrow 
constituencies and hinders them from extending their voter base beyond that. Accordingly, 
being “non-ideological” is considered crucial for electoral success. 
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6.11.3. Islamism 
 As Dixit & Londregan (1996) contend, ideology is an effective way to build 
common identity with the voters. In this sense, the AKP’s coloring of its clientelism 
with the Islamic tone has drawn huge public support, particularly from those who felt 
excluded before because of wearing headscarf, being a member of the religious 
community, or studying in the underground Quaranic courses.  
 In line with that almost every partisan that I interviewed blessed the AKP 
government for its policies towards religion. Some examples are shown below:  
  
‘I vote for the party that is most compatible with Islam. During the AKP 
rule, religious freedom has expanded. Therefore, I vote for it.’ [4]  
 
‘Before the AKP, women with headscarf were excluded from the 
universities and the public institutions. Now, we can go to universities 
and work in public institutions with our headscarf.’ [10] 
 
‘I am very happy to see that our president knows how to read Quran. 
He even reads better than many Imams.’ [38] 
 
 As far as I observed, the AKP’s clientelism interacted with religion in two 
ways. First, clientelism led some radical Islamists, who were historically sensitive to 
the notion of social justice, to realign with the neoliberal AKP. This happened in two 
ways. To start with, clientelist exchange upgraded small-scale business owners into 
big capitalists by allowing them to capitalize on public procurements or undertake 
urban transformation projects. In the same vein, the AKP government connected with 
Islamic-rooted voters by establishing patronage links with the state, which they had 
long imagined to be “alien” or even an “enemy.” These developments, in turn, 
transformed radical-Islamist rooted voters into true supporters of the AKP 
government. The story of Mehmet and Ahmet (see Chapter 6) best illustrates this 
transformation. 
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Second, clientelism has led some previously non-religious people to become 
moderate Islamists, at least at the level of discourse. Adopting an Islamic discourse is 
pragmatically motivated to win procurement contracts or access clientelist benefits. 
This instance particularly applies to traditionally center-right voters who aligned more 
recently with the AKP. Observing this trend, one partisan [21] pointed out that: 
 
Religious words are now in everyone's mouth. Someone addresses you 
with “Selamun Aleykum.” Then, he talks about how to steal people’s 
money. In recent times, people have begun to fast and go to the mosque 
in order to get something out of it. Unfortunately, we observe this 
behavior in many people. 
 
What must be underlined is that moderation among Islamists and Islamization 
among secular people are occurring simultaneously. And the result is inevitably 
conflicting. One partisan [22] argued that:  
 
What has happened in the past decade is that the left has cast off 
nationalism and the state, whereas the right has cast off religion. 
Practicing religion has been rendered merely formal. It now consists of 
visiting religious places with girlfriends on Fridays and tweeting verses 
on Fridays. Although the number of women with a headscarf has 
increased, religious people have become more secular. Now, women 
wear a headscarf but also put on makeup. This is how Islam is being 
distorted.  
 
As this statement illustrates, there has been a widespread reaction to changes 
in religious mindset from the party base, particularly from those who have a National 
Outlook Tradition past. I expect that, despite their extent, these complaints will remain 
whispers unless the AKP’s management of the economy hits such voters in their 
pockets. 
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6.11.4. Neoliberalism  
The second dimension of ideological change is the drift towards neoliberalism among 
clients. This entails two elements. First, it expresses support for the hegemony of the 
devout bourgeoisie. Second, it involves support for neoliberal reforms.  
 Relating to the former, during my interviews in the field, the sense that the AKP 
government had promoted its own business interests was very strong. This 
development is praised rather than opposed because partisans take it as a victory 
against secular business. More than that, it is taken as a “dream model” for climbing 
the social ladder. Illustrating this, one partisan [34] argued that:  
 
Before the AKP government, conservative business was completely 
excluded from the state. Kemalists were taking all procurement 
contracts. This does not happen anymore. Now, Kemalists accuse the 
AKP government of having corrupt relations with businessmen, as if 
they got rich another way.  
 
Another partisan [24] noted that:  
 
Many people have got rich under the AKP government. In this period, 
becoming rich is easier than in other periods. God is bestowing at least 
something on working people.  
 
Second, the ideological change is part of mobilizing the support of the poor for 
neoliberal “reforms,” including subcontracting and privatization. Within the 
framework of clientelism, this means support for economic policies that expand the 
patron’s resources, some of which are then supposed to be passed on to clients in the 
form of clientelist benefits. Illustrating this view, one partisan [11] noted that:  
 
I am against unionization. Unionized workers earn money by sleeping, 
so to speak. The solution is subcontracting. Subcontractors don't cost 
too much, and they work harder because there is no job guarantee. 
Bağcılar municipality implements this policy successfully. 
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Another partisan added that [12]:  
 
The previous governments put their men into state-owned 
enterprises. Therefore, one hundred people do the jobs of ten people 
in these businesses. And the workers earn very high wages. As a 
result, most state-owned enterprises make a loss. Privatization is the 
right policy.  
 
  Because clientelism hinges on inequality and hierarchy between the patron and 
the client, it is inevitable that this is reflected in the economic field. In this framework, 
the neoliberal drift has softened criticisms of wealth and inequality among AKP voters, 
which stands in stark contrast to the RP period (Öniş, 1997). This means that the RP’s 
dream to realize a “just order” has been abandoned. Instead, the notion of justice is 
confined to political issues, such as lifting the ban on headscarves. The views of 
interviewees best illustrate this transformation: 
 
Under the RP, we were thinking more radically. We were against riches 
and waste. I don't think it's the same now. Turkey has changed a lot. 
Now, there is wealth in the country. Traders and builders quickly 
become rich. [20] 
 
The RP could not get the votes of the rich. Mostly, poor people residing 
in the squatter settlements voted for it. Of course, there were people 
voting for religious reasons, but mostly people were voting because of 
the economy. Unlike the RP, the AKP gets votes from every group. [25] 
 
People’s co-optation into the neoliberal order can be observed even more easily 
within party cadres. One party official [58], for instance, contended that:   
 
It is impossible for a person to stay poor in Bağcılar. You can get aid 
from numerous places. Our people are not poor, they are “luxury poor.” 
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They are not poor in the sense of eating and drinking, but in relation to 
social activities. 
 
 The term “luxury poor” entails more than might appear. This view apparently 
takes poverty in the narrower sense of access to food and drink and considers anything 
beyond that (for example, access to social life) as a luxury. This rationale normalizes 
poverty and is instrumental in hampering further economic demands by the poor. The 
remarks of another party official [59] were even more revealing:  
 
I believe poor people are lazy. Today, anyone willing to work can get a 
job easily. But because many institutions provide assistance, no one 
wants to work. 
 
 In a nutshell, these testimonies show that the lower classes have started to 
lose their ability to empathize with each other because they are part of a clientelist 
network. This is a manifestation of what I call “de-identification,” which aims to 
destroy resistance to neoliberal reforms that undermine the well-being of the 
poor. 
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN: COMPARISON 
This section seeks to investigate the role of clientelism in the emergence of 
predominant party systems. My main intention is to situate the Turkish case among 
the broader set of predominant party systems. In order to draw reliable 
comparisons, in this section the cases of Mexico, Taiwan, India, and Japan are 
presented.122  
These cases were selected as follows. First, the cases differ in terms of 
democratic quality. That is to say, while in India and Japan predominant party 
systems are maintained under a democratic regime, in Mexico and Taiwan this 
occurs under a hybrid regime. Second, the cases differ in terms of the form 
clientelism assumes. To illustrate, while vote buying prevails in Mexico, 
patronage and pork-barrel politics prevail in Japan. Third, the cases differ in terms 
of the type of relationship with the voters. For instance, while the voter–party 
linkage is broker-centered in Mexico, it is candidate-centered in Japan. 
Drawing on the secondary literature and DALP data (see Table 28), I argue 
that if the dominant party employs a vote-buying or pork-barrel strategy, then the 
partisan identification does not get stronger over time and ideological change (if 
imposed by the incumbent) remains weak. This is because these strategies are 
aimed at bringing short-term benefits rather at transforming society in the long 
run. My findings are summarized in Table 29.  
First, I shall underline the limits of this section. First, to my knowledge, 
apart from data from the Election Center of National Chengchi University for 
Taiwan, Mexican panel data, and data from the National Election Studies carried 
out by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in India, 
longitudinal data on changes in partisan identification and ideology are missing. 
Therefore, I could not obtain reliable data on the changing ideology of Indian 
                                               
122 Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007, p. 3) argue that there is not much comparative studies on 
clientelism because clientelism as a concept is rooted in anthropological and sociological 
studies that have taken it as a particular instance of social affiliation in traditional societies 
rather than as a pertinent feature of modern polities.  
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voters. Second, the existing data are not satisfactory in a number of respects. For 
instance, the Mexican panel study data do not account for the level of partisan 
identification before the 1990s or reveal the changing nature of voter ideology in 
Mexico. These drawbacks show that a more valid comparison can be made only 
when more data on relevant cases are collected through surveys and fieldwork.  
This chapter is organized as follows. For each case, I first discuss the 
elements that led to the emergence and maintenance of the predominant party 
system. Then, along with other factors, I discuss the role of clientelism in the 
reproduction of dominance. Lastly, I examine how clientelism impacts partisan 
identification and the ideology of clients.  
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Table 28: Clientelism in comparative perspective* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * Scores: 1 to 4 – 1= a negligible [clientelist] effort or none at all; 2= a minor effort; 3= a moderate effort; 4= a major effort. 
Source: DALP data. 
 
 
 
Country Party b1 (gift 
and 
payment) 
b2 
(social 
policy 
benefits) 
b3 
(patronage 
jobs) 
b4 
(procurement 
contracts) 
b5 
(regulatory 
favors) 
b11 
(effectiveness 
of clientelist 
targeting) 
Mexico Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) 
3.7 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.4 2.2 
Mexico National Action Party (PAN) 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.3 1.7 
Mexico Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.0 
Taiwan Kuomintang (KMT) 3.1 3.5 2.6 2.6 3.6 3.5 
Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 2.7 3.2 2.5 2.5 3.4 3.1 
India Indian National Congress (INC) 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 
India Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 
India Communist Party of India (CPI) 2.2 3.0 2.8 2.1 2.2 3.0 
Japan Liberal Democratic Party Japan (LDP) 2.3 3.3 2.4 3.5 3.1 3.2 
Japan Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.6 
Japan Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.2 2.5 
Japan Japanese Social Democratic Party (JSP) 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.2 2.1 
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Table 29: Features of clientelism in selected cases 
 
Case Type of relationship 
with voters 
Form of 
clientelism 
Exclusion Partisan 
identification 
Ideology 
change 
Mexico broker-centered vote-buying 
“pork” 
party-based moderate 
(sometimes 
hostile) 
decline of the clientelist machine led 
to ideological shift towards 
neoliberalism 
Taiwan both broker (local 
factional leaders) and 
candidate-centered 
(SNTV) 
patronage 
vote buying 
party-based 
and ethnic 
(Taiwanese) 
moderate weak 
proof: support for independence rose 
India broker-centered (i.e., 
upper castes and 
classes) 
vote buying 
“pork” 
party-based strong (non-
hostile) 
decline of the clientelist machine has 
popularized local ideologies as an 
alternative to Gandhism 
Japan candidate-centered 
(SNTV) 
patronage 
“pork” 
party-based weak weak 
competition of all against all 
makes ideology secondary in 
addressing voters 
Note: NA: not applicable. 
Source: Author’s elaboration and secondary sources. 
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7.1. Mexico 
The PRI123 is the longest-ruling dominant party in the world. It maintained its 
power from 1929 to 2000. Established as a cadre party to unite the victorious 
warlords following the Mexican civil war, the PRI rapidly transformed into a 
catch-all party by integrating peasants and workers into its “statist corporatism” 
(Magaloni, 2006, p. 4).  
For long decades under PRI rule, Mexico had a hegemonic party system. 
To illustrate this, between 1939 and 1977 the only opposition party that was 
permitted to exist was the National Action Party (PAN), which advocated the 
expansion of religious freedom and a market economy. For long decades, the PAN 
remained loyal to the PRI (Klesner, 2001, p. 25), fulfilling the role of “satellite party” 
in the hegemonic party system.  
During the 1970s, PRI rule was confronted with an economic crisis.124 In 
response, PRI leader Salinas implemented austerity measures, including the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, the reduction of foreign tariffs, a shift to 
an import-based strategy, and further integration with international capital through 
regional organizations such as NAFTA (Kaufman, 2005, p. 182; Dominguez & 
McCann, 1995, p. 36).  
This “party change” had a substantial impact on political competition. First, 
the neoliberal drift led to the eruption of intra-party contestation, which then led 
to the birth of the left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in 1977 
(Solinger, 2001, p. 37). The emergence of the new party undermined the 
                                               
123 Although the PRI lost the presidential election in 2000, it maintained its leading status in 
both the Senate and the House of Deputies until 2018. The 2018 elections witnessed the 
landslide victory of Lopez Obrador of the social democratic National Regeneration Movement 
party (MORENO). With its worst electoral result since its establishment, the PRI captured a 
mere 14 seats in the 128-seat Senate and 42 seats in the 500-seat Chamber of Congress.  
124 The economic problems were due to the increasing public debt and the growing balance 
of payments deficit (Kaufman, 2005, p. 181). To show the extent of the economic crisis, 
GDP per capita declined by 9 percent between 1981 and 1989 and consumer price inflation 
soared over 60 percent. Similarly, the minimum wage was cut by half from 1980 to 1988 
(Dominguez & McCann, 1995, p. 36).  
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legitimacy of the PRI as the sole voice of the peasants and the workers. Second, 
the privatization of state-owned enterprises within the framework of neoliberal 
transformation diminished the public resources that would otherwise have been 
used for clientelist exchange (Greene, 2007).  
When defections and the decline of the clientelist machine combined with 
the personal charisma of Vincente Fox, the PAN’s presidential candidate, the PRI 
was defeated in the 2000 presidential elections (Greene, 2007, pp. 300–301).  
 During its tenure, the PRI used a set of instruments to hold onto power. 
First, the PRI benefited from its historical legitimacy (Klesner, 2001). Second, it 
took advantage of its centrist political position, which typically led to a 
coordination failure among the opposition (Greene, 2007). Repression was a last 
resort and fraud was not rife as late as the 1980s. Besides that, charismatic 
leadership was not crucial because the political system was designed to hinder 
personal dictatorship (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007). Similarly, the contribution 
of the PRI’s economic performance to its dominance was limited (Magaloni, 
2006). 
In addition to the aforementioned elements, clientelism as a pertinent 
feature of Mexican politics (Eisenstadt, 2003, p. 29) fostered the PRI’s dominance. 
For instance, based on 2,400 interviews, the Mexico 2000 Panel Study found that the 
PRI was the most clientelist party in Mexico and its adherents were the biggest 
beneficiaries of clientelist inducements. In the same vein, according to DALP data (see 
Table 28), the PRI targeted voters intensively with gifts and payments, social benefits, 
patronage jobs, procurement contracts, and regulatory favors. To such an extent, in 
fact, that the PRI is probably the most clientelist party among the cases covered in this 
chapter.  
The PRI pivoted its clientelism on a corporatist structure, which enabled it 
to exert tight political control over peasants and workers (Klesner, 2001, p. 6; 
Kaufman, 2005, p. 178). However, this approach weakened when the middle class 
and the urban informal sector started to expand from the 1970s. The response of 
the PRI leadership to this challenge was “portfolio diversification of electoral 
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investments,” which entailed the re-transfer of public funds to less homogenous and 
more competitive districts (Magaloni & Cayeros, 2007, p. 202), as in the case of 
PRONASOL program.125 Ultimately, even the new social benefits offered to voters 
did not halt the demise of the PRI. 
How did clientelism affect partisan identification and voters’ ideology in 
Mexico? To start with the former, because the dominant form of clientelism was vote-
buying (see Table 28), it strengthened loyalty to brokers rather than to the party (Vidal, 
Ugues, Bowler & Hisket, 2010, pp. 79–80). Accordingly, once clientelist resources 
began to shrink during the 1990s, dealignment from the PRI proceeded rapidly. 
With regard to the latter, the fact that the effectiveness of the clientelist network 
began to decline from the 1970s led to an ideological shift – at least at the level of 
party cadres – to save the clientelist machine. As already noted, this manifested itself 
in the abandonment of statist corporatism and the embrace of neoliberal reforms. 
However, rather than halting its demise, this ideological transformation further eroded 
the PRI’s voter base.  
 
7.2. Taiwan 
Established on the Chinese mainland under the leadership of Chiang Kai-
shek, the KMT126 fled to Taiwan after it lost the civil war against the Maoists. The 
party then ruled Taiwan from 1949 to 2000, when the KMT’s presidential 
candidate was defeated by its former secretary, James Soong, who ran as an 
independent.  
In its early decades, the Taiwanese regime was authoritarian in character. 
This was mainly because of the minority rule by “waishengen” (Chinese 
                                               
125 The PRONASOL program was implemented to alleviate the negative effects of the 
neoliberal transformation and to improve national infrastructure. The program accounted for 
8 percent of social spending (Stokes et al., 2013, p. 145).  
126 The KMT has exhibited a cyclical electoral performance since its defeat in 2000. While it 
lost its majority in the 2001 and 2004 elections, it reclaimed the legislature and the presidency 
in 2008. In the 2016 elections, the KMT again lost its majority and the presidency.  
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immigrants), based on martial law. In this setting, only small, tractable parties and 
independents were allowed to run against the KMT (in local elections only) 
(Solinger, 2001, pp. 32–33). The lack of party competition – at least until the late 
1980s – puts Taiwan in the group of hegemonic party systems.  
The authoritarian character of the regime was toned down in parallel with 
the lifting of the state of emergency in 1987 and the ensuing political liberalization. 
In this context, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) appealed to voters with 
its anti-corruption stance.127 The acceleration of this trend led to the end of KMT 
rule in 2000.  
A number of elements fostered the KMT’s dominance. First, the social 
cleavage arising from relations with China must be emphasized (Templeman, 2012; 
Chu, 2005). Second, the KMT benefited from its remarkable economic 
performance, mixing tremendous economic growth – amounting to 9.75 per annum 
between 1961 and 1980 – with relatively low income inequality (Chu, 2005, p. 68). 
This trend also extended to the 1990s (Wang, 2012), illustrating the limits of 
performance legitimacy theory in explaining the KMT’s dominance. Third, the KMT 
took advantage of the SNTV electoral system that gave it a significant advantage 
in elections (c.f. Carey & Shugart, 1995; Cox, 1996; Hicken, 2007).  
Similarly, clientelism boosted the KMT’s electoral performance (Bosco, 1994; 
Fell, 2005; Wang & Kurzman, 2007). According to DALP data (see Table 28), the 
KMT was the most effective party as regards targeting voters through gifts and 
payments, social benefits, and regulatory favors.  
In building its clientelist empire, the KMT enjoyed substantial financial 
resources. In particular, it took advantage of money funneled from state-owned 
enterprises, (SoEs) as well as party-owned enterprises (PoEs) (Ho, Clarke, Chen & 
Weng, p. 164; Greene, 2007, p. 265; Matsumoto, 2002, p. 363). Party-owned 
                                               
127 For instance, one research study found that the proportion of respondents who labeled the 
KMT a “clean” party decreased from 37 percent to 25 percent between 1992 and 1996, while 
this assessment rose from 26 to 41 percent for the DPP (Fell, 2004).  
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enterprises are unique to Taiwan; in most other settings, political parties are not 
permitted to involved in business activities. Party-owned enterprises arguably made 
the KMT the richest party in the world (Matsumoto, 2002, p. 360).128  
Clientelism frequently takes the form of vote-buying in Taiwan (see Table 
28). For instance, one survey disclosed that the KMT bought as many as a quarter of 
the votes in the 1993 elections (Wang & Kurzman, 2007). Recall that vote-buying 
requires brokers who have daily contact with the voters. This role was performed by 
local leaders who had at their disposal experienced campaign managers, a 
significant budget, a network of trust, and judicial protection (Wang & Kurzman, 
2007, p. 61). These brokers were so significant that a decline in their ability to 
mobilize as a result of broad social transformation eventually brought down the 
KMT regime (Chu, 2005, pp. 65–70).  
 With regard to partisan identification, because vote-buying was prevalent and 
brokers were strong, partisan identity remained weak among KMT supporters, at least 
during the 1990s. For instance, a panel study conducted by the Election Study Center 
of National Chengchi University shows that (see Figure 3), for the period between 
1992 and 2000, the proportion of voters who identified with the KMT dropped sharply, 
from 34.4 percent to 21.1 percent, while the share of those identifying with the DPP 
jumped from 3.3 percent to 26 percent.  
 With regard to ideological change, the decline of the clientelist machine had a 
substantial impact on the ideological dimension of party competition in Taiwan, 
namely the question of Taiwanese/Chinese self-identification. For instance, the panel 
study of the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University again shows that 
(see Figure 4) the proportion of those who define themselves as “Chinese” fell sharply, 
from 25.5 percent in 1992 to 12.5 percent in 2000, while “Taiwanese” self-
identification jumped from 17.6 to 36.9 percent. This trend shows that, as anticipated, 
clientelism defined by vote-buying in Taiwan failed to transform clients’ ideology.  
                                               
128 The net assets of the KMT was estimated to be around 6.5 billion dollars which 
amounted to 2 percent of the GNP in 1998 (Matsumoto, 2002). 
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 Source: https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167 
Figure 3: Changes in the party identification of Taiwanese people as tracked in surveys 
conducted by the Election Center, NCCU (1992~2018.06) 
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Figure 4: Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese people as tracked in surveys by the Election Center, NCCU (1992~2018.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166
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7.3. India 
The predominant party system emerged under the rule of the Indian Congress 
Party129 (INC or Congress Party). Historically, the Congress Party transformed 
itself from an independence movement to a “party of consensus” (Kothari, 1964, 
p. 1163) that “cuts across major ethnic, regional and class barriers” (Chhibber & 
Petrocik, 1989, p. 194). This enabled the Congress Party to stay in power from 1947 
until its defeat by the BJP-led coalition in 1977.130 
 During its tenure in power, the Congress Party was confronted by a group of 
fragmented and weak opposition parties that were unable to extend their voter base 
beyond niche ethic, religious, or caste-based constituencies (Chhibber & Petrocik, 
1989, p. 207). This evidently restricted political competition at the national level. 
However, the Congress administration compensated for the lack of inter-party rivalry 
with intra-party pluralism, arising from the party’s catch-all character (Kothari, 1964, 
p. 1165).  
 Although the party itself was democratic,131 Congress Party rule sometimes 
showed authoritarian leanings. Most notably, a set of political and social problems 
during the 1970s132 led to the imposition of a state of emergency, which remained in 
force between 1975 and 1977 (Kochanek & Hardgrave, 2007, pp. 283–285). This laid 
the ground for the collapse of INC rule. 
                                               
129 After its defeat in 1977, the Congress Party returned to power in 1980. Since then, the INC 
has been fluctuating between government and opposition. The overall trend, however, 
suggests that the Congress Party is not as strong as in the past. Illustrating this, in the 2014 
elections, the Congress Party fell well behind the BJP for the first time since 1977 as a result 
of poor economic management and corruption.  
130 The BJP appealed to voters with its pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim rhetoric (Kitschelt, 2012, 
p. 108). 
131 Lijphart (1996), for instance, describes India as a “consociational democracy,” citing four 
reasons. First, India has an inclusive grand coalition. Second, the diverging groups enjoy 
cultural autonomy. Third, the principle of proportionality is taken into account in political 
representation and public appointments. Fourth, a minority veto is possible.  
132 The problems included the Bangladesh war and the ensuing refugee crises, drought, and 
food and energy crises. These led to widespread political unrest throughout the country. The 
state of emergency was declared when political turmoil was combined with a judicial attack 
on Indira Gandhi (Kochanek & Hardgrave, 2007, pp. 283–285). 
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 The Congress Party used a variety of instruments to maintain its power. First, 
the party’s historical legitimacy must be emphasized (Kitschelt, 2012, p. 107). Second, 
the Congress Party benefited from its “centrist” position, which typically led to 
coordination failure among the opposition (Riker, 1976). Third, the Congress Party 
benefited from the deep-rooted social cleavages along caste, religion, and ethnicity 
lines, which constrained the opposition parties to niche constituencies (Chhibber & 
Petrocik, 1989; Kitschelt, 2012). Fourth, the party benefited from the FPTP electoral 
system, which consistently favored it in elections (Kochanek & Hardgrave, 2007, pp. 
259–260). By contrast, the Congress Party’s economic performance had a limited role 
in explaining its dominance.133  
Along with these elements, clientelism played a major role in making the 
Congress Party dominant, to such an extent that Chandra (2004) calls India a 
“patronage democracy.” Clientelism has two main functions in India. First, it has 
an electoral purpose. In this regard, as DALP data (see Table 28) suggest, the 
Congress Party and its main rival, the BJP, target voters with clientelist 
inducements. Second, clientelism allows the political elites to naturalize, 
institutionalize, and deepen hierarchies that rest on religion, ethnicity, and caste 
(Wilkinson, 2004). 
As regards the impact of clientelism on partisan identification, India is a 
paradoxical case. Although the dominant form of clientelism in India is vote-buying134 
(Stokes et all., 2013, p. 51), this has not led to weak partisan identification. For 
instance, the 1967 post-election national survey conducted by Eldersveld (1970, 1973) 
found that 70 percent of voters in India had partisan identification and 51 percent had 
strong attachments.  
                                               
133 GDP growth in India was slightly above 1 percent from the 1950s to the 1970s (Kitschelt, 
2012, p. 133).  
134 Thanks to their social status and control over land, upper caste local intermediaries fulfilled 
this role (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 113; Krisna, 2007, p. 147), although their capability 
substantively declined with the Green revolution (Dasgupta, 2014).  
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With regard to the impact of clientelism on voters’ ideology, it is evident that 
the decline of the Congress Party’s clientelist machine in the wake of the Green 
revolution made Gandhism less popular among Indian voters. The recent rise of local 
ideologies (Rani, 2005) is another indication of this trend.  
 
7.4. Japan 
Japan can be described as a “democracy without competition” (Scheiner, 2006). 
Between 1955 and 2009, the LDP was so dominant that it was out of power for only 
10 months and 20 days.135 As Japanese politics turned into a “spectator democracy,” 
with low electoral turnout rates (Hrebenar & Itoh, 2015, p. 5; Hrebenar, 2000, p. 18), 
the LDP’s cycle of dominance became increasingly difficult to break by the 
opposition.  
Historically, the LDP’s support base includes peasants and small-business 
groups. The urban middle class is a relatively new addition to this list (Hrebenar, 2000, 
p. 25). By contrast, the opposition socialist and conservative parties have been 
constrained to narrow constituencies because they could not develop a reliable party 
program (Greene, 2007, pp. 279–280; Hrebenar & Itoh, 2015, pp. 10–11).136 The 
opposition was long unable to present a common front against the LDP, at least until 
the 1993 elections (Christensen, 2000). Similar to Turkey, the bilateral opposition 
prolonged single-party rule, until the LDP’s defeat by the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) in 2009. 
 LDP dominance hinges on a number of elements. At the top stands the SNTV 
electoral system that overrepresents big parties and underrepresents small ones (cf. 
Cox 1997; Scheiner 2007). This enabled the LDP to form a government alone, even 
though it had not received more than half of the votes since 1963. Accordingly, the 
priority of the opposition was to replace the SNTV system with a mixed electoral 
                                               
135 The LDP returned to power in 2012 and still forms the government. 
136 The opposition also suffered from weak local foundations, candidate difficulties, and poor 
party organization and coherence (Scheiner, 2006, pp. 18–19).  
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system, after the LDP lost its majority in 1993. Despite this development, the LDP re-
asserted its dominance in the next election, which clearly shows the limits of 
institutionalist theories in accounting for dominance. The LDP also owes much of its 
success to its amazing economic performance,137 that lasted from the 1950s through 
the 1970s (Scheiner, 2006, p. 52).  
 In the same vein, clientelism boosted the LDP’s electoral performance by 
weakening the opposition. DALP data (see Table 28) demonstrate that the LDP was 
much more clientelist than its rivals.  
 Clientelism is embedded in Japanese politics. It is, above all, rooted in intra-
party contestation. In this sense, the LDP typically has five to seven factions, each of 
which seeks to capture the party leadership and seek an advantage (Hrebenar & Itoh, 
2015, p. 11) by investing in fundraising organizations such as “Könkei”138 (Bettcher, 
2005, pp. 346–347). Similar to “koenkai” (local support groups), hereditary 
parliamentarism also illustrate the impact of clientelism in Japanese politics (Hrebenar 
& Itoh, 2015, p. 16).  
Unlike the cases of Mexico, Taiwan, and India, where vote-buying prevails, 
the “pork-barrel” approach139 is a dominant form of clientelism in Japan (McCubbins 
& Rosenbluth, 1995; Also see Table 28). The distribution of “pork” involves 
exchanging kickbacks with loyal businessmen through procurement contracts 
(Scheiner, 2006, p. 72; Greene, 2007, p. 282; Woodall, 1996), which frequently leads 
to large-scale political scandals. For instance, due to the Recruit scandal, the Takeshita 
government collapsed in 1989 (Scheiner, 2006, p. 33).  
                                               
137 Illustrating this, for instance, taking GNP base period (100) to be 1951–1953, it rose to 248 
for 1961–1963 and 664 for 1971–1973 (Johnson, 1982, p. 6).  
138 “Koenkei” are candidates’ organizations for raising funding for election campaigns. The 
annual expenditure of koenkai may exceed 1 million dollars (Christensen, 2010, p. 10). 
According to Er (1994), the persistence of koenkai in Japanese politics can be explained by 
three things: the absence of strong party organization; the traditional values of Japanese 
society; and small group loyalty as the basis of Japanese social interaction.  
139 Pork-barrel politics came to the forefront in the context of renewing national infrastructure 
devastated during World War 2 (Pempel, 2010). 
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 Pork-barrel politics did not lead to strong partisan identification because it is 
not embedded in daily life. Accordingly, partisan identification in Japan remains 
among the weakest in the industrialized world (Scheiner, 2006, p. 68), as also indicated 
by the low turnout levels.  
 In Japanese politics, ideological debate is subsumed by clientelism (Scheiner, 
2006, p. 66), although the impact of former on the latter is not easy to predict. This is 
because of the all-against-all competition in elections, which makes it inefficient for 
same-party candidates to use ideology to target and mobilize voters (Bettcher, 2005, 
p. 347). Therefore, candidates rely mainly on clientelist measures to appeal to voters 
(Cox & Thies, 1998, p. 269). However, as clientelist resources have fallen due to the 
country’s economic stagnation since the 1990s (Park, 2008), ideology may be more 
important in targeting voters in upcoming elections.  
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8. CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I explore the role of clientelism in the emergence of the 
predominant party system in Turkey. First, I adopted a threefold strategy to tackle the 
conceptual confusion that has plagued the widely discussed, but weakly 
operationalized concept of the predominant party system. Drawing on Sartori’s (2005) 
framework, I contend that a predominant party system emerges when a party wins at 
least three consecutive elections in a competitive political environment and is able to 
form a government alone.  
Following that, I discussed relevant theories that may account for the 
emergence of the predominant party system in Turkey. I argue that resource theory – 
which posits that a predominant party system emerges if a party commands public 
resources and subordinates the public bureaucracy – is more relevant in explaining the 
AKP’s dominance.  
The central concept in resource theory is clientelism, which is an understudied 
phenomenon in the context of Turkey. Therefore, drawing on fieldwork in one of 
Istanbul’s poorest and most densely populated districts, Bağcılar, I highlighted various 
features of the AKP’s clientelism. First, clientelism primarily addresses the poor and 
the devout bourgeoisie. Second, there is a division of labor among patrons in clientelist 
exchange. Third, clientelism is leader-mediated, implying that brokers are weaker than 
in other settings (for example, Latin America). Fourth, clientelism works as a problem-
solving strategy for diverse social groups, especially for the poor. Fifth, clientelism is 
shaped by neoliberalism. Sixth, clientelism draws on sectarian rather than ethnic 
exclusion. Seventh, Islam constitutes a non-material aspect of clientelism.  
 After that I highlighted the actors, the structure, and the operation of clientelism 
in the context of Bağcılar. Then, I revealed the causal mechanism that connects 
clientelism to voting. I contend that the causal link between clientelism and dominance 
is, in fact, far from being automatic. If it was, then the predominant party system would 
have emerged long before 2002 because clientelism is a pervasive feature of Turkish 
politics.  
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 I argue that the AKP’s use of clientelism has two ramifications, which in turn 
reproduce the cycle of dominance. To start with, clientelism leads to strong partisan 
identification. This contrasts with the traditionally weak partisan identification in 
Turkey. Strong partisan identification has three dimensions in the Turkish context: (i) 
it entails reading political developments through the eyes of the party or rather the 
party leader; (ii) it corresponds to hostile partisanship; and (iii) it marks a change in 
the pyramidal structure of competing identities, in which partisan identification rises 
to the top.  
 Second, clientelism has prompted ideological change, namely neoliberalization 
in an Islamic setting. This accounts for three developments: (i) it explains how Islam 
and neoliberalism have become intertwined; (ii) it expresses the support of the poor 
for neoliberal policies, although they undermine their well-being; and (iii)  it shines a 
light on the realignment of radical Islamists and center-right voters with the AKP.  
 Finally, I sought to extend my arguments to the similar cases of Mexico, 
Taiwan, India, and Japan. Based on the available data and the secondary literature, I 
posit that if vote-buying and/or pork-barrel politics prevail as a dominant form of 
clientelism, partisan identification will not be stronger over time and ideological 
change, if imposed by the incumbent, is less likely to occur. This is because, first, vote-
buying secures loyalty to brokers rather than to the party. Second, because pork-barrel 
politics is not reproduced in everyday life, it does little to transform clients into 
committed party members.  
 Based on the narrative presented above, this study opens up two areas of 
research for further investigation. The first is the gathering of data, be it quantitative 
or qualitative, on the impact of clientelism on partisan identification and ideological 
change in relevant cases. The second is ethnographic research on rural clientelism. 
This is essential if we are to understand transitivity between rural and urban spaces.  
In light of this paper, it is possible to make some inferences regarding the future 
of AKP rule. It is better to start with what has not happened so far and what is less 
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likely to happen in the near future: defections and factionalism.140 Thus far, defections 
have not posed a serious challenge to the AKP leadership as intra-party opposition has 
not been transformed into outside party opposition (with the exception of Abdüllatif 
Şener, former vice chairman in the AKP and current CHP deputy). This is because of 
organized attacks by both the government-controlled judiciary and the pro-AKP 
media. I think that even if a party is established by defectors in the near future, it will 
not rapidly turn into a credible alternative unless Erdoğan’s charisma substantively 
erodes in the eyes of the electorate. Factionalism, on the other hand, has been contained 
by Erdoğan’s tight control over the party.  
By contrast, two issues have the potential to accelerate dealignment as they 
tend to trigger reactions from the party base. 141 The first is crony capitalism and 
corruption; the second is the status of Syrian refugees. The fact that hundreds of 
thousands of Syrians have joined the workforce adversely affects the AKP because 
unemployment has soared and wages are falling, especially in poor districts.  
Dealignment may manifest itself at the next local elections in the form of a fall 
in turnout. If this occurs, it may even cost the AKP the local elections in big cities 
where its lead is narrow. To retard this trend, it is likely that the AKP’s or rather 
Erdoğan’s authoritarian policies will be more evident on the eve of the elections.  
In any case, it would be misleading to expect that dealignment will rapidly turn 
into realignment. This may happen only if the opposition parties, particularly the 
AKP’s right-wing competitors, develop a strategy to attract dealigned voters. 
Otherwise, because the vote share of the right-wing block (around 60 percent) is 
                                               
140 The role of defections in dominant party politics has been well emphasized by Duverger. 
According to him (1954, p. 312), “the dominant party wears itself out in office, it loses its 
vigor, its arteries harden. It would thus be possible to show ... that every domination bears 
within itself the seeds of its own destruction.” 
141 Such a reaction from the party base illustrates the notion of the “hidden transcript” (Scott, 
1990), which can be taken as a form of resistance to patrons. This is ironic if it is recalled that 
the AKP came to a power by promising to end widespread corruption during the 1990s and 
deliberately used “AK” (clean) in its official name to distinguish itself from the mainstream 
parties.  
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typically double that of the left (around 30 percent) and transitivity is weak between 
these blocks, the Social Democrat alternative does not have much chance of ending 
AKP rule.  
As a rule of thumb, when authoritarianism is combined with high levels of 
social and political polarization, destructive consequences are likely. The trajectories 
of the Turkish party system provide abundant examples that hint at what might occur 
in the near future.  
One thing already attempted but without success was a military coup. The still 
inchoate institutional structure after the transition to the presidential system, the 
elimination of parliament’s auditing powers and judicial independence, and, most 
notably, the severe ethnic, sectarian, and political polarization, which might potentially 
evolve into violent conflict, may again drive the army to take the initiative. Second, 
the curtailment of legislative power may strengthen extra-parliamentary opposition. 
This may increase the potential for a civil war–like situation, as in the 1970s.  
 Finally, the impact of the ongoing economic crises on the future of AKP rule 
needs to be discussed. As shown, the AKP’s economic performance is strongly 
correlated with its electoral record. This means that, under deteriorating economic 
conditions, the local elections in March 2019 will witness a tight race between the 
AKP and the opposition parties. The dramatic decline in the vote shares of the 
“People’s Alliance”142 may potentially lead to snap elections, which may change the 
balance of power between the incumbent and the opposition.  
 The economic crisis, if it deepens, may have severe repercussions on the future 
of the clientelist machine as well. First, it would weaken the ties between private 
business and the party leadership, who is politically responsible. This development 
would reduce clientelist resources obtained in the form of bribes and tax. Second, as 
the problem-solving capacity of the social state diminishes due to shrinking public 
                                               
142 With the change in law before the June 2018 legislative elections, the parties are permitted 
to form an alliance in elections. This led to the formation of the “People’s Alliance,” which 
includes the AKP and the MHP, and the “Nation’s Alliance,” which includes the CHP, the İyi 
Party, and the Felicity Party.  
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resources, clientelism will be more vital in fulfilling this role. Third, neoliberalism will 
continue to shape clientelism if the government intensifies its neoliberal policies to try 
to overcome the crisis. Fourth, as public and private resources become more scarce, 
clientelism will reach fewer people and thus become more exclusive. In this case, the 
first group to be sacrificed will be the swing voters, who have a decisive influence in 
local elections, especially in metropolitan areas. Finally, as material resources shrink, 
the non-material component of clientelism, Islamic ideology, will slowly turn into a 
substitute for material benefits rather being complementary to it. Increasing 
investment in Imam Hatip schools and Quran courses is the clearest indication of this 
trend.
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APPENDIX I: Interview guide 
Introduction § How long have you been living in Bağcılar? 
 
AKP 
 
§ How many times have you voted for the AKP? 
§ Have you ever voted for another party? 
§ Which party and why? 
 
Form of 
integration in 
clientelistic 
networks 
§ Are you aware of the material benefits distributed by the 
government and the pro-AKP actors? 
§ Have you received any benefits so far? 
§ If yes, what, when and how much? 
§ Is there any mediator that secures your access to goods? 
§ When deciding on which party to vote for, how important 
is the distribution of material benefits for you? 
 
 
 
 
Partisan 
Identification 
 
§ What is your type of relationship to the AKP? (voter, 
member or partisan) 
§ How has it changed in recent years? 
§ How regularly do you take part in party activities? 
§ How close do you feel to the AKP? (weak, moderate, 
strong) 
§ Are you a sympathizer/member of any other religious or 
social group? 
§ If the AKP’s interest clashes with that of your mentioned 
group (religious group, regional-communal organization 
or civil society groups) which side would you take? 
§ Why? 
 
 
Ideology 
 
 
§ How do you define yourself politically? (e.g., left, right, 
conservative, nationalist) 
§ Have you observed any change in your political position 
during the AKP period? 
§ If yes, on which issues? 
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APPENDIX II: The list of interviews 
Number Gender Date Age Homeland Neighborhood Islamic 
tradition? 
Core or 
Swing? 
Voters 
1 M 17.11.2017 24 Erzurum Evren Y C 
2 M 19.11.2017 62 Adıyaman Evren Y C 
3 M 21.11.2017 46 Hatay Güneşli N C 
4 M 23.11.2017 44 Gümüşhane Evren Y C 
5 F 28.11.2017 40 Kazakhistan Bağlar N S 
6 F 28.11.2017 23 Malatya Hürriyet N S 
7 F 1.12.2017 55 Siirt Merkez Y C 
8 F 1.12.2017 34 Kars Hürriyet N S 
9 F 5.12.2017 32 Bosna Hürriyet Y C 
10 F 5.12.2017 33 Ordu Hürriyet Y C 
11 M 9.12.2017 60 Trabzon Merkez N C 
12 M 9.12.2017 66 Adana Merkez Y S 
13 M 9.12.2017 42 Hatay Fevzi Çakmak Y S 
14 M 14.12.2017 20 Adıyaman Evren N C 
15 M 14.12.2017 24 Artvin Bağcılar Y C 
16 F 19.12.2017 37 Konya Bağcılar Y C 
17 F 19.12.2017 30 Ordu Bağcılar Y S 
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18 F 19.12.2017 41 Ordu Bağcılar Y C 
19 M 3.01.2018 48 Diyarbakır Demirkapı Y S 
20 M 3.01.2018 53 Diyarbakır Demirkapı Y C 
21 M 3.01.2018 39 Siirt Demirkapı N S 
22 M 9.01.2018 32 Erzurum Mahmutbey Y S 
23 M 9.01.2018 26 Kastamonu Mahmutbey N C 
24 M 11.01.2018 59 İstanbul Bağcılar N S 
25 M 11.01.2018 70 İstanbul Bağcılar Y C 
26 M 11.01.2018 66 Samsun Bağcılar Y C 
27 M 16.01.2018 41 Ordu Evren N C 
28 F 16.01.2018 33 Çanakkale Hürriyet N S 
29 F 20.01.2018 39 Adıyaman Evren Y C 
30 F 20.01.2018 48 Diyarbakır Güneşli Y S 
31 F 20.01.2018 57 Sivas Evren Y C 
32 M 24.01.2018 33 İstanbul Güneşli N S 
33 M 24.01.2018 28 Tokat Güneşli N S 
34 M 27.01.2018 60 Ordu Göztepe Y C 
35 M 27.01.2018 65 Rize Göztepe Y C 
36 F 14.03.2018 38 Bingöl Fevzi Çakmak Y S 
37 F 14.03.2018 27 Bitlis Fevzi Çakmak Y S 
38 F 14.03.2018 38 Adıyaman Göztepe Y C 
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39 M 20.03.2018 31 Adıyaman Güneşli Y C 
40 F 20.03.2018 22 İstanbul Evren N S 
41 F 20.03.2018 25 İstanbul Evren N C 
42 F 20.03.2018 34 Hatay Evren N C 
43 M 3.04.2018 52 Hatay Mahmutbey N S 
44 M 3.04.2018 32 Ordu Mahmutbey N S 
45 M 3.04.2018 34 Ordu Mahmutbey Y C 
Municipality  
46 F 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
47 F 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
48 M 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
49 M 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
50 M 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
51 M 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
52 M 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
53 M 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
54 M 17.11.2017 - - - - - 
Party  
55 M 6.03.2018 - - - - - 
56 M 6.03.2018 - - - - - 
57 M 10.03.2018 - - - - - 
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58 M 10.03.2018 - - - - - 
59 M 10.03.2018 - - - - - 
Mukhtar 
 
 
60 M 20.11.2017[ - - - - - 
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